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UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON 
ABSTRACT 
Winchester School of Art 
Fine Art 
Doctor of Philosophy 
‘The Anadyomene Movement’: Metamorphics of Figure-Ground 
by Simon Patrick Morley 
 
‘Figure-ground’ is about the production of meaning based on the perception of contrasts or binary 
oppositions and segregations. Viewers of my paintings, and of the kind of paintings that interest me, 
have the impression that the ‘figure’ subsides or slips or fades into ‘ground’, or that the ‘ground’ is 
more powerful or dominant than the‘figure’, or that the ‘figure’ is insecurely attached,  suggesting it is 
incapable, unwilling, too acquiescent or complicit to fully differentiate itself from the ‘ground’.  I 
address flux, mutation, indistinctness and complementarity within the visual field of painting.  I develop 
and extend the heuristic context for the interpretation of my studio practice and for work of a similar 
kind, and then feedback this new context into my practice in order to generate new works, also in the 
process shedding a new light on my interpretative models. Beyond this, I also make a more general 
argument for the re-alignment of the relationship between art theory and practice - one that can better 
incorporate a sense of in-between-ness, indistinctness or liminality. My approach is comparative: I look 
at East Asian art and ideas and, in particular, deploy the writings of the French Sinologist and 
philosopher François Jullien, in whose work there is the attempt to expand Western epistemology, 
ontology, semantics and aesthetics via a discussion of Chinese thought and aesthetics. Jullien proposes a 
paradigm that draws the ‘in-out’ respiratory rhythm or pulse within the perceptual field towards the 
centre of a theory of representation, a theory that seeks to account for consciousness from the ‘inside’ 
rather than the ‘outside’. The consequence of this relocation of agency is an interpretative framework 
that is firmly grounded in a nondualistic and holistic approach, foregrounding affect and empathetic 
relationships between artist and work, viewer and work, and self and the world. Traditional East Asian 
thought begins with similar premises to poststructuralism in the West: the ‘self’ is an illusion and the 
possibility of knowledge of reality independent of thought is dismissed as untenable because there is no 
objective reality accessible to us. Everything depends on the bias of the mind, rather than on anything 
we can identify as an innate attribute of reality itself, thus there is no escape from our lived experience, 
and we are profoundly limited by the interpretive knowledge of our mind; we are trapped within the 
‘prison house of language’. But within the different recursive orientations that characterize  ‘East’ and 
‘West’ the interpretation and consequences of these insights are understood in quite different ways.  I 
explore why this should be the case and what some of the consequences are, both theoretically through 
the written text and performatively through my studio work.  
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CHAPTER I: 
Introduction 
 
 
 
Nothing keeps its original shape, and nature, ever renewing the world, creates new forms from old ones endlessly.  
Ovid, The Metamorphosis, 2001, Book XV, p. 258  
 
Art visibly performs the brain’s coincidentia oppositorum, the constant transformational activity of the thinking self 
fleetingly becoming its opposite in the effort to achieve a synthetic unity of consciousness.  
Barbara Maria Stafford, 2011, p.27 
 
There is a work of the negative in the image, a ‘dark’ efficacy that, so to speak, eats away at the visible (the order of 
represented appearances) and murders the legible (the order of signifying configurations).  From a certain point of 
view, moreover, this work of constraint can be envisaged as a regression, since it brings us, with ever-startling 
force, toward a this-side-of, toward something that the symbolic elaboration of artworks has covered over or 
remodeled. There is here a kind of anadyomene movement, a movement whereby something that has plunged into 
the water momentarily re-emerges, is born before quickly plunging in again. It is the materia informis when it 
shows through form, it is the presentation when it shows through representation, it is opacity when it shows through 
transparency, it is the visual when it shows through the visible.   
Georges Didi-Huberman, 2005, p.142-3 
 
 
 
I have borrowed my title, the ‘anadyomene movement’, from Georges Didi-Huberman’s description of 
what he calls the “work of the negative in the image” – that is, how art always seems to escape the 
regime of the “the legible”. In Greek, anadyomene means ‘she that emerges’ or ‘rises up’, and 
historically the word was often employed in relation to the myth of the birth of Aphrodite [FIG. 1], who 
is described as being born from the sea-foam (Shipley, 1984, p.264). As this symbolism suggests, in 
choosing my title I want to signal that what concerns me is an invisible force, seemingly rising and 
 
 
FIG. 1: Titian, Venus Anadyomene, c.1520, oil on canvas, National Gallery of Scotland, Edinburgh 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:TITIAN_-
_Venus_Anadyomene_(National_Galleries_of_Scotland,_c._1520._Oil_on_canvas,_75.8_x_57.6_cm).jpg  
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subsiding,  and pressing in upon us from inside and out. Furthermore, if we credit the connection with 
the Goddess of Love, then my research is also in some way concerned with the energies released by a 
kind of amorous attraction. I will be thinking about the lure and allure of vision. 
 
Big subjects. So, in order to give my project a more tangible focus, I will approach it via a consideration 
of ‘figure’ and ‘ground’, as it can be discerned (at least, initially) within the framed format of (my) 
painting. In particular, I will be addressing figure-ground’s relationship to non-differentiation and 
impermanence, seeking to map an interstitial space, an evanescent and mutable motility, through an 
exploration of an unfamiliar cultural paradigm. I will be thinking above all in terms of a movement 
between flux, mutation and complementarity, on one hand, and structure, stasis and differentiation, on 
the other - “the metamorphosis of seeing and seen”, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1993, p.30) puts it - a 
dynamic process that, according to him, “defines both our flesh and the painter’s vocation.” My goals 
are: firstly, to develop and extend the heuristic context for the interpretation of my studio practice, and  
then to feed this new context back into my practice in order to generate new works, in the process also 
shedding a new light on artworks that share similar traits; secondly, by doing this, I want to make a 
more general argument for the re-alignment of the relationship between art theory and practice - one 
that can better incorporate a sense of in-between-ness, indistinctness, or liminality.  
 
* 
 
In the painting of the last sixty years (to give some varied examples spanning abstract and figurative 
idioms) Francis Bacon, Willem de Kooning, Mark Rothko [FIG.2], Barnett Newman, Ad Reinhardt, Cy 
Twombly [FIG.3]
1, Agnes Martin [FIG.8], Brice Marden, Robert Irwin, Yves Klein, Antoni Tàpies, 
Bridget Riley, Roman Opalka, and more recently, Ross Bleckner [FIG. 4], Gerhard Richter, Jack 
Goldstein [FIG.5], Sherizeh Houshiary [Fig.6] and Lee Ufan [FIG.7], have created works in which 
something undefined, ambiguous, faint, dim, hazy or vague pulses within the visual field.
 We feel we 
are on a liminal borderline between form and formlessness, the bounded and unbounded.
 The affects 
and effects these artists explore also remain a significant aspect of the work of younger contemporary 
practitioners; for example, in the paintings of Callum Innes, Rudolf Stingel and R.H. Quaytman, 
[FIG.8]
2, or the almost imperceptible figurative works of the Dutch painter Maaike Schoorel [FIG.9].
3 
Viewers of such paintings have the impression at different moments that surfaces or grounds are 
ontologically dominant, then, that they are subsidiary to the surrounding or setting for the delineated 
figure or form, and then again, that they are equal to and co-dependent with the form. The ‘figure’ 
subsides or slips or fades into ‘ground’. This is a figure-ground relationship that is in process rather than 
static. Metaphorically – and suggesting psychological implications - one can say that in such works it is 
as if the ‘ground’ is more powerful or dominant than the ‘figure’, or that the ‘figure’ is insecurely 
attached to the ‘ground’, or that the ‘figure’ is incapable, unwilling, too acquiescent, or too complicit to 
fully differentiate itself from ‘ground’.	 ﾠ4	 ﾠ  
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FIG. 2. Mark Rothko, No. 10,1950. Oil on canvas, 229.2 x 146.4 cm. The Museum of Modern Art, New York, Gift 
of Philip Johnson, 1952. 
http://www.nga.gov/feature/rothko/classic2.shtm 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 3.  Cy Twombly, Untitled III, 2005-2007,  acrylic on wood panel, 43.8 x365.8cm,  Gagosian Gallery. 
http://theredlist.fr/wiki-2-351-382-1160-1122-view-usa-profile-twombly-cy-1.html 
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FIG. 4. Agnes Martin, Falling Blue, 1963, oil and pencil on canvas, 182.9 x 182.9 cm, San Francisco Museum of 
Art. 
http://pinterest.com/pacegallery/agnes-martin/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG.5.  Ross Bleckner, Birdland, 2000, oil on linen, 244x244cm.  
http://www.lehmannmaupin.com/artists/ross-bleckner 
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FIG. 6. Jack Goldstein, Untitled, 1988 , Acrylic on Canvas , 213,4 x 243,8 x 16,5 cm. 
http://x-traonline.org/issues/volume-15/number-3/jack-goldstein-operational-pictures/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 7. Shirazeh Houshiary, "Fine Frenzy," 2003, black and white Aquacryl, white pencil and ink on canvas. 
Private Collection. 
http://www.moma.org/explore/multimedia/audios/27/651 
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FIG. 8. R.H.Quaytman, Chapter 12: iamb (Fresnell lens), 2008; diamond dust, silkscreen, and gesso on wood, 82 x 
133cm. Miguel Abreu Gallery, New York.  
http://www.artpractical.com/profile/r_h_quaytman/ 
 
 
 
 
       
 
 
FIG. 9. Maaike Schoorel, The Visit, 2005, oil on canvas, 164 x 244.5 cm, Saatchi Gallery. 
http://www.saatchigallery.com/artists/artpages/maaike_schoorel_visit.htm 
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FIG. 10. Lee Ufan, Dialogue, 2010, oil and mineral pigment  on canvas, 194 x 162 cm. Hyundai Gallery, Seoul. 
http://www.pacegallery.com/artists/257/lee-ufan  
 
I am going to look at how the perceptual groupings and correlations involved in retrieving meaning 
from paintings are problematized and partially undermined. I explore effects that can be described as 
out-of-focus, murky, milky, misty, hazy, smoky or veiled, and that are juxtaposed with effects that are 
more focused, clear and distinct. These are analogies drawn from nature, to be sure, and to some extent 
what I discuss can be described as a kind of ‘atmosphere’ or ‘ambiance’. But it would certainly be 
wrong to infer that I am merely discussing an attenuated species of landscape painting, although the 
genre is certainly central to the emergence of the effects and affects I discuss.  
 
Where once we would have expected clear contrasts, a more subjective kind of vision substitutes a 
sense of complementariness, liquidity and permeability, thereby seemingly undermining a fundamental 
prerequisite for the comprehension of painting as a system.
 Thus the paradox that interests me is how an 
indistinct and confused visual perception can supply a context within which percepts are organized into 
patterns but according to criteria different to those that normally prevail. I address moments of change 
or action - the creation of analogies for more mobile and spontaneous negotiations of space and time. 
These works explore the “evanescent, diffuse and elliptical margin” (Readings, 1991, p.26), addressing 
a transitory state suspended between two poles: between the tangibility of the ‘figure’ and the 
evanescence of the ‘ground’. They foreground the indeterminate nature of being, which is otherwise 
obscured in the empirical space of realized forms (Bersani and Dutoit, p.121). I am interested in 
theorizing this event in relation to models that propose visual perception to be neither totally relative 
nor predominantly understood via analytic cognition, and I try to reinstate the salience of the moment at 
which a viewer negotiates a passage between perception and cognition – from the in-between, or in   22 
medias res - and who, as a consequence, can become involved in a more subjective, imaginative or 
‘eccentric’ kind of seeing.  
 
Painting, which is hand-made  (usually, anyway), and so in an indexical relationship with the body, is 
centrally involved with somatic sensations and affects - the active capacities of a body to act, and the 
passive capacities of a body to be acted upon.
5  My aim will be to investigate the fact that a viewer of 
the kind of painting that interests me are presented with contradictory visual sensations, and enter 
spaces in which to negotiate the transition between showing and signifying. The particular cluster of 
affects that my work - and work like it - allude to suggests a situation that dilutes the distinction 
between presence and absence, bringing to light an undifferentiated foundation but not succumbing to 
it.
 6   
 
Addressing the metamorphics of figure-ground, or the phenomenon of figure-ground-together, brings to 
awareness the dynamics of knowing and not-knowing (epistemological indeterminacy), being and not-
being (ontological indeterminacy), meaning and not-meaning (semantic indeterminacy), the visual and 
the non-visual (aesthetic indeterminacy). My theme involves undecidability that effects and also infects 
what is seen - works whose meanings or referents cannot be fixed.  The space I explore marks the 
threshold of the visible - makes room for the occluded, the invisible, the unknown and unknowable - 
pointing towards a less structured domain where indeterminacy takes centre stage.  This means thinking 
about  a kind of painting that evokes a consciousness involved in mediating, as Barbara Maria Stafford 
(Stafford, 1999, p.106) puts it, “the absolute opposition between two incongruous orders – whether they 
be phenomena or noumena – body and soul, body and bodies – rendering their irreconcilability 
approximate, their resemblance verisimilar.”  
 
I will thus be looking for pictorial analogies for a certain kind of experience - for the temporary 
enlarging of the “tight little cell of ego” (Hillman, 1989, p.100) under pressure from some force coming 
from both outside and inside. This implies a concept of the subject understood as involved in dynamic 
transformations and posited as fundamentally mutable. It assumes a nontranscendental, embodied, 
externalized, divided and decentred model of subjecthood - what Julia Kristeva (1984) terms the 
“subject-in-process” or “on-trial”. The limits of the analytic and rational method, and of the idea of the 
centred and self-contained subject it fosters are exposed, restoring consciousness back into the “flesh” 
of the world, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962; 1968; 1993) calls it.  My focus is on what Leo Bersani 
(Dean, et. al. 1997, p.3) describes as  “the idea of self-shattering” - the pitting of the “fixed anchoring of 
the self” against the contrary awareness of the “circumferential expansion of the self”. For the ego is 
only “a structured fantasy of consciousness or a kind of primal fantasy of being as structured” (Bersani 
and Dutoit, 1993, p.138). In such an expanded ontology, so Barbara Maria Stafford (2011, p.46) writes, 
“[t]his thing we call ‘self’ possesses a distributed inlay, matrix, or lattice structure shot through with 
pores. 
 
 My focus is on contemporary discourses and artworks that explore this boundary or  ‘horizon’.  I   23 
address what McLuhan (McLuhan and Zingone, 1995, p.357) calls the interstitial space of the “the 
resonant interval”. Entering such an ambiguous zone of perception means positing theoretical models of 
intersubjectivity characterised not so much by static configurations as by evanescent and volatile bonds 
that circulate or agitate between poles. Perception is recognised as being suffused with the liquidity and 
permeability of peripheral vision, rather than the centre.  I characterize this in terms of analogy or 
complementarity – of suspension between signifying and ceasing to be a sign, wherein an artwork finds 
itself sited on “the ambiguous borderline between unconscious images and necessary critical lucidity” 
(Didi-Huberman, 1996, p.53). Loss of contour and of clear figure-ground segregation make present 
what Bersani and Dutoit  (1993, p.100) describe as “the always tense relation between the distinctness 
of forms and the indeterminacy of their boundaries”. In engaging specifically with the metamorphic 
potential of figure-ground in art we are confronted by “conditions of uncertain readability that makes 
problematic the tracing of boundaries in the space outside art” (Bersani and Dutoit, 1993, p.108). This 
is, as Bersani and Dutoit suggest, a situation in which maker and viewer can momentarily become 
cognitive of consciousness of the world as non-oppositional. 
 
However, at the same time as I draw attention to “blur, vagueness, ambiguity, equivocality, and 
uncertainty”, I will be seeking not so much to jettison the idea of the self as something ‘fixed’ and 
‘anchored’ as to place awareness of the “subject-in-process” within an expanded ontology that can also 
accommodate its contrary – awareness of separation. I will be looking for a ‘middle way’, one that 
addresses the cognitive as well as the non-cognitive, possession as well as dispossession, self as well as 
non-self.  
 
It is for this reason that my analysis will be limited to paintings – or at least, to framed-formats. I cannot 
claim, indeed consciously do not wish to claim, the kind of benefits offered by the expansive ‘open’ and 
‘relational’ art work (Bourriaud, 2002), which is now a staple of contemporary practice. Instead, and 
importantly, I explore boundary-dissolving affects “within the framework of what is, apparently, a 
securely marked-off and privileged aesthetic space” (Bersani and Dutoit, 1993, p.100). A boundary 
separates one area from another, and yet at the same time belongs to both.  
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Figure-Ground 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.11: Figure-Ground. Above: High contrast. Below: Low contrast 
 
Fig.11 illustrates how figure-ground segregation works.  At first, we see just a random jumble of 
splotches and the number of potential groupings is infinite. But once the dog has been identified as a 
‘figure’ through the ability of our visual system to link only a subset of splotches together,  “the target 
emerges from its camouflage in the background” (Stafford, 2007, p.168-169).  Indeed, it will prove 
impossible not to ‘hold on’ to this grouping.  Henceforth, we will always see a dog.  
 
In his pioneering work, psychologist Edgar Rubin noted that some general rules apply to this figure-
ground segregation: the figure will seem more present than the ground; the figure will seem to be in 
front of the background; the background will appear to be unformed; the boundary between figure and 
ground will always belong to the figure.  Furthermore, Rubin added, visual characteristics that can aid 
assignment of figure status are meaningfulness, symmetry, a tendency towards a convex edge, 
coherence of smaller areas, plausible illumination, possession of complementary colour components, 
and vertical or horizontal orientation (Rubin, 1958).  Gestalt psychology built on Rubin’s work, and has   25 
done most to shed light on figure-ground segregation’s role in constructing consciousness. It proposes 
that the operational practice of the brain is fundamentally holistic and cannot be determined or 
explained by its component parts alone.
7 A ‘Gestalt’ – or ‘shape’ - refers to the form-forming capability 
of our senses, particularly in relation to the visual recognition of figures and whole forms rather than 
just collections of simple lines and curves. Gestalt psychology made two major claims that have had 
lasting impact on the study of figure-ground. Firstly, it argued that instead of perceiving in terms of 
clusters of atomized sensations, which memory and past experience only subsequently organize (the 
dominant view before Gestalt, and still a persistent illusion), we in fact perceive meaningful and 
organised wholes - of which the most basic is that of a figure against a ground - and that these 
configural cues do not depend on past experience but rather are hard-wired components of human 
perception and thought of a pre-linguistic nature. Secondly, it claimed that when confronted by a 
perceptual field the brain will seek equilibrium; one aspect of the field rather than another will become 
the locus of our attention. 
 
In order to defend ourselves against the perpetual onslaught of countless percepts we habitually 
experience our entire visual and mental environments in terms of a continual series of visual 
segregations. Seeing is always an issue of countless and competing sensory stimulations and momentary 
foci of interest or attention that must be organized into patterns, and so figure-ground is not necessarily 
a property of the stimulus object but rather of the psychological field. As a result, the perceptual process 
will conceal at the same time as reveal.  Thus when we perceive a text or image we also consign a 
background to imperception; in order to see something as ‘figure’ it is necessary to abandon the 
‘ground’, which slips into vagueness. As Rudolph Arnheim (1954, p. 229) notes, “all shapes belonging 
to the ground plane tend to be seen as parts of a continuous backdrop” and, “[s]ince the ground has no 
shape, it lacks a dynamics of its own” (1954, p.232).  So the ground is essentially passive, a negative 
entity, and indeterminacy is an inherent quality of this zone. In other words, for every object perceived 
and set up as ‘figure’, there is related material that is perceived but not attended to. In addition, these 
two aspects are in interrelationship. “Even if I knew nothing of rods and cones,” Merleau-Ponty (1962, 
p.78) writes, “I should realize that it is necessary to put the surroundings in abeyance the better to see 
the object, and to lose in ground what one gains in focal figure, because to look at the object is to plunge 
oneself into it, and because objects form a system in which one cannot show itself without concealing 
others.”  
 
As a result, the act of seeing is fundamentally about meaning-making.  For the choice about what is 
figure and what is ground requires reinforcement and guidance, and so a cognitive bias enters the field 
of perception. Seeing is an active process, one in which the most plausible and least ambiguous amongst 
a vast range of competing potential foci of attention are allowed to appear to consciousness and become 
dominant and stable in the mind.  As the neuropsychologist Richard L. Gregory (1998, p.2000) writes, 
the activity of seeing involves 'bottom-up' signals from the body,  'top-down' knowledge, and 'sideways' 
rules coming from context, memory and experience. ‘Top-down’ knowledge is specific, while 
‘sideways rules’ are general schemata applied to all objects and scenes. The figure-ground segregation   26 
is an example of a ‘sideways rule’. What we see is therefore only tenuously related to reality, and is 
essentially an activity of predictive hypotheses about fundamentally ambiguous and indeterminate 
situations. Visual perception involves a process of correlating, grouping and binding of the visual field 
into graspable and stable patterns.  
 
To put it succinctly, there is no such thing as the innocent eye.  There is no ‘reality’ accessible to 
consciousness, only constructions, and these are produced through various kinds of mental segregation 
that depend on the mutual opposition of elements. As Nelson Goodman (1976, p.7-8) notes: 
 
The eye comes always ancient to its work, obsessed by its own past and by old and new insinuations of the ear, 
nose, tongue, fingers, heart and brain. It functions not as an instrument self-powered and alone, but as a dutiful 
member of a complex and capricious organism. Not only how but what it sees is regulated by need and prejudice. It 
selects, rejects, organizes, discriminates, ascribes, classifies, analyzes, constructs. It does not so much mirror as take 
and make; and what it takes and makes it sees not bare, without attributes, but as things, as food, as people, 
enemies, as stars, as weapons. Nothing is seen nakedly or naked.  
 
Neuroscientist V. S. Ramachandran and philosopher William Hirstein (1999, p.23) provide a 
description of figure-ground contrast, as it is understood today: 
 
The key idea [….] is the following (and it applies to many of our laws, not just grouping). Given the limited 
attentional resources in the brain and limited neural space for competing representations, at every stage in 
processing there is generated a ‘Look here, there is a clue to something potentially object-like’ signal that produces 
limbic activation and draws your attention to that region (or feature), thereby facilitating the processing of those 
regions or features at earlier stages. Furthermore, partial ‘solutions’ or conjectures to perceptual problems are fed 
back from every level in the hierarchy to every earlier module to impose a small bias in processing and the final 
percept emerges from such progressive ‘bootstrapping’.  
 
The inclination to segregate the perceptual field is driven by a desire for focused attention on the 
gratification of needs, so an overwhelming psychological impulse exists that requires us to leave the 
larger part of the visual field in a vague medley of images. What is in cognitive and emotional focus 
becomes ‘figure’, and what is ‘ground’ slips into the unnoticed background.  By ignoring some of the 
cognitive field and assigning some things to ‘ground’ and others to ‘figure’, the mind lightens the 
cognitive load, saving itself from having to search for more alternatives, but also making it pre-disposed 
to accept a ‘ready-made’ gestalt. For, generally, familiar configurations will win out over the novel ones 
because cognitive value lies in repeatability and reliability. Gestalt psychology calls this the ‘Good 
Figure’ or the ‘Law of Prägnanz’. We strive for wholeness where we sense lack, and understanding 
where something is unclear. As Issa and Rosenberg (2011, p.109) write: “biological systems are 
constructed in such a way that information is biased to emphasize what is important for survival, 
reproduction, and – after aeons of evolution – neurochemical satiety.” Thus the key to understanding 
sensory perception is to identify where biases are imposed, and where it may give rise to illusory 
perceptions, because “we literally create what we see” (Ethington, 2011, p.139).  
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It is possible to become so locked into seeing something in one particular way (locked onto the ‘figure’ 
and never the ‘ground’) that we will not be able to see any other pattern, or acknowledge the validity of 
another point of view. A “horizon of meaning” structures and delimits sensations (Merleau-Ponty, 
p.18).  This ‘horizon’ surrounds each situation, and is the limitation placed on change. It is what allows 
us to adopt a perspective, but also what prohibits us from being open to change.  Studying figure-ground 
thus exposes the fact that the value of any body of knowledge is limited to the paradigm – or gestalt - 
that produces it. But it also shows that the mind is an active agent in relation to how it perceives and 
interacts with the world.  The subject creates reality just as much as it perceives reality, and so what it 
experiences is not the actual world but rather a re-creation, an interactive experience of the world. The 
mind is embedded within society; as Friedrich Nietzsche noted (1994, p.87): “There is only a 
perspectival seeing, only a perspectival ‘knowing’.” Thus, as Thomas Kuhn (1996) argues in his 
seminal The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), revolutionary changes in society must depend on 
fundamental changes in individuals,  because such changes involve transformations not just of 
theoretical belief but also of what can be seen.  And the pre-requisite for such change is exactly what is 
suppressed in consciousness most of the time: the essential mutuality of figure and ground, the fact that 
“[n]othing has meaning alone. Every figure must have its ground, or environment”, as Marshall 
McLuhan (1995, p.357) writes. “A single word, divorced from its linguistic ground, would be useless”, 
as McLuhan stresses. “A note in isolation is not music. Consciousness is corporate action involving all 
the senses.”   
 
The pattern recognition that pertains to visual perception is only part of the activity of the mind. 
However, considering the characteristics of figure-ground opens a passage-way onto much broader 
issues that take us well beyond questions of the psychology of perception and art, issues relating to the 
general problematic of body and mind, ‘signal’ and background ‘noise’, significance and irrelevance, 
reality and construction. Specifically, it reveals two important underpinnings for the working of 
consciousness in general: firstly, that a specific capacity of the organ of sight is prejudiced as the source 
of valued knowledge; secondly, that individuals - indeed entire cultures - adopt specific conceptual 
biases based on perceptual pattern-formations or gestalts. Thinking about figure-ground segregation 
leads one to ponder a fundamental question:  “When we look into the world, do we see what we 
apprehend through our senses or do we see what we know?” (Chatterjee, 2004, p.58) Ultimately, it 
means pursuing the paradox that we both inherit and create the world we inhabit. 
 
 
Figure-Ground in Art 
In painting, ‘figure-ground’ refers to the relationship of the picture surface or plane (‘ground’) – 
commonly known in Western art as the 'background'  - to the images on the picture surface (‘figure’). 
All planar compositions structure the two-dimensional rectangular plane in terms of a coherent array of 
positive and negative shapes or schemata. When a figure or ‘positive space’, for example, a human form 
or a letter is drawn inside a frame, a complementary space, or the ‘ground’, or ‘background’, or 
‘negative space’ – is also drawn.  Thus ‘figure’ is the space occupied by forms, known as the 'positive'   28 
space, while ‘ground’ is the ‘empty’ or unoccupied space around the form, also known as the 'negative' 
space. After the Renaissance, figure-ground segregation served primarily to differentiate, clarify and fix 
the position and meaning of objects in fictive three-dimensional space, and from that time until the 
advent of modernism, artists utilized the frame as a bounding edge within which an illusionist space of 
boundless depth and lateral extension could be projected. In this sense, the whole painting becomes a 
kind of borderless ground, with the frame functioning now as ‘figure’, and representing the limits of the 
field of vision of a viewer.  
 
As a framed planar format containing contoured shapes, a painting is therefore unavoidably involved in 
the assignment of figure-ground contrasts. Indeed, as Elkins (Elkins, 1998:99) observes in an overview 
of methodological approaches to the question of figure-ground: “If we accept visual artefacts as 
evidence of figure/ground relations, then the problems are as old as marking itself”. But as Elkins 
(1998, p.85) also notes, in most studies of figure-ground “there is no room for an intermediate term 
between figure and ground, and so the question keeps being reduced to figure or ground.”  It is exactly 
this ‘intermediate term’ that concerns me, for while figure-ground is about the production of meaning 
based on the perception of contrasts or binary oppositions, I will be addressing “more specific kinds of 
attention that throw the binarism into question” (Elkins, 1998, p. 85), foregrounding instead the fact that  
“the  ‘meaning of meaning’ is relationship.” (McLuhan, 1995, p.357)  
 
 
Metamorphics of Figure-Ground in Art History 
Awareness of flux-like mutability within the visual field produces a kind of art that is premised on the 
fact “that human vision can be thought to be less than master of all it surveys”, as Rosalind Krauss 
(1993, p.180) puts it.  This foregrounds an awareness of art as a field for “potential images”, as Dario 
Gamboni (2001) calls them   – where the subjective nature of seeing takes centre-stage.  
 
 
FIG. 12. Cave Paintings, Grotte Chauvet, France, c.30,000 BC. 
http://www.studyblue.com/notes/note/n/art-history-chap1-2/deck/3651261 
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A history of such evanescent art would probably have to begin with cave paintings, emerging and 
subsiding before the eyes of Paleolithic man in flickering torchlight [Fig.12]. Later, it would encounter 
Christian icons, glowing in the numinous depths of churches. These are contexts from ‘before the era of 
art’, as Hans Belting (1994) calls it, emphasizing the fact that a sense of visual permeability and fluidity 
is an inherent aspect of the experience of images from the beginning, but also that the kinds of 
perceptual experiences I address are as much factors of the environment or ambiance within which 
images are situated as they are of the works themselves. Or rather, that environment and work cannot be 
separated.  These instances also draw attention to the fact that for the pre-modern subject, awareness of 
the fundamental fluidity and permeability of human consciousness was far more central than it would 
become to the modern humanist subject (Foucault, 1984).  
 
Thus in art the invention of fixed-point perspective in the Renaissance, which built on the Classical 
injunction to create a mimetic art founded on a relationship to ideal forms, involved the insertion of a 
matrix of contoured shapes into a geometric grid so as to provide an abstract system through which to 
order visual perception in terms of ratios of clear and distinct differences. Now, in theory at least, the 
rational order of disegno was the fundamental and sufficient organizing principle within this new 
language of art; line carried most of the signifying power. Cartesian perspectivalism, which posits the 
conjunction of the gaze presupposed by the perspectival image of the Renaissance with Cartesian 
epistemology, subsequently became the dominant ‘scopic regime’, or conventions of seeing, of the 
gaze, or sight as social fact.  Descartes argued that while the self is real and discernible through 
immediate intellectual intuition it is necessary to distrust the senses, separating mind from body.  
Reason alone provides knowledge of objective innate ideas, which means an equation of the eye and the 
mind. Within this ocular construction, as Jay notes, space becomes isotropic, rectilinear, abstract and 
uniform. “In the Cartesian model the intellect inspects entities modelled on retinal images”, writes 
Richard Rorty (2009, p.45). “In Descartes’ conception – the one that became the basis for ‘modern 
epistemology’ – it is representations which are in the ‘mind’. The inner eye inspects these 
representations hoping to find some mark which will testify to their fidelity.” Sight is assumed to be 
monocular, static, unblinking, saccadic (jumping from one focal point to the next rather than panning), 
and disembodied, because the viewer is construed as standing outside the viewed scene and to be 
capturing an eternal moment (Jay, 1988, p.5-7). Cartesian perspectivalism also assumes that all sight is 
identical, universal and transcendental, so that any differences in sight must be an error or imperfection. 
(Jay, 1988, p.11)  Its dominance produced what David Summers (2003, p.567) calls “metaoptical” 
space, as opposed to a purely optical one; that is, Cartesian perspectivalism coordinated the visual field 
“into a ratio of ‘notional’ parts”, so that it becomes a matter of the detached analysis of an abstract grid. 
The ‘metaoptical’ is a framework within which the unruly forces traversing the perceptual field can be 
concentrated and controlled: “Because metaoptical space is notional, boundless, and at every point 
equivalent, it is in fundamental respects antithetical to the values of real space”, which is experienced as 
embodied and subjective, Summers (2003, p.564) adds.  There occurred within artistic practice a 
withdrawal of emotional involvement from the activity of depiction, and this also involved de-
contextualization of the image from the wider gestalt, because an “abstract, quantitatively   30 
conceptualized space became more interesting to the artist than the qualitatively differentiated subjects 
painted within it,” with the result that “the rendering of the scene became an end in itself” (Jay, 1988, 
p.8-9).   
 
 
FIG.  13. L e o n a r d o  d a  V i n c i ,  Madonna  with  the  Yarnwinder,  c.1510,  oil  on  canvas,  50.2x36.4cm,  Private 
Collection 
http://www.maria21.net/?document_srl=7187 
 
However, as Stuart Clark (2007, p.1) writes, during the pre-modern period,  “vision was anything but 
objectively established or secure in its supposed relationship to ‘external fact’.’ The Cartesian 
perspectival system was challenged from the beginning from within its own codes, effectively exposing 
the subject to representations that challenged the dominance of such apparent ‘objectivity’. For 
example, in the fluid multiple contours that traverse Renaissance sketches,  Fra Angelico’s colour-
suffused sacred spaces, Leonardo’s hazy sfumato engulfing and softening the Albertian grid [FIG.13],  
and the Venetian colourists’ substitution of a luminously chromatic and affective ambience for linear 
outlines. Indeed, as Clark (2007, p.2) writes, by the period of the late Renaissance, “[i]n one context or 
another, vision came to be characterized by uncertainty and unreliability, such that access to visual 
reality could no longer be normally guaranteed.”  
 
As James Elkins  (1998, p.44) notes, it is an intrinsic quality of a graphic mark to be potentially 
indistinct – a “shimmering thing at the edge of analysis”. Its metamorphic qualities mean that at one 
moment a mark will seem solid and clearly defined, while at others it will “operate at the limit of 
resolution of the eye.” Thus, Elkins writes, “barely perceptible forms are another universal mode for 
graphic marking. Their indistinctness is not always meant to be resolved […. ] it is part of of their way 
of accepting and declining determinate meaning.”  Leonardo’s work is exemplary of this kind of 
indeterrminacy, while Elkins gives the example of Georges Seurat’s drawings, as a more recent 
instance. 
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The dark, hollowed out and indeterminate spaces of tenebrism, further challenged the capacity of the 
faculty of sight to master the visual, while the indeterminate horizons of landscape painting [FIG.14] 
had even more profound implications, effectively bringing about “a subterranean displacement that 
pushed European painting out of its academic framework”, as François Jullien (2009, p.124-5) writes. 
  
In taking its distance from the perceptual logic of a sensation that can be passively organized by reason, landscape 
painting uncovered the immediate, invasive power of the impression and, in so doing, led the more primordial 
consciousness of a being-in-the-world to outstrip the visual object. [….] In addition, in shattering the self-
sufficiency of those paintings whose meaning was conferred entirely by history, landscape painting, makes the 
beholder dream of vague, far-off places, including him in its reverie through its indeterminations [……] The object, 
dispossessed of its constitutive unity and increasingly indefinable, was gradually inundated or it decomposed. 
 
Martin Jay (1988; 1994) argues that three dominant and overlapping  “‘scopic regimes’ of modernity” 
have defined Western visuality  since the seventeenth century: the Dutch 17th-century ‘art of 
describing’, as Svetlana Alpers (1983) terms it, and the baroque ‘madness of vision’. The ‘art of 
describing’ contrasts with the rhetoric and theatricality of Italian Renaissance and Baroque art, but can 
be understood as more a variation than an alternative with respect to the ocularcentrism of Cartesian 
perspectivalism, although through attention to the task of ‘description’ it paid closer attention to the 
mobility of visual perception, the involvement of the seer in what is seen.  Jay’s third ‘scopic regime’, 
on the other hand, by engaging in paradoxical combinations of the ephemeral and the material, 
embraces obscurity rather than transparency, the indecipherability of the visual rather than the panoptic 
gaze of the transcendental subject, and engenders a mobile and dynamic kind of gaze provoked by the 
eye-catching, disorienting and ecstatic surplus of images central to baroque visual experience. It deploys 
a visual rhetoric that prioritizes the proliferation of points of view, signaling a return to the sensuality of 
touch, the haptic rather than the optical. Baroque art signifies the relentless erosion of an established 
sense of order, the introduction of subjectivity at the heart of seeing.  As Mieke Bal (1999, p.27) writes, 
Baroque art shows that an object “only comes to life – or rather to light – to visibility – for us through 
our point of view, which itself is moulded by it, folded in it…It cannot exist outside of ‘us’.” In effect, 
‘Baroque reason’ “abandons the firm distinction between subject and object” (Bal, 1999, p.8), and so 
henceforth the subject “becomes vulnerable” to the object: “subjectivity and the object become co-
dependent, folded into one another, and this puts the subject at risk.” (1999, p.28) As a result, as Michel 
Foucault (Quoted in Buci-Glucksman, 1994, p.135) put it, “thought ceases to move in the element of 
resemblance”.  
 
In the eighteenth century, the concept of the ‘sublime’ emerged as another  important counter-point to 
the clear and distinct qualities attributed to the classical concept of the ‘beautiful’ at the centre of 
Cartesian perspectivalism.  In the sublime an unrepresentable contingency is brought to light, so that, as 
Jay puts it,  “what is perceived by the senses and what makes sense are split asunder.” (1993, p.585-6) 
“The essential claim of the sublime”, writes Thomas Weiskel (1976, p.3), “is that man can, in feeling 
and speech, transcend the human.” But, as Weiskel adds, just “what if anything, lies beyond the human 
– God or the gods, the daemon or Nature – is a matter of great disagreement.” The sublime addresses   32 
the abyss that opens up between self and world after the stable pattern of religious beliefs central to the 
established sense of order have begun to disintegrate under the pressures of experiences that can no 
longer be accounted for within traditional worldviews. The sublime, writes Jean-Luc Nancy (1993, 
p.44), “is a feeling, and yet, more than a feeling in the banal sense, it is the emotion of the subject at the 
limit”. In art, the experience of the sublime leads to the paradoxical situation in which something 
unrepresentable – that resists presentation – still nevertheless must make itself known in images. 
Negating the ‘figure’ in favour of the undifferentiated  ‘ground’ becomes a central justification for 
Romantic art, as it would later be for the non-mimetic art in the early twentieth century - “the 
breakdown of illusion in the face of urgent spiritual demands.” (Elkins, 1998: 249) Painting’s surface is 
equated with the ground of Being itself, and the artist pledges himself to transcendence, and to the ‘re-
enchantment’ of the modern world. The sublime, so Jean-François Lyotard argues, developing Kant’s 
thesis
8, means above all that art is about the ‘unpresentable’, and that it addresses the fundamental fact 
of indeterminacy and its ramifications - the fear and thrill of the experience of limitlessness. For 
Lyotard (1984, p.78), art’s purpose within the sublime’s force-field becomes to ‘de-figure’ 
representation in order to re-figure it as the unfigurable  - to sunder figure from ground and to reveal 
ground as the sublime (non-) image. “Formlessness, the absence of form”, he writes, are “a possible 
index to the unpresentable”.  
 
 
FIG. 14. J.M.W. Turner, Norham Castle, Sunrise, 1845. Oil on canvas, 91 x 122 cm, Tate Gallery, London 
http://triviumproject.com/artist/joseph-mallord-william-turner/#1 
 
Thus we witness figure-ground segregations exfoliating at the centre of Baroque art and in the 
“premorphously inchoative” ambiances of Romanticism (Werner Hoffmann quoted in Gamboni, 
2001:19). Lines dissolve in baths of colour [FIG.14]. Later, the optical diffuseness of Impressionism, 
the ambiguous suggestiveness of Symbolism, and then modern art’s monochrome painting, its all-over 
surface, mise-en-abyme and abstract grid, all  in one way or another involved confusions of  the stable 
coordinates of the the perceptual field (Krauss, 1993, Ch. 1). Cubist collage, for example, subverted 
conventional codes based on ratio and logic so that it is often unclear whether A is on top of B or behind 
it, or whether the two coexist in the same shallow space. Much modern art became “flattened,	 ﾠ
geometricized, ordered”, thereby banishing reference to nature, the mimetic and the real (Krauss, 1977, 
p.51). This shift also meant that in constructing compositions within a newly emphasized rectangular   33 
two-dimensional space, artists attended to a much greater extent to both positive and negative space, 
treating ground as the location of ‘negative’ shapes. Indeed, it can be said that modernist painting 
“begins with the rejection of the concept of background – that is, an ontologically and naturalistically 
subsidiary surrounding or setting for the figure”, writes James Elkins (1998, p.104), and in its place sets 
about the “instating of ground – understood as ontologically equal and co-dependent with the figure.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In the art of Dada and Surrealism, meanwhile, repressed psychic material is allowed to irrupt through 
the patterns of figure-ground segregation  central to the stable subject “in ways that disrupt unitary 
identity, aesthetic norms, and social order” (Foster, 1993: xvii), thereby unleashing “a force that is 
transgressive of those very notions of ‘distinctness’ upon which a modernist optical logic depend”, as 
Rosalind Krauss (1993, p. 217) writes.  The new medium of film proved especially fertile for 
experimentation with the ‘metamorphics of figure-ground’. The introduction of the dimension of time, 
and the use in the edit of blurred crosscuts and other techniques for undermining the stability of the 
image, makes the instability of the visual an intrinsic part of the language of the movies. Experimental 
filmmakers, such as Hans Richter, for example, described his abstract films as being fundamentally 
involved with ‘emerging’ forms and ‘rhythm’ as much as with anything fixed and stable (Turvey, 2011, 
pp.18-23, 41-45).  “Vision is obscured”, as Briony Fer writes of the theory of  the Surrealist, Georges 
Bataille, “and yet the sight is ravishing. Forms are dissolved, almost like a modern form of chiaroscuro. 
Under those conditions, the pleasure of not seeing, or at least of not seeing clearly, are intense.”  (Fer, 
2000, p.76)  
 
In post-war paintings, such as Tachism or Abstract Expressionism, the fleetingness of sensory 
experience replaces the solid geometry of pure forms. All the viewer senses are “slipping glimpses”,  as 
Willem de Kooning (1960) put it. The goal was to paint compositions that had an affect on the  viewer 
wholly divorced from obvious mimesis and representative or symbolic associations. Indeed, the realm 
of feeling and imagination that music explored was now considered far more subtle and elevated than 
that accessible to mimetic representation and words, or expressible within the limits of bounded forms. 
The unstable ontological and epistemological nature of the visual image was now understood to be a 
better model for conveying deep meaning and feeling than the clarity and determined forms of the 
discursive.  
Within the arts in general, a new kind of fluid and open-ended relationship between work and viewer 
was being forged, one that sought “the establishment of an open relationship in which the viewer is 
called upon to collaborate in the development of a work in progress” (Gamboni, 2001, p.241). 
Furthermore, inherent within this shift, which incorporated a greater agency for materials and chance 
effect, a new idea of the artist was being defined, one not so much considered as a “powerful 
demiurge”, but rather as an “operator” (Gamboni, 2001, p.241). Roland Barthes diagnosed the 
transformation as signalling the collapse of the old ‘monologism’, and announced the “death of the 
author” and the “birth of the reader”, declaring: “The reader is the space on which all the quotations that   34 
make up writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text’s unity lies not in its origin but in 
its destination”.  (1977, p.148)  
 
One way of understanding this transformation is to think in terms of the ‘frame’.  In the discourse of the 
sublime we see the frame becoming increasingly foregrounded as a limiting condition. A viewer of a 
work by Turner or Friedrich is made more aware of the extension of the pictorial filed beyond the 
rectangle of the canvas itself. In modernist monochrome painting, the traditional division of the picture 
plane into figure and ground is challenged, so that one continuous surface with no 'positive' or 'negative' 
space was sought - an interwoven or homogeneous field was established. As a result, the opening out of 
virtual space into infinity that was pursued by Romantic painting was countered by a re-affrimation of 
the finite nature of the painting surface itself. Thus, as Rudolph Arnheim (1956, p.240) notes,  it can be 
argued that within modernist practices, “the boundary line between frame and canvas was no longer the 
inner contour of the frame, but the outer contour of the picture”, so “[t]he picture was no longer ground 
behind the frame, but figure.”  Mewnhile, in contradt to this tendency, an art of the ‘abstract sublime’  
(as in the work of Rothko,Barnett Newman and Agnes Martin) emerged that focused on the potential of 
boundary-breaking sensations.  As a result, as John Welchman  (1996, p.213) ) notes: “The frame is a 
virus in the machine of formalism, a sort of double agent functioning as a necessary part of the system 
but also as the gateway to its dissolution.” Gradually, however, it became clear that ‘framing’ 
conditions existed not only as a physically limiting presence but also on conceptual and institutional 
levels – what Joseph Kosuth  (1977) called the ‘first frame’ of the institution of painting and sculpture 
and the ‘second’ frame of institutional mechanisms.  Both these ‘frames’ also determined the nature and 
stability of the figure-ground segregation. As Welchman  (1996) notes, the process through which the 
frame becomes more porous and contested had begun with the confusion of the limiting condition of the 
frame in the work of the formalist abstractionists, and would culminate in the 1960’s in a critique of 
such framing-conditions established by both the ‘first’ and, more especially, the ‘second’ frame, with 
the result that the relationship between figure-ground becomes more ambiguous, just as the location of 
the frame is in a state of continual migration.  
 
The  neo-avantgarde’s ‘institutional critique’ of the ‘second’ frame, however,  led to a neglect of the 
problematics of the ‘first’. Jean-François Lyotard’s exploration of a specifically ’postmodern’ sublime  
served to return such a problematic to the discussion fo contemporary practice. Thus Lyotard (1984, p. 
81) argued that while Modernism still believed the unpresentable could be put forward “ as the missing 
content”, and so “continues to offer [….] solace and pleasure”, postmodernism rejected any such 
reconciliation or totality, and as a result, “takes shape in an empty space [….] its sole function is to 
deploy and preserve this space as one of dispossession.”  In the “‘postmodern’ regress of reality”, as 
Christine Buci-Glucksman (1994, p.134) terms it, we are confronted by an open or ‘relational’ art, one 
driven by “the logic of extremes, paradox and non-dialectical neutralization of opposites”. The 
contemporary artwork, so Welchman (2001, p.51) argues, should be seen within the context of the 
“shredded cubes” of modernism, signaling as it does “a counter-monumental, unenclosed and 
polyvalent space of becoming”, which he terms the ‘rainbow net’. Bill Viola’s video installations, for   35 
example, as Barbara Maria Stafford (2001, p.160) describes them, employ the “engulfing use of 
electronic media to embed viewers in destabilizing psychoactive spaces… [which] incarnates the 
absorbing and repelling thrusts of consciousness. Stimuli pour in, forcing us to shoulder the burden of 
our own processes of perception by roiling what goes on below the skin.” In this context, painting can  
seen retrogressive or anachronistic – a medium inevitably hobbled by devotion to structure. But, as we 
will see, it is exactly painting’s ability to enact boundary-dissolving affects “within the framework of 
what is, apparently, a securely marked-off and privileged aesthetic space” (Bersani and Dutoit, 1993, 
p.100), that makes it so compelling and of contemporary relevance. 
 
However, as Welchman  (1996, p. 219) argues, within  the art of ‘institutional critique’ that dominated 
the avant-agrde in the 1980’s and 1990’s,  as well is in the more ‘experiential’ or ‘sublime’ works of 
postconceptualism, such as Viola’s, the frame “will be reimagined as a context and forgotten as an 
object. Henceforth the frame is no the subject of the artwork, it is the predicate.” It is precisely 
painting’s inevitable engagement with the frame as ‘an object’ that will be one of my major concerns in 
what follows, and the basis for an assessment of painting as a medium  of contemporary relevance.  
 
 
 
My Studio Practice 
In Chapter II I look at my on-going series of Book-Paintings and related works, made in acrylics on 
canvas
9, and in Chapter V I discuss newer developments.  In Chapter II I use a broadly empirical and 
phenomenological approach, focusing on the visual experience of my work and trying to analyse how 
this experience is produced and what the effects on cognitive awareness and emotional states are.  I am 
using my own practice as a ‘test case’ through which to address issues that I believe are of broader 
significance in relation to contemporary art and art theory. I analyse how my own paintings serve as 
analogues for the “gauzy permeability of consciousness” (Stafford, 1999, p.178).  
 
In what follows, I will not be going into much depth concerning the implications and context of the use 
of written text in my practice, nor of the nature of the historical references these texts evoke. This could 
be a topic in its own right, but I put it largely aside for this occasion because my focus is on the optical 
effects of figure-ground confusion in my work. I will pose via my work a cluster of interrelated 
questions: what would a typology of the ‘intermediate term’ between ‘figure’ and ‘ground’ consist of?  
From where does its visual rhetoric come, and what would a genealogy contain? What is the best way to 
interpret this effect, and what is the most persuasive and profitable hermeneutic approach? What is the 
status of the image within this state? What does it mean from an ontological point of view? What is the 
status of the viewer within this experience, and what does this interstitial position say about the 
relationship between work and viewer, self and world? What is happening psychologically within the 
force field of such an event? A further aim is to make a case for a kind of contemporary painting that 
does not sit too comfortably within a retrograde conception of art, but instead is uniquely sited on the 
fertile borderline or liminal threshold of subjective in-between vision, of the elusive ‘anadyomeme    36 
 
 
 FIG.15: Simon Morley, Zarathustra (1924/1943/ 1950). 2012. Acrylic on canvas. 120x160cm each. Botttom   37 
movement’.  Finally, I should add that it goes without saying that my interpretations will leave many 
aporias, and while I am eager to hitch very profound issues onto the back of my works, that they may 
very well fail to bear the weight. 
 
It is also important to emphasise from the start that although my artworks may in the present context 
appear somewhat programmatic, in reality they are not. I am interpreting rather than prescribing, 
though the effect of my discourse may be to make it appear I knew in advance what the work meant or 
that I was illustrating a theory. This is not the case. In fact, closer to the truth is that I am mostly trying 
to give cogent reasons ‘after the fact’, and this is because I am seeking to explain my own practice – 
create a heuristic opening – according to the criteria established by my elected methodology and within 
the restraining protocols of this kind of research project.  But my methodology has also been 
performative and generative. That is, it has led to the creation of new works that exceed the confines of 
the discursive framework I imposed, and the interpretative machinery I deployed. Thus in Chapter IV I 
discuss recent works, some within the closed format of painting, but others exploring the potential of 
the time-based (but still closed-) format of video. This stage is more exploratory and experimental, and 
the works are reactive, open-ended, performative, and remain provisional.  
 
Chapter II is in part retrospective, insofar as it deals with a style that has been a central aspect of my 
practice for some time, although the works I refer to have been made during the period of my research 
and the ideas I bring to bear derive from my current research, which in turn have precipitated significant 
changes. The focus of Chapter II is an on-going series of works called Book-Paintings  [FIG.15], which 
source or ‘sample’ the formats of book covers or title-pages, and make an isomorphic analogy between 
the shape of a stretched rectangular canvas and the shape of a folio book.
10 But rather than presenting 
the viewer with a stable visual experience - one in which ‘figure’ stands out clearly from the ‘ground’, 
as is the case in looking at and reading a normal book in which words and images are easily legible - 
these paintings present the viewer with an oscillation and fluctuation within the perceptual field. There 
is a period of initial encounter during which the eyes must adjust to low chromatic contrast; forms seem 
to exfoliate or deliquesce, and at first a monochromatic effect predominates, even producing a kind of 
partial and temporary Ganzfeld effect.
11  But gradually, over time, the image and text become clearer 
and more distinct, until a figure-ground segregation is established. I describe my paintings as 
‘’temporary’ monochromes, or even as ‘fallen’ or ’failed’ monochromes, insofar as they only briefly 
resist the encroachments of image and sign, of the discursive and historically contingent.  Perhaps they 
are “nothings awaiting their own destruction”, as Jonathan Rée (Batchelor, 2010, p.298) put it, talking 
of his experience of white monochromes.  
 
The loss of boundaries my works (and works like it) precipitate is supplemented by another and 
converse one: when viewed at different distances and by the re-positioning the body, they will also 
generate a contrary awareness – that of separateness, clear delineation, solid structure and permanence. 
As a consequence, the persistence of ‘figure’ and ‘ground’ differentiation at close viewing, the formal 
geometry of the painting-support or frame, and the legibility, discursivity and denotative specificity of    38 
the signs that are embedded within the matrix of specific historical references, mean that a more secure 
relationship to memory and the socially and historically-given is delivered.
  Thus, while my works 
corrode linear forms they do not entirely negate them, for on closer inspection a clear figure-ground 
segregation is established, and words and images appear in semi-relief upon the painting’s surface. 
 
The initial context for the kind of painting I discuss – at least on some important levels - is the 
monochrome, an empty kind of art without perceptual anchors, where indeterminacy reigns. 
Monochrome painting disables normal distinctions, not only internally but also between viewer and 
work.  Thus empty or near-empty paintings become “exemplary sites for the production of the kinds of 
meaning where options remain open for longer than usual.” (Gibson, 2003, p. 200)
12   A monochrome 
painting can suggest mere blankness or declare material objecthood (Greenberg, 1982; Fried, 1998A),
13  
but the fluctuating readings of the kind of work that interest me forestall any claim to modernist-style 
‘presentness’ (Fried, 1998A). ‘All-at-onceness’ is the opposite of what I’m after, or what the work 
delivers. My goal is something more drawn out and incremental, stretched and irregular.  But how best 
to interpret these affects? 
 
My works may also suggest a kind of dream space– perhaps a ‘dream screen’. Or they may stand as 
simulacra for the upright and bilateral symmetry of the human body, presenting themselves 
metaphorically as containers, like a body, with the surface suggesting a skin (Wollheim, 1989).  They 
may, in ways that are difficult to describe, produce a strongly felt awareness of somehow being 
addressed (Fried, 1990, 1998, 2010), of a painting initiating an encounter (Lee Ufan, 1996).  Or they 
may appear to be an entry point or portal into indeterminate or infinite space (as in, say, Yves Klein or 
Mark Rothko’s work), and as a result generate analogies relating to both spatial and psychic emptiness 
or nothingness, or to the desire for transcendence, transit, the breaching of boundaries, the annulling of 
difference (Bersani and Dutoit, 1993). These kinds of associations connect my work to the convergence 
of monochrome painting with the long history of Western mysticism or metaphysical speculation – of 
Neo-Platonism, Cabbalism, and Christian mysticism such as embodied by Pseudo-Dionysius and 
Meister Eckhart - and its relationship to a ‘theo-aesthetic’ impulse (Tuchman, 1987; McEvilley, 1996).  
 
But my paintings clearly struggle and fail to achieve this status; indeed, the connection to monochrome 
painting is quickly undermined, for a closer viewing of the surface of one of my paintings reveals the 
presence of text and/or imagery. Signs are still present. They are not erased, and indeed remain to 
‘pollute’ the potential plenitude of the empty chromatic field. Here, also, planarity asserts itself against 
any readings of depth, but not as a declaration of pictorial flatness; rather, at this point my work slips 
into the company of more conceptual practices which foreground the discursive aspect of visual art, and 
in particular, it relates them to works that deal in one way or another with the written word  (Drucker, 
1994; Morley, 2003). My paintings then might be understood as analogous to some kind of surface for 
the posting of data – what Leo Steinberg (1972) characterised as the postmodern ‘flatbed picture-plane’ 
or  ‘bulletin board’, with rectangular objects used to carry information, such as books or posters, and 
now also the computer screen. This aspect of my practice situates it in relation to the various discourses   39 
concerning ‘postmodernism’ and appropriation - the “critical deconstruction of tradition”, as Hal Foster 
(1983, p.xii) puts it, involving the questioning of “explicit cultural codes”. Especially, perhaps, it 
identifies my work as an art of the labyrinthine postmodern ‘allegorical impulse’ (Owens, 1994).
14  
 
 
Methodological Approaches 
The experience I am exploring depends on the presence of an intensity that circulates within and 
without, betwixt and between established sign systems, and in aiming to reconcile the analytic processes 
of dissection and elucidation central to the discursive method with the “gut feelings, flickers of emotion, 
moral struggles, and secret attractions we intuitively feel” (Stafford, 1999, p.179),  in wanting to know 
what is at stake in the fluidity and permeability of figure-ground - in art’s relationship to testing the 
limits of clear ontological boundaries - my purpose is not to gain access to this ‘horizon’, thereby 
turning it into a ‘text’ or a discursive sign - an impossible task, anyway.  
 
The initial context for my research is the cluster of coentemporary discources that John Lechte (2008) 
calls ‘vitalist’, that is,  focus on the origin and phenomena of life that are dependent on forces, energies, 
or principles distinct from the purely material, chemical, physical, social or symbolic. Life processes, it 
is recognized,  arise from or contain a nonmaterial vital principle and cannot be explained entirely as 
physical and chemical phenomena. If life is viewed as process -  as active and changing, and not static 
and eternal – then it follows thatthe most abstract, intellectual activities are affected by drives or energy.  
 
More specifically, my research can be related to the analysis of vision and visuality, and of ‘scopic 
regimes’. Stuart Clark (2007, p.9) provides a succinct overview of such theory: 
 
All cultures apportion value to vision, both positive and negative. In our own case, an entire re-evaluation has taken 
place in which the traditional hegemony of vision has been dismantled and many different ways of theorizing about 
seeing now compete for attention. Western modernity, at least from the eighteenth century onwards, is associated 
with a particular model of cognition designed to secure vision a commanding place in science, in the field of 
political power, and in the construction of communal solidarity and personal identity in bourgeois society. After a 
century of the ‘denigration’ of this model, particularly in French philosophy, and the emergence of post-modernism 
throughout Western culture, ‘ocularcentrism’ is now on the defensive. […..] Above all, perhaps, thanks to 
developments in art history, visual anthropology, and visual hermeneutics we now take for granted the constructed 
nature of vision and the extent to which visual perception and visual meaning are fused. 
 
However, while it is evident that ocularcentrism is a major strand in Western intellectual thought, and 
that its critique plays a central role particularly in the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and 
the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, for example, I argue that it must be stood alongside other Western 
‘scopic regimes’ that recognize the presence of traditions that aim to site visual perception within a 
context of a more heterodox kind.
15  In particular, my cross-cultural methodology will reveal the co-
existence of a very different kind of visuality in East Asia that can serve as a supplement to those 
propogatd in the West.    40 
I need an approach that assumes, as James Elkins (2008, p.1) writes, that the “optical models of 
modernism are part of our past”, and that recognize that “[s]eeing is embodied, and it should no longer 
be separated from touching, feeling, and from the full range of somatic response”. We have entered a 
transitional period in which the cognitive modes grounded in the delivery of clear and distinct data, 
where perception is understood to be primarily concerned to construct a feeling of certainty, are being 
supplemented by the study of forms of consciousness that are complex, liquid, uncertain, multi-
dimensional and holistic. “Synesthesia, Einfühlung, empathy and sympathy, immersion, performance, 
and embodied encounters are now central to the art experience”, writes Elkins  (2008, p.1), and  
theorizing indeterminacy is a central concern of contemporary theory. But how best to explore the fact 
that “seeing is embodied”, or to capture the  “physiological inter-twinings of internal with external 
events”, as Barbara Maria Stafford (1999, p.160-161)  describes it? How best to challenge  “both the 
separation of quantitative rationalism and isolationist theories of the rationality of the emotions” 
(Stafford, 1999, p.160-161)?  More precisely, how best to interpret a kind of art that undermines but 
does not wholly erase the sense of differentiation, boundary-making and segregation that is central to 
figure-ground segregation?  
 
A number of pliable interpretative strands are brought together in the writing of Rosalind Krauss, and 
three texts by Krauss will serve to summarize the methodological approaches available for the analysis 
of the ‘metamorphics of figure-ground’. First, I will discuss Krauss’s influential study The Optical 
Unconscious (1993); second, I mention an essay concerning the paintings of Agnes Martin (1999) – an 
artist who is a paradigmatic case from recent art of the kinds of liminal moments I want to explore 
[FIG.8]; and thirdly, I conclude with a brief discussion of  her essay ‘Overcoming the Limits of Matter: 
On Revising Minimalism’ (1991). 
 
As James Elkins (1998, p.103) notes, The Optical Unconscious  “might easily have been subtitled 
Beyond the Figure/Ground Principle”, for it demonstrates “perhaps two dozen substantial strategies for 
dismantling those oppositions [of figure-ground] by acknowledging the place of the viewer.”  Krauss 
traces the collapse of the stable figure-ground gestalt under the onslaught of the forces of disintegration 
coming from within the unconscious, and her methodology can be seen within the contemporary context 
of postmodernism’s rejection of the essentialism of modernism and its embrace of flux and 
indeterminacy - a counter-narrative to what the author posits as the totalizing force of a Greenbergian 
formalist modernism, which is mired, so Krauss declares, in the fantasy of the omniscient, panoramic, 
Cartesian eye and in Kantian intellectualism.
 She challenges the apparent sufficiency of the clear and 
distinct aura of contemplation in order to explore the connection between creative cognitive processes 
and existential inaccessibility, So, argues Krauss, while in a narrative dominated by the logic of 
modernism, the flat, non-representational surfaces of abstract art signify purification, specificity, and 
transcendence, assuming the possibility of disengaged contemplation by the viewer, these same stylistic 
traits, Krauss declares, can be shown to conceal decomposition, erasure, obliteration, cancellation, 
emasculation and pulverization, and a viewer now exposed as very far from being an ideal of 
detachment.  She celebrates the Duchampian ‘antiretinal’ impulse in which vision is inextricably and   41 
unavoidably bound to the darkness and ‘blindness’ of the ‘optical unconscious’ – to the uncontrollable 
forces of embodied desires, which uncouple perception from any kind of logical system. Krauss refers, 
for example, to Lyotard’s psychoanalytically informed and anarchic concept of the ‘figural’ within the 
field of vision. Thus, as Krauss (1993, p.217) declares: “the beat they [artists of the ‘optical 
unconscious’] employ must, in some sense, be figural – but of an order of the figure that is far away 
from the realm of space that can be neatly opposed to the modality of time.” In the fluid spaces of the 
unconscious the ‘good form’ of the figure-ground Gestalt is disdained, for it allows “two, or three, or 
five things to be in the same place at the same time. And these things are themselves utterly heteroclite, 
not variations on one another but things in total opposition”. (1993, p.218) For the unconscious deals 
not in oppositions,  but rather in differences, and is constantly involved in flux, mutations, 
metamorphoses, underminings, complementarities, and the seemingly random blocking together of 
disparate elements  (1993, p.220).   
 
In her essay ‘Agnes Martin: The/Cloud/’ Krauss seeks to account for the affective and cognitive 
potency of Martin’s serene and minimal works, which are a paradigm case of the ‘metamorphics of 
figure-ground’.  A structural reading is applied. Within painting’s code, wherein alternative clusters of 
signifiers function “[l]ike chess pieces, like phonemes in language” (Bois, 1990, p.135) and compete for 
dominance, the evanescent affects intrinsic to Martin’s paintings are read as part of a binarism.  Krauss 
draws on Hubert Damisch’s account in which the indistinctness of  clouds – or the sign ‘/Cloud/’ - is 
interpreted as an indication of the painting’s openness to a kind of visual experience that cannot be 
accommodated within Cartesian perspectivalism -  one that surpasses the limits of the visible and 
foreseeable. “At the meeting point of what was depictable and what was not”, Damisch argues, painting 
sought through /cloud/ to find ways to address the invisible.  ‘/Cloud/’ is the signifier of all that painting 
has to overcome. “In one way or another,” Damisch (2002, p.145) writes, “cloud connoted the closure 
of the system, revealing its limitations by operating at its margins.” Thus the blurred, out-of-focus 
quality of  Martin’s paintings is an example of the sign /cloud/ working against the structural rigour of 
the discursive texts and images that seek to inhabit and control pictorial space. The phenomenology of 
Martin’s work, according to Krauss’s reading, functions within a binary structure within which two 
opposing terms – bounded/unbounded - work to undermine the possibility of constructing a stable 
gestalt.  
 
But in the event, despite Krauss’s close attention to the encounter with Agnes Martin’s works, she is 
methodologically incapable of really engaging with them on the level of feeling, emotion, intuition and 
sensation  - levels of response central to Martin’s intentions, and also to many viewers experience. 
Indeed, Krauss seems to feel obliged to gently chastise Martin herself for ‘regressing’ in a description of 
her film Gabriel (1976) to a pre-conceptual and ‘naïve’ evocation of landscape analogy - to the 
‘pathetic fallacy’ and quasi-mystical evocations of ‘oceanic feelings’ of wholeness. The background to 
this methodological limitation is made evident in her essay ‘Overcoming the Limits of Matter: On 
Revising Minimalism’. Here, Krauss identifies two rival ‘traditions’ within the monochrome – one 
epitomised by Ad Reinhardt, the other by Frank Stella. The former - which has its apotheosis in the   42 
California ‘light’ artists such as Robert Irwin and James Turrell - “seemed to think of Art as opening up 
some kind of back door in the mind, an expanding, pulsing awareness of the visual process itself”, 
Krauss writes (1991, p.123).  In other words, Reinhardt is also paradigmatic of the liminal qualities I am 
exploring.  Stella, meanwhile, according to Krauss, leads a rival group that is more committed to  
material surface and the repudiation or critique of the formers’ avowedly ‘vitalist’ or metaphysical 
agenda: “Meaning would no longer be a function of illusion, of an imagined ‘inside’ or ‘behind’ the 
surface”, writes Krauss (1991, p.125). “Meaning, since it could form nowhere but on the surface itself, 
would be an effect of the surface: a meaning-effect.” The rest of the essay makes it very clear that 
Krauss methodology is far more hermeutically apposite while addressing the conceptual protocols Stella 
camp, and falls short of being able to interpret Reinhardt’s as leading to anything other than a kind of 
art that is “unmediated; it is in the same room with me.” (1991, p.133)  
 
In practice, a methodology like Krauss’s seems strangely ambivalent.  The hermeneutic big guns of 
semiotics, psychoanalysis, phenomenology and gender studies that are rolled out only succeed in 
transforming questions asked of Being into questions asked of language.
16  Despite her best attempts at 
a more intimate and informal mode of address (in The Optical Unconscious, Krauss refers to Clement 
Greenberg as ‘Clem’, for example), Krauss remains rigidly unwilling to engage with the somatic, 
expressive, emotional and empathetic potency of the art she discusses - the potential of the mediated 
visual image to nevertheless provoke physical arousal, or to function as something that is not so much 
there to be analyzed as an event to be actively engaged with and used. In the Optical Unconscious and 
the essay on Martin, Krauss is committed to the logical analysis of the illogical, but her study attends to 
the signifier as the locus of meaningful attention, treating painting as a coded system or structure, and 
effectively leaves out major aspects of what a painting does and means. While addressing the non- or 
pre-cognitive, Krauss in fact still employs a set of terms whose functions are primarily textual in scope. 
The ‘natural attitude’ (Bryson, 1983, p.34) is replaced by recognition of “painting as an art of signs, 
rather than percepts” (Bryson, 1983, p. xii). In broad terms, as Mieke Bal (2003, p.13) writes, this kind 
of approach “merges images with textuality in ways that require neither the presence of actual texts, nor 
unwarranted analogies and conflations. Rather, looking as an act is already invested in what has since 
been called reading.” Visual perception is always visuality:  it is a mediated  ‘gaze’, that is understood  
as the projection of social conventions and prejudices onto the visual field,  which both enables and 
limit the possibilities of meaning, forms of expression, and relationships between people.   
 
This kind of approach can only describe the meaning of a painting in metaphors that draw from the 
conceptual field of argumentation. As a result, this kind of critical art writing, as Jan Verwoert  (2005) 
puts it, 
 
does not provide any useful steps toward grasping the immanent qualities of a painting, even if it happens to 
actually recognise their existence in principle. All it can do is state that, for particular conceptual reasons, a painting 
is what it is. Any statement about what experience a painting communicates qua painting can scarcely be 
formulated with concepts like position, verification and demonstration. In fact it is questionable whether this 
quality of experience can be comprehended in conceptual categories at all, or whether the moment when the   43 
'strategic model' reaches its limits really is the time when the art of describing aesthetic experiences comes into its 
own once again. 
Thus while the cognitive categories assumed by earlier art historical writings, which implied a 
unidirectional causal explanation of perception, have ceded in studies like Krauss’s to approaches that 
more fully engage with what the Gestalt psychologists recognized as the “circular, interactional nature 
of sense experience” (Jay, 1994, p.301), they still often betray a deep-seated, indeed systemic, bias that 
prioritizes detached analysis from the outside - what communication theorist John Shotter calls (1999, 
p.2003)  the ‘monological-retrospective-objective’ mode of discourse  (also the dominant style of 
academic address).  Krauss acknowledges that art has the capacity to expose the inherent obscurities 
and inconsistencies of consciousness to view, but she is still wedded to the idea that its power lies in 
ideological effects that are registerable on the level of the sign. “The signifier rules over a set of terms 
whose functions are primarily textual in scope”, writes Norman Bryson (2003, p.6).  Even though 
Krauss is committed to exploring the post-Cartesian subject, she remains skewed towards protocols of 
rational analysis and the extraction of clear and distinct ideas, in spite of the fact that the phenomena she 
addresses are noncognitive and affect-heavy.
 17 
In contrast, I will attempt to swerve away from the study of the role of the signifier, and instead will 
draw attention to the somatic, feeling, emotion, intuition and sensation -  “the creatural life of the body 
and  of  embodied  experience”,  as  Norman  Bryson  puts  it  (2003,  p.11).  Seeking  a  rapport  between 
discourse and the optically indistinct will necessitate the “uncoupling the power of showing and the 
power of signifying,” thereby allowing us to distinguish between, on the one hand, “the attestation of 
presence”, and on the other  “the testimony of history”, as Jacques Rancière (2009, p.26) writes.  For 
while it is necessary to acknowledge the discourses that present and comment on art and the institutions 
that display it, and the forms of knowledge that interpret it, I will also need to leave a space open for 
what lies beyond discourses, institutions, systems of knowledge, and beyond the methodologies adept at 
identifying them.  
 
In order to supplement such approaches I will be drawing of the writings of  Leo Bersani and Ulysse 
Dutoit, James  Elkins, Jean-François Lyotard, Barbara Maria Stafford,  and François Jullien. Together, 
their writings adopt transgressive approaches towards disciplinary boundaries, aiming to heighten 
awareness of the denigration of visuals at the hands of logocentrism and textuality, and to overturn the 
primacy of conceptuality and cognition in the analysis of art. Thus, Bersani and Dutoit in their Arts of 
Impoverishment (1993), for example, deploy the Freudian paradigm in order to address the boundary-
breaking implications of Mark Rohtko’s paintings, emphasising how the formal characteristics of 
images can function as visual correlates for psychic processes. The psychological correlates for the 
shifting between structure and anti-structure is a dynamics of self-making and self-shattering. As 
Bersani and Duoit (1993, p.40) write, “boundary-free fusions” within the visual field serve to remind us 
of the fact that being is “incommensurable with identities”. In other words, that the ego is “a structured 
fantasy of consciousness or a kind of primal fantasy of being as structured”. As they continue (1993, 
p.138-9):   44 
 
The fantasy is of course grounded in our perception of distinct form, although this perception is then structured as 
an agency of the self that both repeats the phenomenon of pure demarcations in the world and partially censors all 
perceptual stimuli that cannot be placed within a representational structure. What Freud called the ego is the 
individuating containment of the world, the result – to move to another sense of ‘contain’ – of a disciplinary 
strategy.  
 
Projected displacements, reversals of ‘normal’ figure-ground segregation, condensations, and so on, 
disrupt the symbolic order, heralding the advent of unconscious fears and desires into the field of 
representation. Painting under the sign of psychoanalysis is then what Krauss calls an art of the ‘optical 
unconscious’. It isn’t so much involved in purely optically spatial or temporal quantities as in 
channelling a pulse, beat or force that resonates “far away from the realm of space that can be neatly 
opposed to the modality of time.” (Krauss, 1993, p. 217) 
 
 
Drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and bringing into play the metapsychology of 
psychoanalysis, Jean-François Lyotard’s work challenges the reduction of the encounter with the 
artwork to the semiotic level. While ‘discourse’ passes as the accepted model for communication and 
signification, it does so by forgetting the materiality of the signifier, Lyotard argued. Discourse thus 
entails a belief in transparency and lucidity, and to this Lyotard (2010) opposes what he calls the 
‘figural’ - understood to be fundamentally at odds with the reign of structure, order, discourse, and the 
cogito.  This is the non-cognitive experience of art, understood as fundamentally at odds with the reign 
of the discursive and driven by the energies of unconscious desires. The space phenomenology posited, 
Lyotard argued,  was a visible one in which forms come into being -  “the space of good form, of the 
good gestalt” (Krauss, 1993, p.218), and Lyotard challenges this by positing another kind of space  –  
the psychoanalytic – the space of the unconscious.   This ‘psychological space’ de-stabilizes Merleau-
Ponty’s visual space by giving unconscious desire a central role. Figurality, for Lyotard is what injects 
opacity into the discursive realm, with the result that the figural, as Martin Jay writes (1993, p.564), “is 
not so much the simple opposite of the discursive, an alternative order of meaning, as it is the principle 
of disruption that prevents any order from crystallizing into full coherence.” In short, the figural 
addresses unreadability, and is tied to the temporality of what Lyotard calls the ‘event’, that is, the 
“unique happenings that undermine the stasis of a synchronic system.” (Jay, 1993, p.565) 
18 Lyotard’s 
writings on the sublime (1982; 1984; 1984A; 1991), foreground the fact that art  “takes shape in an 
empty space [….] its sole function is to deploy and preserve this space as one of dispossession.” (1984, 
p. 81).  
 
James Elkins, meanwhile, stresses that the elements of any image are simultaneously semiotic and non-
semiotic, “at once prone and immune to systematic linguistic and structural descriptions.” (1998, p.78) 
However, as he continues (1998, p.78), it is necessary to find a middle way between extremes: 
 
No graphic mark is merely a sign, but none is a “technical”, “meaningless” gesture made only in the service of 
some higher significance. Readings are lazy in proportion as they ignore the meaningless mark in favour of the   45 
historically significant sign, or as they retreat into the safety of the nonverbal studio and speak only of gestures, 
textures, and paint.   
 
Barbara Maria Stafford’s work is especially significant, as it constitutes perhaps the most far-reachingly 
ambitious attempt to escape the dominance of the 'language paradigm' in discussions of art. Stafford 
(Stafford, 2007, p.171) emphasizes that as a result of such technological transformations, and  in 
response to profound changes in our understanding of the physical world brought about by quantum 
physics and in our understanding of consciousness made possible by the neurosciences,  “[f]inding ways 
to visualize blur, vagueness, ambiguity, equivocality, and uncertainty in all areas of scientific and 
cultural production are […] among the central issues of our time.” In Echo Objects (2007) Stafford 
brings neurophilosophical and neurological debates on consciousness into the very centre of aesthetic 
matters. 	 ﾠ
 
However, while such methodologies are certainly useful, they require further supplementation. Thus, I 
will seek to go beyond the phenomenological paradigm by positing an understanding of images that 
sites them not only in relation to ‘flesh’ or corporeality, but also to cognition. Furthermore, I challenge 
the  sufficiency  of  psychoanalytic r e a d i n g s ;   Bersani  and  Dutoit’s  paradigm,  for  example,  is  caught 
within  the d i a l e c t i c s o f  masochistic  dispossession  that  are  premised  on  the  narrowly  Freudian 
interpretation of the sexual impulses behind self-emptying.  In The Freudian Body (1986) Bersani sets 
out his premise: self-shattering as a  drive within art is essentially involved in masochistic tensions, a 
“domesticating and civilizing project (1986, p.111), and a “transmutation of the sexual into the cultural” 
through the negotiation of a liminal passage which always risks the “erasure of form in art” (1986, 
p.111). But this limiting of the dynamics of the experience of unboundedness to a Freudian aetiology 
fails to overcome the inherent Freudian bias against the ‘oceanic feeling.”
19  Lyotard’s preoccupation 
with the ‘figural’ and the sublime, for its part, also over-emphasises the dispossessive impulse within art 
though being tied to a Freudian model. As Jacques Rancière (2007) argues, Lyotard (and Deleuze) 
seems to sweep away any possibility of a negotiation between what is seeable and sayable. Similarly, 
Stafford’s  methodology,  like  Lyotard, o v e r e m p h a s i s e s  t h e  d i s r u p t i v e ,  n o n -narrative  status  of  self-
awareness at the expense of less boundary-breaking or self-shattering aspects of art, in addition to being 
hobbled by a tendency to pile up references and allusions from science, the humanities, and the arts in a 
maelstrom of data that tends towards inevitable obfuscation.   
 
One way of analysizing this problematic is suggested by Rancière (2007). He argues that modern 
culture as a whole should be seen as marked by a fatal bifurcation into Nietzsche’s two rival “plots of 
consciousness”: the ‘Apollonian’, which “weaves its way through its own opacity and the resistance of 
the materials, in order to become the smile of the statue or the light of the canvas”, and the ‘Dionysian’ 
(epitomised by Lyotard), which is “hatched by the unconscious and unleashes a pathos that disrupts the 
forms of doxa, and makes art the inscription of a power that is chaos, radical alterity…..the unthinkable 
in thought”. These contrasting impulses drive the modern self’s relationship to the world: one aims to 
consolidate the self, or what Freud would call the Ego, and thus to reinforce the various kinds of 
boundaries that separate self from world, while the other, traversed, or so Freud would argue, by the   46 
pulse of unconscious desires, works to dismantle the Ego and to erase boundaries. What is necessary is 
to identify a methodology that can trace the liminal borderline between ‘flesh’ and cognition – that 
explores what Derrida (2000) in his study of the philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy calls the ‘quasi-
corporeal’ - a space that is neither corporeal nor transcendental. 
 
 
François Jullien and East Asian Thought and Aesthetics 
Elkins is more sensitive to seeking an account that is a kind of ‘middle way’ between the cognitive and 
non-cognitive. However, his meta-art historical analysis often seems to abdicate to the pressure exerted 
by a sense of a cultural relativism and closure. Thus, for example, he poses the problem of cross-
cultural comparison at perhaps its most intractable when he concludes that the deep-rooted Western 
conventions inherent in any encounter between Western art history and Chinese art must overwhelm 
any possible investigations of the Chinese works themselves on their own terms or the ideas that inform 
them. For, so he argues (2010, p.139), while “it is true that we all see brushstrokes, flat surfaces, spatial 
cues, compositions, and so forth [….] the naming of such elements, the structure of our analysis, and 
the conviction that we are doing something that is phenomenologically fundamental to a perception of 
art, are all Western.”   
 
However, pace Elkins, in order to expand my methodology and to embrace other modes of analysis that 
are more conducive to an understanding of visual in-between-ness of “blur, vagueness, ambiguity, 
equivocality” and their contraries, in Chapter III I will bring Western thinking about figure-ground into 
confrontation with an alternative cultural paradigm. Such a methodology will also involve me in 
exploiting the principal insight of Gestalt psychology concerning figure-ground and its relationship to 
cultural norms: “In one culture [certain] experiences may be considered the most interesting for 
analysis, the most revealing of our basic humanity, the most fruitful to emphasize”, as the philosopher 
Thomas P. Kasulis (2002, p.22) writes. “In another culture, however, they might be considered 
common, not particularly revealing about very much.” In one culture certain things becomes ‘figure’, 
while others recede into the ‘ground’. But as Kasulis continues: “If we could then reverse the preference 
and focus on what is not normally emphasized in our culture we might be able to attain quite suddenly a 
glimpse into the other culture.”  
 
My decision to apply this comparative methodology is largely due to the fact that I have periodically 
spent time in South Korea from 2008, and have lived and worked there more or less permanently with 
my  Korean  partner  from  March  2010.    Not  surprisingly,  my  thinking  has  undergone  considerable 
changes, as has my studio practice. This Thesis, then, is an attempt to bring into focus some of these 
changes.  
 
Chapter III features a comparative discussion of East Asian and Western approaches to vision and 
visuality, while Chapter IV focuses on East Asian aesthetics, seeking to show how it gives a central 
place to what I am calling the “metamorphics of figure-ground”.  My principal guide will be François   47 
Jullien, who attempts to expand Western thought by exposing its limits.  In particular, Jullien proposes a 
paradigm that draws the ‘in-out’ rhythm or pulse of what I am calling the ‘anadyomene movement’ 
towards the centre, seeking to account for consciousness from the ‘inside’ rather than ‘outside’. The 
consequence of this relocation of agency is an interpretative framework that is firmly grounded in affect 
and empathetic relationships between artist and work, viewer and work, and self and world.   
 
My discursive methodology is comparative. I juxtapose two recursive cultural patterns, broadly defined 
by the French Sinologist and philosopher François Jullien as  ‘Greek’ and ‘Chinese’, and look at what 
they do with the perceptual field - with visuality. I ask what kind of ‘scopic regime’ they employ and 
how this relates to patterns of figure-ground segregation. 
20Jullien’s thesis amounts to an attempt to 
incorporate expanded notions of knowledge into epistemology, of the self into ontology, of language 
into semantics, and of perception into aesthetics. He stresses the absolute ‘otherness’ of  ‘Chinese’ and 
‘Greek’ cultures.  Indeed, this apparent Manichaeism has come in for some strong criticism, most 
notably from another influential French Sinologist, Jean-François Billeter (2006). The assertion of 
essential and irremediable difference, so Billeter argues, especially suppresses the specific political and 
therefore local and historically contingent origins of such differences.
21  In drawing on something called 
‘East Asian thought’, however, I will not be referring to such an absolute ‘other’, or to some 
fundamentally different and irreconcilable culture. I follow Jullien in seeing the apparent alterity of East 
Asian thought as a useful supplement (in the sense meant by Derrida of an absence that completes what 
is dominant within an episteme), but in my argument I will also be siding with Billeter, insofar as I 
prefer to find in the East Asian experience not absolute difference but rather scattered traces of the 
common ground of human experience. In other words, my purpose is to resist the binary East-West by 
problematizing it. I will be addressing not so much the antinomy of East and/or West, rather, their 
complementary relationship. Nevertheless, I will begin with the assertion that, as Jullien puts it, we can 
indeed identify two contrasting recursive orientations: towards ‘immanence’ (East) – characterised by 
in-between-ness, allusions and detours -  and ‘transcendence’ (West) – characterised by essences, clarity 
and finitude.  I believe that, in the specific context of this thesis,  thinking about  Jullien’s thesis offers a 
way in which to shed a very different light upon the breakdown of clear contrast between figure and 
ground.  For as Jullien stresses,  ‘in-between-ness’, the unclear and the indistinct lie at the heart of East 
Asian thought and aesthetics.  
 
My use of the term ‘East Asian’ is meant to suggest a broad, recursive orientation shared by a 
confederacy of diverse but connected cultures, just as ‘Western’ signifies cultures broadly influenced by 
classical thought and aesthetics. Jullien’s preferred shorthand is ‘Chinese’ and Greek’, but as I also want 
to think about Korea and Japan, I will use ‘East Asian’. I am well aware of the fact that there are 
considerable variations in cultural norms within the East Asian cultural region. In Korea in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century during the Joseon dynasty (1392-1910), for instance, there 
developed a unique landscape style that sought to free itself from the until then overweening dominance 
of Chinese models. ‘True-View landscape’ painting took shape in Korea under the influence of the artist 
Jeong Seon (1676–1759) [FIG 43], putting a special value on the direct and spontaneous response to   48 
particular locations, rather than on the depiction of generic and ideal scenes. In contrast to Chinese and 
Japanese works, Korean landscape paintings henceforth often displayed a more naturalistic and 
spontaneous treatment of the specific geography of the mountainous scenery typical of the peninsula.
22  
 
From a contemporary East Asian perspective, the value of referring to something called ‘East Asian 
culture’ may seem spurious, for it can be judged synonymous with reaction and the failure to embrace 
modernity.  Furthermore,  Western  interest  in  ‘the  Orient’  can  be  dismissed  as  mere  exoticism  and 
romanticism.
23 But I am not interested in reversing privileged distinctions, so that East Asian culture 
becomes, for example, the source of all ‘goodness’ and the West of all ‘decadence’, nor am I indulging 
in what Edward Said calls ‘Orientalism’ (1978). Or, if I am, then it is of the kind that J.J. Clarke (1997, 
p.9)  suggests is also available and viable. “Orientalism”, he writes,  “cannot simply be identified with 
the  ruling  imperialist  ideology,  for  in  the  Western  context  it  represents  a  counter-movement,  a 
subversive entelechy, albeit not a unified or consciously organized one, which in various ways has often 
tended to subvert rather than to confirm the discursive structures of imperial power.” So what I am 
doing – I admit it - is referring to a “characteristic family of attitudes and approaches that Europeans 
have taken to it [East Asia]” (Clarke, 1997, p.10), thereby hoping to construct a set of representations of 
East Asia that,  as it is explicitly understood, are “in pursuit of Western goals and aspirations.” (Clarke, 
1997, p.10)  
 
 
 
FIG.16.  Jeong Seon, Waterfall at Mt.Lu, ink on silk, 120,7x64,2cm,  National Museum of Korea. 
http://www.art-and-archaeology.com/korea/seoul/nmk06.html 
 
I will, then,  persevere in believing in the feasibility of a more global and tractable approach, one based 
on acceptance of commonalities and differences. I will be addressing not so much the antinomy of East 
and/or West but rather their complementary relationship, using East Asian art as what Jullien calls an 
‘elsewhere’. I refer not to hard-and-fast cultural differences but to recursive cognitive patterns or   49 
orientations that play more or less dominant roles within cultures. In short, I will deploy my 
methodology as “a roundabout way of disinterring buried possibilities, of reopening understanding” 
within our own Western culture, as Jullien (Jullien, 2005: xvi) puts it. Indeed, such confrontations seem 
unavoidable within the multiple meeting-places characteristic of contemporary global culture. In his 
seminal The Location of Culture (1994) Homi Bhabha argues that previously autonomous cultural 
orientations are now contested both from within and without, and that what is most likely to challenge 
the status quo are the obscure and fluid forms of hybridity to be found where cultures meet and merge,  
thereby displacing interpretation to the indeterminate liminal zone of the culturally ‘in-between’, to “the 
interstices – the overlap and displacement domains of difference – [where] the intersubjective and 
collective experiences of nationness, community interest, or cultural value are negotiated.” (1994, p.2) 
The broad context for my discussion, then, is not so much some ‘clash of civilizations’ as a situation 
within which two different worldviews are becoming more permeable to each other. Ultimately, the 
value of making this cross-cultural comparison lies in looking at where ideas overlap and meet, but also 
at where such meetings cease and trying to understand why.   
 
Thus one final research question is this:  traditional East Asian thought begins with similar premises to 
so-called postmodern thought in the West: the ‘self’ is recognised to be an illusion; the possibility of 
knowledge of a reality independent of thought is dismissed as untenable because there is no objective 
reality accessible to us; everything depends on the bias of the mind, rather than on anything we can 
identify as an innate attribute of reality itself; thus there is no escape from our lived experience, and we 
are profoundly limited by the interpretive knowledge of our mind -  trapped within the ‘prison house of 
language’. But within the different recursive orientations that I characterize as  ‘East’ and ‘West’ the 
interpretation and consequences of these insights are understood in quite different ways. For example, 
the former speaks above all of a movement between dispossession and recuperation, while the later 
mostly addresses only dispossession.  Why should this be? 
 
Much important knowledge is transmitted in non-discursive ways, and our encounters with art works  
are continuously disrupted by primary ontological and biological movements, with the cognitive and 
cultural determinants only constituting a final stage. But this subjectivized and initiatory dimension 
should be construed in neither a personalized and individualistic sense nor as merely a projection of 
subjective preferences. Rather, it involves the mirroring of feelings generated by the encountered 
artwork.
24  
 
My goal is to create a typology that straddles two different cultural paradigms while feeding off both. I 
juxtapose a paradigm founded on ‘transcendence’ with one founded on ‘immanence’, and posit the 
latter as giving a more productive place to the unclear and indistinct. For, as Jullien (2000, p.291) 
writes:  
 
The great image, that is, the image that contains all images (in the manner of the Tao) and manifests the source of 
things, is an un-imaged image, but it is not abstract (it does not refer to the level of essences): it has simply 
liberated its character of image from any anecdotal or specific aspect of its content; by retaining the indistinct, it   50 
remains open to plenitude. 
 
 
‘Action-based’ Research 
The content and rules communicated by art are of secondary importance to the practical training that is 
at the heart of what can be described as an ‘intimate’ form of knowing. This is why the performative 
dimension to my research is so important:  metis rather than techne, tacit doing, rather than theorized 
knowing (Shepherd, 2007, p.233). Empirical observation and analytical or logical reasoning make room 
for emotive identification. 
 
Barbara Maria Stafford (1991, p. 6) notes that within most critical discourses "nondiscursive 
articulations suffer from the fact that they do not say or read", and to counter this bias she argues that  it 
is necessary  to attribute to images an analogical value that does not depend on the protocols of the  
discursive. As Stafford (1999,p. 3) writes, analogy is 
 
born of the human desire to achieve union with that which one does not possess, is also a passionate process 
marked by fluid oscillations. Perceiving the lack of something – whether physical, emotional, spiritual, or 
intellectual – inspires us to search for an approximating resemblance to fill its place. That theological, 
philosophical, rhetorical, and aesthetic quest gave birth to the middle term: the delayed not-yet or the allusive not-
quite. This fleeting entity – participating both in what one has and what one has not, like and unlike the yearned-for 
experience – temporarily allows the beholder to feel near, even interpenetrated by, what is distant, unfamiliar, 
different. Denial and accommodation, retreat and advance, absence and presence [….].marks the capriccio 
dynamics of analogy’s jumps from antithesis to synthesis and then back again.  
 
Procedurally, I employ such an analogical approach while also utilizing in part an ‘action research’ 
methodology, involving a hermeneutical circle that includes practical planning, making, observing and 
reflecting (O’Brien, 1998). This is the purpose of the studio-based component of my research. Rather 
than trying to embody my discussion wholly in a written text, my approach is also performative, 
structural and formal. Instead of using only the ‘monological-retrospective-objective’ mode of 
discourse, I hope in my studio work to open onto what John Shotter terms its counterpart - the 
‘dialogical-prospective-relational’ mode (Shotter, 1999; 2003). Here the model is 'intersemiotic'; that is, 
it includes but also goes beyond the signifier and the semantics of language, being predominantly 
empirical and concrete rather than conceptual,  being grounded in action rather than reflection and 
analysis. This mode involves ways of thinking that respond in an immediate fashion, and is immersed in 
a living, bodily, affect-heavy, empathetic and participatory context. The ‘dialogical-prospective-
relational’ mode is practical rather than explanatory, and therefore disorderly and informal in kind (at 
least, according to the criteria laid down by the ‘monological-retrospective-objective’ mode), and it is 
predominantly analogical. It is involved in making connections, the “creative and tentative weaving 
together of individuated phenomena” (Stafford, 1999, p.61).
25 Ultimately, this approach posits a kind of 
“mindful but thoughtless” cognition (Shotter, 2003, p.371) as constituting a key aspect of knowledge 
gathering. It hopes to perform rather than describe, enact rather than narrate, embody rather than   51 
represent, and stage rather than exposit. Thus my Thesis will function on two interconnected levels: one 
is discursive and textual, and proceeds in the ‘monological-retrospective-objective’ mode, while the 
other is studio-based, visual and performative, and in the ‘dialogical-prospective-relational’ mode. 
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CHAPTER II: 
The Metamorphics of Figure-Ground in relation to my Studio 
Practice 
 
 
“Indistinctness is my fault.” Or  “Indistinctness is my forte.” 
Both comments attributed to J.M.W. Turner (1845), Finlay, 1999, p.228
26 
[N]othing escapes connectedness, the play of and between forms […..] In a sense, there is nothing ‘to know’, only 
the consciousness of the movement in which we participate.   
Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, 1998, p.72 
 
For, at every moment, numberless noisy perceptions exist within us – like a distant roar of the ocean – but without 
rising to consciousness through the focusing of apperception and reflection. 
Barbara Maria Stafford, 1999, p.129 
  
Pure touch gives access to information, a soft correlate of what was once called the intellect. 
Michel Serres, 2009, p.84 
 
My interest is in experience that is wordless and silent. 
Agnes Martin, 2005, p.89 
 
 
 
The essential vehicle for painting is the eye, which is both subjective and objective and functions as a 
mediating instrument. In my studio practice - as also in the kind of work that interests me - the viewer 
perceives slippages between figure and ground, producing a visually in-between situation that 
foregrounds this mediating role. Specifically, a finite representation generates greater subjective 
awareness of the indistinct - of evanescence, instability, undifferentiation, ephemerality, 
interconnectedness, transitoriness, unboundedness, and loss of structure.  Something ambiguous, 
inchoate, flux-like or deliquescent is emerging or subsiding within spatially indeterminate fields. The 
space my paintings convey can be described as a soft, indefinite, ambient, pulsing, and slowly changing 
field. Unfixed and in continuous process, a sense of the fluid and unfolding is conveyed, implying a 
preference for the subjunctive mood, insofar as the paintings produce transitional effects rather than 
steady states. They evoke an immersive environment. Forms dissolve into an expansive ambient 
ground, evolving relationships that engage the viewer’s capacity to imaginatively relate visual 
perception to subject and context while at the same time entering them into states of suspension, non-
knowing, negativity.  
 
The kind of experience I want my works to generate is a temporary and heightened sense of emptiness, 
but an emptiness that the viewer is also aware conceals a plenum of signs. For the experience of 
something indistinct is supplemented by another and converse one:  when viewed at closer distance and   54 
different light, my works also generate a contrary awareness – that of separateness, clear delineation, 
solid structure, and permanence. As a consequence, a more secure relationship to memory, and to the 
socially and historically given is delivered. Through the persistence of figure and ground differentiation 
at close viewing-range -  as through the formal geometry of the painting-support or frame - the 
legibility, discursivity and denotative specificity of a range of signs embedded within the matrix of 
specific historical references, means that the viewer experiences something more stable, coherent and 
familiar. Therefore, the effects produced undermine the sense of differentiation, boundary, or 
segregation central to figure-ground segregation but it does not wholly erase it. ‘Figure’ and ‘ground’ 
shift in relationship to each other, forestalling the possibility of my chromatic rectangles being 
perceived as merely blank, or offering the instantaneous sight of one colour. Instead, my works suggest 
movement, passage or transition. Signs exist in an ambiguous zone, and expresses condition, 
hypothesis, contingency, possibility and process, rather than stating anything definitive.  
 
 
Colour 
Iinitial contact with my paintings delivers the visual perception of a monochromatic rectangle, or an 
encounter with the ‘ground’ of the painting surface, or alternatively, with a rectangular ‘figure’ against 
the ‘ground’ of the wall [FIG.17, 21]. They convey a sense of an unmodulated colour-field, insofar as 
they seem at first to present the viewer with a blank, one colour rectangle. Thus there seems to be no 
internal figure-ground contrast, only a coloured surface. When my paintings are made in a small sized 
format  (about the same size as a book) and viewed from a distance,  they tend to read more assertively 
as ‘figures’ to the wall’s ground, and when hung side-by-side the colours of each canvas appear to 
advance and recede relative to each other upon the wall’s ‘ground’, suggesting variations in the 
perception of depth and strength of  the ‘figure’s’ status as ‘figure’. Colours play off each other, thereby 
incorporating the wall into their field, and are implicated in figure-ground segregations, functioning 
optically and helping to produce space. For, as Rudolph Arnheim notes (1956, p.231): “we are not 
surprised to find that a saturated red makes for figure more strongly than a saturated blue; this 
corresponds to the general tendency of red to advance and of blue to recede.”  
 
In my work, the flat painted surface is laid on uniformly and with a minimum of textures, or of other 
signs of bodily engagement announced through brush-mark traces, although through repeated layering I 
produce a kind of lattice-like ‘skin’, one that is neither too ‘industrial’ or frangible. Over the years, I 
have become aware that some colours work better than others, and as a result  I have progressively 
moved towards lighter tonalities, mixing white into the paint. I use colours that do not overly stimulate 
visual receptors – I want a non-strident, calming and silencing visual impact. Lighter tones also seem to 
more successfully facilitate the kind of in-between-ness that interests me, as they absorb rather than 
reflect the light, do not stand out in contrast so robustly from the whiteness of the wall, and facilitate 
more subtle plays of light over their surfaces.  
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FIG.17. Installation View of the Exhibition ‘The English Series’, Art First, London, 2008. FIG.19 is second from 
left. 
 
In being both material and sensual, colour first of all offers itself up to visual pleasure and so resists 
being fully incorporated into a code or sign-system.
 As Paul Klee wrote, as quoted in Merleau-Ponty 
(1993, p.141), colour is the “place where our brain and the universe meet”, where the secondary 
sensible properties of consciousness are most manifestly in opposition to the primary rational attributes. 
As a secondary property, colour is more subjective than line, playing on the emotions. Therefore, colour 
has traditionally been deemed to be of less epistemological value than the logos-serving line -  it is a 
mere extra used to supply visual pleasure (Gage, 1995, 2006; Batchelor, 2009).  
  
   56 
Colour, as the visual dimension of light,  is intrinsically shifting; it is a property of our retina rather than 
of objects, and generates a kind of pulsing, undulating sense of space. It causes an “effervescence of 
object and sign” (Kristeva, 1980, p.162), and through  “the unadulterated intensity of a single colour”, a 
space can become for us “nothing but undifferentiated light” (Bersani and Dutoit, 1993, p.118).
27  
Colour easily breaks free from its containment within contoured boundaries, eroding figure-ground 
patterns and roaming across the surface of the canvas, rendering the visual experience inherently more 
complex, and leading the eye of the viewer towards the nuanced play of the surface. Quixotic and ever-
changing, colour’s indeterminacy thus brings an awareness of the mobility of forms, and its shifting 
patterns foreground perceptual doubts about precise locations and contours. Colour substitutes 
vibrations for boundaries, blurring distinctions between inside and outside spaces, and its evanescent 
patterns, never static, entail the checking and verification of difference.  
 
Colour’s opposition to form and unstable relationship to the mimetic - or its  “truant quality” as Ann 
Eden Gibson (2003, p.195) puts it – have made it a favoured vehicle for the artistic exploration of what 
cannot, or cannot yet, be figured. In particular, the visual experience of a luminous chromatic emptiness 
or blank invites a range of responses and interpretations, becoming a potential space within which to 
project emotions and imaginative scenarios, and provoking a gamut of associations that can span 
extremes of human consciousness from despair to transcendence. For the artist Yves Klein (Klein, 
1982), for example, an expanse of his specially manufactured blue pigment served as a vision of the 
infinite beyond. Indeed, as Thomas McEvilley (1996, p.87) writes, “throughout the twentieth century 
the broad one-colour field has functioned both as a symbol for the ground of being and as an invitation 
to be united with that ground”.  
 
Colour cannot be considered as uncomplicatedly hard-wired to the nervous system or wholly liberated 
from the symbolic, however. We perceive colours purposively. In order for red to signify as something 
it must cease to simply be something we feel, and instead we must engage a cognitive function: 
“Henceforth the red is no longer merely there, it represents something for me”, writes Merleau-Ponty 
(1962, p.16). Furthermore, viewers inevitably attach particular meanings to colours, and responds to 
them not only as visual and expressive events, but on levels that encompass the intellectual, conscious, 
unconscious, and subconscious. Colour has cultural significance as a symbol in most languages 
throughout the world, and various meanings are associated with each one; for example, colours are used 
in religious and cultural rituals to symbolize significant aspects of belief.
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The colours I choose in my work, for example,  consciously carry the trace of their own historicity. 
Sometimes, the colours are suggested by the actual colour of the original book [FIG.15, Frontispiece], 
but often the connection is more oblique. I may think about colour associations brought on by the 
subject of the book, for example, using colour for its expressive potential.  Thus, a series of ‘English’ 
themed paintings were made in ‘autumnal’ hues to suggest a nostalgic or elegiac mood [FIG. 17, 18, 
19]. But I also think about how colours possess a history, and how an entire era or culture can be 
evoked through a certain tone of blue or green.  A series of Italian ‘Movie Poster Paintings’, for   57 
example, celebrating the golden age of Italian movie poster design, the colours were coded to the era 
when the movies were made, moving from subdued earth tones in the 1940’s to more stridently bright 
colours in the 1960’s [FIG. 21].  In Book-Paintings using Korean themes, I painted celadon ceramic 
colours and white – both colours possessing strongly Korean cultural resonance [FIG. 22, 23, 24] 
                    
 
 
 
FIG. 18.  Simon Morley, ‘Life Among the English’ (1942), 2007, acrylic on canvas, 30.5 x 40 cm. 
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FIG. 19. Simon Morley, A History of the English Speaking Peoples: Volume II, 2008, acrylic on canvas, 96x75cm.  
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FIG. 20. Simon Morley, ‘Twentieth Century Russia (Second Edition),1964’ (2008)  
acrylic on canvas, 30.5 x 40.5   60 
 
 
 
FIG.21. Simon Morley, ‘Poster-Painting’: Antonioni’s ‘L’Eclisse’, 1960, 2006, 96x72cm.  
Below: Installation view of ‘Cine Italia’ – a series of paintings based on Italian movie posters from the 1940’s – 
1960’s, Zonca & Zonca, Milan, 2008.They are in chronological order, left to right, and the penultimate painting is 
FIG. 21. 
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FIG. 22. Simon Morley, ‘The Truth About Korea (1951), 2011, acrylic on canvas, 40x30cm 
Below: detail 
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FIG 23. Simon Morley, ‘Song of Arirang (1941)’, 2011, acrylic on canvas, 40.5x30cm 
FIG 24.  Simon Morley, 'Korea Land of the Dawn (1931)', 2011, acrylic on canvas, 40.5x30cm   63 
‘Figuring the Word’ 
While my works corrode linear forms they do not entirely negate them, because on proximal inspection 
a clear figure-ground segregation establishes itself: words and images appear in semi-relief upon the 
painting’s surface.. At a crucial stage, text and image emerge from the chromatic envelope, and the 
picture plane is recognized as the site for the depositing of pre-existing text and typography. At this 
point my paintings shift the viewer from perceptual space into scriptive space, and the presence of 
verbal signs undermines the integrity of the monochromatic sensation.  Indeed, probably the most 
striking aspect of my paintings is the fact that they carry text, and the ‘Book-Paintings’ actually imitate 
and make an isomorphic connection with the cover or title page of a book.
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The appropriation of the book has two broad implications: it forces the paintings into the discursive 
realm of written signs, and it connects the paintings to historical contexts.  In my painting, ‘official’ 
historical narratives invade pictorial space. But instead of the firm perceptual and cognitive anchorage 
provided by a real book, these appropriated sources are re-inscribed within a more evanescent space.  
Furthermore, the connection to the book and to historical sources, render the paintings’ relationship to 
time and space decidedly and explicitly ‘impure’. A sense of historical period is explicitly carried over 
onto the title of the work, which record the date of publication of the appropriated source books, thereby 
setting the painting within a specific time frame. In the case of one of the works made during the period 
of my research, the triptych Zarathustra [FIG.15, Frontispiece], I was able to incorporate into one piece 
a span of historical time ranging from 1924 to 1950. The work thus resonates with the connotations of a 
historical period – in this case evoking an especially troubled period - a time of trauma - and pinning the 
words written by Nietzsche in the nineteenth century within a specific twentieth century drama. Colour, 
typography and design also relate to this time frame, which is demonstrated in Zarathustra on two 
levels: that of the appropriated book cover and of monochromatic colour. Typographical style shifts 
from the backward-looking Art Nouveau design of 1924, through the austere and visually unattractive 
serif font in 1943 (required no doubt by the war conditions), to a ‘noble’ classical style perhaps 
considered appropriate to post-war reconstruction and the return of ‘timeless’ values.
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“The wonderful thing about language”, writes Merleau-Ponty (1962, p.401), “is that it promotes its own 
oblivion. [….] My eyes follow the line on the paper, and from that moment I am caught up in their 
meanings, I loose sight of them. The paper, the letters on it, my eye and the body are there only as the 
minimum setting of some invisible operation. Expression fades before what is expressed, and this is 
why its mediating role may pass unnoticed.” In reading this sentence you are unlikely to note that it is 
typed in a particular font, Times New Roman, with its own unique visual shape, or that the heading 
above is in Arial Black, which unlike Times New Roman is a member of the more visually minimal 
and modern-looking family of sans serif. The fact that a letter is a ‘figure’ against a ‘ground’ goes 
unnoticed - the darkness and contour of the letters stand out against the ground of the page and this 
substrate does not consciously register. Especially in typewritten texts like this one we pass effortlessly 
from the signifier to what is signified.  
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Letters of the alphabet are a finite set of stimuli that are sharply focused, familiar and over-learned. 
Almost universally, black is the preferred colour for letter-shapes, which then function more stridently  
as ‘positive’ elements, while white or off-white is chosen for the receptive surface or ‘ground’, which 
recedes to be  dismissed as a ‘negative’ and irrelevant substrate. The identification of letters depends on 
what Gestalt psychology terms the ‘Law of Proximity’ – objects near to each other tend to be grouped 
together cognitively, because the brain more easily associates such objects as being connected. In 
contrast, unlike written signs, images consist of a finite and easily learned combination of shapes and 
are potentially infinite in form and structure – they are inherently polysemic. Therefore, they are often 
unfamiliar and more difficult to ‘read’. But when an image is constricted to the same contrastive 
elements as a letter -  flat dark ‘figure’ on light ‘ ground’ -  as occurs in many of my paintings,  it 
becomes even more difficult to ‘read’. The result is a confusion of the cognitive processes entailed in 
processing words and images. 
 
An encounter with one of my paintings also involves the perception of the movement of the word in the 
direction of the image. Immersed in an evanescent coloured haze,  they enact a kind of “figuring the 
word”, as Johanna Drucker (1998) puts it,  bringing to  awareness the material form of language. The 
linguistic sign’s conventional relationship to meaning cedes to something that is essentially 
‘unnameable’, and the viewer is distanced from the word’s discursive meanings and made more aware 
of noncognitive and affective qualities of the visual. Obliged to look and read, then look again, they are 
involved in shifts between different cognitive activities. Text moves from a typically scriptive model 
like this: 
 
WORD 
to one like this: 
 
WORD 
Or, more precisely, like this: 
 
 
WORD 
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At this kind of low visual contrast a letter’s usefulness diminishes, though familiarity with its shape will 
ensure recognition, even at considerable levels of blur. In fact, much less visual contrast than is  the  
norm with  regards to letters is actually needed to see such middle thickness shapes, as the visual system 
is more sensitive to these than to very thick or very thin ones.  
 
But the movement of text over into the more fluid and indeterminate pictorial space of forms is already 
implicit in most of my literary sources, insofar as I select examples of writing that are intended to 
contain an element of visual prominence. That is, a book cover is designed to attract the eye as much as 
the cognitive faculties. It is intended to have allure.  A text doesn’t look like this typewritten sentence, it 
looks more like this: 
 
WORD 
Text that has been cajoled in the direction of image, so that the viewer is already primed to be cognizant 
of the non-semiotic figural traces or gestural marks out of which the ‘figure’ or text has been made.
   
 
The turbidity of  text and images has the effect of softening, smoothing, uncoupling, loosening and 
dematerializing the discursive order. It forces the detachment of seeing from the determined activity of 
perceiving a clear and distinct sign. In looking at my painting the eye is drawn first  into the chromatic 
haze, then moves towards the play of illusion and the reading of signs, then in looking closer still, to the 
play of material surfaces, until once again, as it moves away again, the indeterminate coloured space re-
asserts itself. The effects I describe migrate my painting from ‘writing space’ into ‘pictorial space’. Text 
moves over into the arena of painting’s  ‘being-as-image”, as Norman Bryson calls it (1981, p.6) - a 
dimension far less restrained by the order of discourse.  
 
At one extreme, painting is closely tied to writing, as it is a coded system produced through the medium 
of visible marks – it is a ‘graphic’ space.  The word ‘graphic’ derives from the Greek graphein, which 
means both to write and draw. Scriptive or ‘graphic’ space – the space of signs - is a rationally 
coordinated arena of analysis, discourse, and logos. It is flat, tabular, and two-dimensionally regulated, 
and organised around spacings and intervals. Visual, perceptual space, on the other hand, unfolds in 
depth; it is gestural, rhythmical, embodied, and about connecting rather than dividing. Visual space is 
about looking, while scriptive space is about learning. Bryson suggests that paintings can be analysed 
according to the criteria established by two opposing models: the discursive, which is bound to 
‘scriptive space’, on the one hand, and what he calls the ‘figural’, on the other (from fingere, to form, 
and here used in a different way from ‘figure-ground’, in order to emphasise the visual rather than 
mental nature of painting) (Bryson, 1981, Chapter One). The ‘figural’ is visual space, and crosses and 
confuses the logical and ordered system of spacings that constitute the code of visuality with the   66 
ambiguous and indeterminate openness of the perceptual field. This ‘figural’ dimension is present in 
those aspects of visual display that  do not in any clear or coherent way serve the purpose of 
symbolizing a message or furthering a narrative meaning, and include the spatial organisation of a 
composition, the manner in which drapery and other details are depicted, those aspects of the work 
organised in relation to effects of light and dark, the decorative application of colour and line, 
brushstrokes and surface facture. These all seem in excess to a purely discursive task, they are a 
surfeit.
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The ‘figural’ also presses on verbal signs: it intervenes in the protocols of signifying at the level of the 
signified by unstitching the tight weave of the discursive whenever the semantic function of the sign is 
undermined by the ambiguity and evocativeness of the image itself; but it also clearly permeates at the 
level of the signifier, because ‘figurality’ is there in the visual appearance of the graphic marks used to 
inscribe forms in space, and pushes towards the non-semiotic characteristics of the mark.  
 
At one extreme of visual representation, then, are glyphs or hieroglyphics, or visual signs that imply the 
possibility of containing the visual within an artificial and strictly determined socially-conditioned 
semiotic code, at the other are figural traces or gestural marks laid down on a surface, elements in 
excess of any code and driven by the movement of the body. From the point of view of discursive 
language these ‘figural’ elements are an unnecessary addition, an apparent irrelevance, even a threat. 
Furthermore, drawn and painted marks usually have a more fragile and insecure attachment to their 
grounds. The result is that there is always, more or less, an inherent instability within the pictorial field. 
Indeed, as James Elkins (1998, p.125) argues, “pictures are incoherent ab ovo from the outset of 
perception and from the first moments when they seem to generate meaning. They only gradually 
reform themselves into the shapes of historical interpretation and semiotic structure by appealing to our 
desire for meaning and our aversion to blatant meaninglessness.”  
  
 
Foveal and Peripheral Vision 
In my painting, levels of perceptual uncertainty occur through which the positive-negative binarism of 
an existing figure-ground segregation is undermined. Optically, my paintings challenge the perceptual 
and conceptual acuity of ‘normal’, clear, and distinct vision by simulating defocus or diffuseness at the 
retina through the blurring out of detail and sharp edges, and reduction of contrast. The effect of 
peripheral vision is partially shifted towards the centre.
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The physiological activities involved in creating ‘normal’ visual space are an affair almost entirely of  
what is called the ‘foveal centre’. Foveal vision draws the visual field around a focal point and flattens it 
at the periphery.
33  This delivers clear detail and perception in depth, and the ability to distinguish 
patterns, and to organize them into schemata, such as figure-ground. It is this kind of vision that makes 
the optical sense the most useful for the creation of rational space. But as FIG. 25 shows, foveal vision   67 
 
 
FIG. 25.  Foveal and Peripheral Vision.  
Source: Ethington, 2011 p.141. 
 
constitutes only a very small zone of potential perceptual data, and this zone is far more dominated by 
cognitive processes than is peripheral vision. Indeed, in humans foveal vision is the most pronounced of 
that of all the primates, and resolution is about 100 times that at the periphery, but it is only about 1º 
across, while the part of the visual field that is actually brought to resolution is no more than 3º across. 
This acuity corresponds to a lack of acuity in peripheral vision (in contradistinction to animals such as 
deer and other herbivores who employ a much wider perceptual field), so this fundamental bifurcation 
of vision yields a locus of foveal attention and simultaneously a nebulous field of peripheral awareness. 
Psychologist Robert L. Solso (1996, p.23) notes: “Foveal vision subtends a very small angle of view, 
while impressions in the parafovea (the region surrounding the fovea) are somewhat less distinct. Even 
impressions up to 30º from the centre are discernible, but are much less clear than central impressions. 
Stimuli in peripheral vision are poorly resolved.”  
 
 Such foveal or ‘centric’ vision, and the kinds of pattern segregations it produces, depends on a static 
and immobile stance – the eye bores a channel through space towards a target. The optic nerves  arrayed 
at the foveal centre provide much better data than the other senses in relation to the establishment of a 
clear, finite and distinct gestalt.  
 
Hans Jonas (1966, p.136 – 150) suggests that three characteristics of the organ of sight as it functions at 
the foveal centre are especially phenomenologically salient in relation to its dominance over hearing, 
touch, smell and taste: simultaneity (vision delivers a simultaneous presence of a whole field, it   68 
neutralizes a sense of dynamism and seems to extend the present moment) (1966, p.136); neutrality (“I 
see without doing” (Jonas, 1966:146)); and distance (vision requires a sufficient distance between self 
and world to process it, suggesting autonomy and  independence of subject and object (1966, p.149-
150). As Jonas concludes: “The gain is the concept of objectivity, of the thing as it is in itself as distinct 
from the thing as it affects me, and from this distinction arises the whole idea of theoria and theoretical 
truth.” (1966, p.147) The visual, as a result, “tends to unite the senses and semantics in a kind of 
gestalt”, writes Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan and Zingone, 1995, p.340). “When the visual sense is 
played up above the other senses, it creates a new kind of space and order that we often call ‘rational’ or 
pictorial space and form”, McLuhan (McLuhan and Zingone, 1995, p.340) declares.  “Only the visual 
sense has the properties of continuity, uniformity and connectedness that are assumed by Euclidian 
space. Only the visual sense can create the impression of continuum.”  
 
In contrast, peripheral vision draws our attention to the ground that is always present during the figure-
ground segregation. But most of the time we are completely unaware of the periphery’s importance, and 
therefore also of the ground.  Indeed, as Jean-François Lyotard (2010, p.152-156) notes, the contrast 
between the peripheral margins of the visual field and its focal centre is as an example of how ‘normal’ 
consciousness is organized in relation to a narrow point of view, and how it registers deviations from 
such organization as meaningless confusion.   But in fact, Lyotard argues, the periphery is in a sense 
more ‘truthful’, because it communicates awareness of the unbalanced configuration of space before the 
construction of a stable figure-ground gestalt. Indeed, the periphery undermines the stability of the 
world established by discourse, and so constitutes a menace to the ordered systems that it maps. “The 
first contact”, Lyotard (2010, p.154) writes, “the entrance of something at the edge of the field – this is 
visual otherness, an invisible of the visible.” For the periphery engenders an energy that injects opacity 
into the lucid realm of the foveal centre. It disrupts and prevents any discursive ordering. Thus the gap 
between edge and centre within the visual field involves more than simply the difference between two 
points: 
 
This gap gives much more than the here and the elsewhere, the front and the back. It gives the qualitative 
discontinuity of the two spaces in their simultaneity: the curved, twilight, fleeting, lateral space of the first 
peripheral contact with something, and the stabilized, constant, central rectangular space of the grasp of foveal 
vision. This grasp is a seizure, a prehension, an impounding akin to a preying, laborious, linguistic grip. (Lyotard, 
2010, p.154) 
 
Peripheral vision is   ‘subliminal’ or unconscious, a kind of vision with the capacity to scan the total 
field through a haptic appraisal of percepts, and it is also prone to easy malleability. Only if we 
immobilize or blind the focus - for example, as happens at twilight, can the peripheral shapes “manifest 
themselves in all their elusive dreamlike quality ” Anton Ehrenzweig (1967, p. 274) writes. Peripheral 
vision unconsciously has the ability to continuously scan the total field, and this is in opposition to 
foveal vision’s attempts at a narrow range of control. This demonstrates “the undifferentiated structure 
of primary process phantasy” (Ehrenzweig, 1967: 263) which pre-dates the ego’s ability to organize the 
field into stable patterns. Therefore, “Our visual field does not look like a bad photograph in which   69 
everything except the centre is grossly out of focus and blurred. Vagueness and blurredness alone do not 
repel conscious attention in the way the peripheral visual field does.” (Ehrenzweig,1967, p.274).  
 
Foveal vision is always in fact a kind of reading, while the periphery is in some senses more 
authentically seeing (Lyotard, 2010, p.156). As a result, as Juhani Pallasmaa (2005, p.10) writes:  
“Focused vision confronts us with the world whereas peripheral vision envelops us in the flesh of the 
world.”  Peripheral vision can never be ‘captured’ in attention: “the peripheral is not only blurred, it is 
other, and any attempt as grasping it looses it.” (Lyotard, 2010, p.155) It is elusive, because as soon as 
we seek to attend to it, the periphery automatically becomes the centre.  
 
 
Contrast and Spatial Frequencies 
It takes time to ‘tune in’ to the figure-ground segregation in my ‘Book-Paintings’ and related 
‘monochrome’ paintings due to the low spatial frequencies involved. The process involved is rather like 
getting accustomed to the dark after being in a more illuminated space. The eye must adapt to the 
greater diffuseness of contrast, and this is why initially a viewer may think they are looking at a purely 
monochromatic surface. But once they have adjusted to the low spatial frequencies, the image and text 
emerge. Before each painting the process of pattern formation or the segregation of the visual field is 
therefore more overtly enacted, and as such, segregation will remain cognitively conscious, registering 
as contingent and as part of a process. 
 
If you look at any picture out of the corner of your eye, using peripheral vision, it will appear blurry and 
smaller, but looked at straight on, in foveal vision, it comes into focus. This is because we can see high 
spatial frequencies (fine details) with our central vision but not low spatial frequencies (broad, blurry 
patterns), which are accessed with our peripheral vision. In reading this page you are currently using a 
high spatial frequency channel to discriminate the printed letters. In looking at a page of text at a low 
spatial frequency, on the other hand, the letters will blur and the high spatial frequency information will 
be lost, with the result that the individual letters of words will coalesce into rectangles of paragraphs, 
which will appear as blocks of dark grey.  FIG.26 shows one of my series of ‘Paragraph-Paintings’ in 
which I simulate this effect (inadvertently, until my research enlightened me). Normally, paintings 
display a combination of low, medial, and high frequencies but coalesce in the eyes at medial 
frequency. An example of a work of art made with a much greater level of high frequency than is usual 
is a pointillist painting by Georges Seurat, though it still forms into low frequencies at greater viewing-
distance.   70 
 
FIG.26.  Simon Morley, ‘Osip Mandelstam’: Penguin European Poets, 2008, acrylic on book pages. 
 
Figure-ground segregation depends on the establishment of clear visual contrast [FIG.11]. Indeed, as 
James Elkins (2000, p.79) stresses, contrast is fundamental to the making of meaning in general: 
“Without a contrast between one thing and another, I cannot know anything: whether it is the distinction 
between a printed letter and its white page, or the difference between a person I love and every other 
person. Contrast creates meaning”. Blurring out of fine detail, sharp edges, and contrast sensitivity, as 
occurs in my painting, frustrate normal perceptual activity. Loss of contrast challenges visual acuity, 
producing an ambient field that works to erode the tangibility of signs.  
 
 
 
FIG. 27.  Variations in Contrast. 
http://vision.psy.mq.edu.au/~peterw/csf.html   71 
 
 
 
FIG. 28.  Medium, Low and High Spatial Frequency Channels. 
http://www.ics.uci.edu/~majumder/vispercep/spatialvision.pdf 
 
Typically, changes in visual stimulation like luminance, colour, texture, motion, and even depth can 
determine contours, but the most basic producers of contour are changes in luminance and  changes of 
texture. The distinct nature of contours is the precondition for identifying ‘figures’ in space, even when 
we know that our identification of such figures neglects the multiple points at which they are in fact 
indistinguishable from the ground. As Solso (1996, p.53) writes: “The eye and brain are excellent edge 
and line detectors and process that type of information in a deceptively casual manner.” Dark-to-light 
transitions are first-order cues, and are usually the most important features exploited by the visual 
system to segment an image in figure-ground (Issa and Rosenberg, 2011, p.117). But the process of 
segregation is so fundamental, and the eye and brain so adept at detecting lines or contours and 
processing the information that, as Solso (1996, p.53) writes, “our common impression is that edges and 
lines are simple components of the ‘real world’”, while “we believe that other processes, such as 
understanding mathematics or reading, are complex because they require years of training to do well.”  
 
At low contrasts, there is more ‘noise’, which limits detection of shapes; at higher contrasts, the 
contribution of the ‘noise’ diminishes, being tuned out by the larger responses from the relevant 
channels. Half closing the eyes will automatically reduce spatial frequency, encoding coarser luminance 
variations at low frequency. High frequency channelling provides the finely detailed perceptual 
resolution, while at the periphery vision is diffuse and coarser, working at low frequencies. Low 
frequencies are global, and deal with patterns of light or luminance, while high frequencies are local, 
and detect edges.
 Figure is delivered more by high spatial frequencies, while ground is more sensitive to 
low spatial frequencies [FIG. 27, 28] Low frequency vision is located in brain areas with small 
receptive fields, and as a result does not generate coherent object boundaries. High frequencies, 
meanwhile, is largely indifferent to a specific vantage point and so more abstract, and is the main source 
of object recognition. Generally we are aware of perceiving the visual field at medium or intermediate 
frequency, and these generate coherent viewpoint-specific representations. The locus of conscious 
experience thus lies in the intermediate level of visual perception, indeed it is now believed in some 
theories of consciousness that it is here that consciousness itself takes place (Prinz, 2012, p.54). 
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FIG. 29.  High and Low Contrast Grating 
http://vision.psy.mq.edu.au/~peterw/csf.html 
 
 
 
 
FIG 30. Filtering by Spatial Frequency Channels. 
Source: Landy. 
 
In foveal vision, outlines or contours establish space, enabling forms to stand out and delimiting them. 
‘Figure’-making activity depends on a combination of high and low spatial frequencies (variations in 
the perception of line spacing or grating) [Fig. 27-30]. Such spatial frequencies are a property not of the 
world but of our retina. How does the production of contrast happen on a physiological level? On the 
left of FIG.29 is a series of repeating ‘grating’ bars at high contrast - the light bars have a very high 
intensity and the dark bars have a very low intensity. The right hand grating has lower contrast because 
the light bars are not very light and the dark bars are not very dark. As the dashed horizontal lines in the 
graph shows, both gratings have the same average intensity or luminance. Changing average intensity 
makes the average luminance either lighter or darker; changing contrast leaves the average the same but 
makes the blacks blacker and the whites whiter.  FIG. 30 shows three gratings of different contrast but 
the same average luminance. Contrast decreases from left to right, and the grating on the right is hardest 
to see, as the difference between its whitest white and its blackest black is very small, or the difference 
between its peak luminance and its trough luminance is minimal, and it perceptually appears to pulse or   73 
to be undergoing a transition. A ‘first-order’ image feature - for example, a boundary between dark and 
bright regions – is defined directly by variations in light intensity, and delivered by high spatial 
frequencies. Second-order image features, on the other hand, are defined by variations in contrast, and 
are delivered by low spatial frequencies.  
 
 
 
 
FIG. 31. The Cornsweet Illusion 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cornsweet_illusion 
 
A stable figure-ground gestalt requires luminance and contrast, strong and constant light. The 
environmental enemy of figure-ground is low spatial frequencies, and its nemesis is darkness. Without 
radiant and ambient light, contrast cannot be perceived, and with a paucity of adequate external 
information the imagination may compensate by supplying meanings, projecting virtual contrasts into 
the void, hoping thereby to guarantee some kind of cognitive mastery. Indeed, without sufficient 
perceptual cues we indulge in cognitive filling-in:  we compensate for lack of a contour by creating one. 
In the Cornsweet illusion  [FIG.31], for example, the left part of the image seems to be darker than the 
right. In fact they have the same brightness, as can be seen in viewing the same image with the edge 
down the middle hidden so that the left and right part of the image appear as they really are – the same 
luminance.  
 
When there are no contours whatsoever, or when there is no overall contrast,  a suspension of spatial 
frequency channeling occurs. Without spatial frequencies, an undifferentiated perceptual expanse 
induces a kind of blindness, such as happens in a Ganzfeld – such as a sea mist or fog (or an artwork by 
James Turrell). Such sensory deprivation can lead to significant changes in consciousness, and the   74 
motor disturbance can include the loss of the sense of balance and/or coordination. As Solso (Solso, 
1996: 52) writes, in Ganzfeld experiments “subjects report complete (temporary) loss of vision after 15 
minutes and do not know if their eyes are open or closed.” Indeed, in such an extreme situation the 
subject is likely to substitute internally generated imagery for the absent external sensory stimuli. 
‘Continued deprivation of visual contours may result in hallucinations.” (Solso, 1996:52)  
 
 
Texture 
A large amount of information defining a visual field is carried by ‘second-order’ features, such as 
changes in texture, that serve to cue object boundaries (Issa and Rosenberg, 2011, p.116-117). As 
Rudolph Arnheim (1954, p. 229) notes, for normal perception “the surrounded figure possesses greater 
density than the looser ground”, which means, “when the density of texture is increased by graphic 
means, the figure-ground situation created by the contour can be either strengthened or reversed. 
Texture makes for figure.” [FIG. 31]
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FIG: 32. Texture and Figure-Ground. 
Source: Arnheim, 1954, p.230. 
 
My paintings are characterised by significant contrasts in texture, rather than contrast in colour or tone. 
The  ‘ground’ is relatively flat, with a smooth application of paint, while the ‘figure’ is built up with 
layers of impasto. The ‘figure’ is strengthened through the building up of texture within the contour, 
which thus consolidates its status as ‘figure’. Furthermore, the encounter with this ‘figured’ status is 
belated, coming only on proximal viewing. Because of loss of colour contrast or contour, distinctions 
between fields is delivered more through texture variations than is usual, and even though contrast and 
contour are suppressed, a sense of ‘figure’ is donated to the text and/or image because they are raised 
above the ground in painted relief and so stand out from the ground due to variations of texture 
highlighted by ambient effects of light upon the surfaces - shadows are cast within the painterly terrain 
and shift depending on the time of day or position of the viewer. The flatness of the picture-plane is 
reinforced by surface facture and monochromism, but also by the fact that the imagery is reduced to 
simple flat contrasts of a lighter and darker tone, and with minimal tonal difference. The loss of contrast 
this entails is counterbalanced, however, by a sharp increase in the usual ratio of textures.  The 
illusionistic three-dimensionality of the original sources – be they photographs or paintings – is 
suppressed, and instead image works in a similar way to text, though as a result the legibility of the 
image is reduced rather than increased.    75 
 
Recognition of figure-ground differentiation therefore comes through a more haptic and tactile, almost 
sculptural, differentiation between surfaces. The haptic response to a painting’s representation involves 
perception at close range, while the ‘optical’ necessitates viewing from a distance. The haptic engages 
peripheral vision and low spatial frequencies. In this spatial mode a rigid link is made between the eye 
and the hand, and frontal or proximal viewing is essential. Unlike optical space, the negotiation of 
haptic space takes place, as Gilles Deleuze (2003, p.123) notes, within a kind of “darkness”. The effect 
is then such that “the form and the ground lie on the same place of the surface, equally close to each 
other and to ourselves.”   
 
 
Surface, Movement and Time  
My paintings draw attention to planar or surface conditions. As in monochrome abstract painting, in the 
first stage of viewing they move the bounding edge to a new location – beyond the physical limit of the 
painting’s support and onto the point where work meets the wall itself.  This forestalls the tendency to 
read the painting as a window or stage, and instead it becomes an object in real space, a perpendicular 
plane, but still a figure (a painted rectangle) against a ground (a wall). As the viewer moves in closer, 
however, the coloured surface begins to assert itself as its own ground, because the painted field extends 
only to the two-dimensional limits of the rectangle and does not curve round the edges to cover the 
sides – which are normally 4cm deep and painted white or left unpainted altogether.  But changes in 
viewing position rescue the perception of one of my paintings from the fate of monochromatic 
nondifferentiation, and guides the viewer towards a more stable and familiar kind of segregation of the 
perceptual field involving organization into figure and ground (words become visible and then legible, 
images emerge from the chromatic envelope).  Despite the obstacles put in the way of normal readings 
of the visual field, in the end a gestalt does establish itself. But such mutability invites a more active 
encounter than is usual with painting. A fuller experience of space, delivering a sense of depth, 
supposes such mobility - a  kinaesthetic engagement which generates  “the movements of the look”, as 
Merleau-Ponty (1968, p.134) terms it.  
 
The viewer must locate and adopt positions from where to gather visual data. This entails an active role 
for the viewer’s body, in which changes occur to cognitive readings via perceptual ones. In this sense, 
my work is viewer-activated. I foreground the fact that a painting is an object that is passed – not just 
seen head-on and in an isolated context, but also seen from the side, with peripheral vision, and in the 
context of other paintings. The adopted viewing distances, performed in time, determine the relative 
authority of figure or ground, image or surface.  This involves a kind of “embodied temporality” (John 
Hay, 2007, p.448). Responses to the figure-ground oscillation also change in relation to the size of 
perceptual field encountered; with a small canvas surface-area, read as a rectangular ‘figure’, it is not 
difficult to grasp the whole configuration in one glance, taking in both the rectangle and the marks 
within the rectangle. But, as the psychologist Jan Bouman (quoted in Elkins, 1998, p. 84) notes: “when 
we are confronted with a field which is five times bigger, the whole situation becomes different. We can   76 
now fixate parts of the whole configuration in an easier manner. Our eyes find ‘hooks’ to ‘hang’ our 
glances upon [….] it is indisputable that a five times bigger figure is another figure”, that it is, 
differentiable from the figures within.” This activity is connected to the  limitations of ‘normal’ vision. 
“Because sharp [or foveal] vision is restricted to a narrow band of available stimuli,” writes Solso 
(1996, p. 23-24), “we view objects, such as paintings, with eyes that are constantly refocusing on 
different regions. A consequence of this eye movement is that we do not see a painting all at once, as is 
commonly thought, but by formatting an impression based on a large number of individual eye fixations 
that examine details falling within foveal vision.” 
 
For my Book-Paintings I use three different sizes. The first makes the homology with a book explicit 
and one-to-one [FIG. 17, 20, 22, 23, 24]. A book is scaled to the human body in order to be easily 
handled and portable. My paintings at this size therefore relate to the body of the viewer via their habits 
of reading. But my works are displayed vertically on a wall rather than either vertically on a bookshelf, 
horizontally, or diagonally. The scale in this context is also an intimate one, especially as a viewer is 
obliged to move in close in order to read/see the surface. But this kind of intimacy diminishes as the 
size of the paintings increase. The medium-sized ‘window’ paintings suggest a link to conventional 
landscape, portraits, or other mimetic genres, or in a rather different context - which again is more 
homologous - to monumental inscriptions [FIG. 18]. But they may also now read as ‘Big’ books, with a 
metaphoric implication of importance, even bathos. At this scale, the colour becomes more absorptive 
and assertive, and on approaching, quickly exceeds the field of vision to become a field. In the biggest 
scaled paintings –- an analogy to a doorway is implied, or to a large window, or also to monumental 
inscriptions [FIG.15]. They become more architectural, more immersive. Here too, the chromatic 
intensity increases substantially. The surface becomes more productive, conveying a greater sense of 
texture. Intimacy is replaced by a feeling of the colossal or monumental - even of the intimidating.  
Varying formats size serves to accentuate the ways in which figure-ground functions at different levels, 
so that what was ground can become figure, depending on the limits placed on the perceptual field and 
the focus of attention. 
 
In order to produce the raised and tactile terrain, I slowly apply layers of acrylic paint. As a depository 
of indexical signs, one of my painting’s surfaces resonates with the traces left behind by persistent and 
laborious bodily contact.  It also marks the time of the work’s making, recording in spatial terms the 
cycle of production, thereby signaling the location of a specific kind of structured time, one with a 
slower rhythm. This slowness is also conveyed through the lack of colour contrast and stridency, and by 
the ambiguity of figure-ground. Corporeal contact foregrounds the work’s affective qualities, which can 
be understood as communicating potential, relayed through touch or haptic sight.  Surface in this sense 
phenomenologically links the ontological status of the mark to that of the maker.  
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Visual Ambiguity  
At birth the brain is a reservoir of potential that is then manipulated by the world, and the essential 
openness of perception is closed down by the limits imposed by cognitive processes. As Merleau-Ponty 
(1962, p.313) noted: 
 
We now begin to see a deeper meaning in the organization of a field: it is not only colours, but also geometrical 
forms, all sense-data and the significance of objects which go to form a system. Our perception in its entirety is 
animated by a logic which assigns to each object its determined features in virtue of those of the rest, and which 
‘cancel out’ as unreal all stray data; it is entirely sustained by the certainty of the world.  
 
Concentrating our gaze on an object means we “become anchored in it, but this coming to rest of the 
gaze is merely a modality of its movement: I continue inside one object the exploration that earlier 
hovered over them all, and in one movement I close up the landscape and open the object.” (1962, p.78) 
Thus a ‘horizon’ of meaning limits what we are able to see.  As Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. 440) observes: 
 
[A]s Gestalt psychology has shown, there are for me certain shapes which are particularly favoured, as they are for 
other men, and which are capable of giving rise to a psychological science and rigorous laws. The grouping of dots 
• • • • • • • • • • • •  
is always perceived as six pairs of dots with two millimetres between each pair, while one figure is always 
perceived as a cube, and another as a plane mosaic. It is as if, on the hither side of our judgement and our freedom, 
someone were assigning such and such a given grouping.  
 
But given that the subject has a limited capacity to process information, it attempts to adopt strategies 
that simplify complex problems, and is forever trying to conserve cognitive energy. This extends 
beyond visual perception to all kinds of situations. Thus the dominant need at any time becomes the 
foreground ‘figure’, and the other needs recede, at least temporarily, into the background. For example, 
a person may be thinking about a particular relationship, which is then ‘figure’, but as soon as the focus 
is shifted to thoughts about a job, the job becomes ‘figure’.  Needs move in and out of the ‘figure’ and 
‘ground’ fields. After a need is met it recedes into the ‘ground’, and the most pressing need in the new 
gestalt then emerges from the ‘ground’ as a new ‘figure’.  Inevitably, such ‘filling-in’ can lead to 
serious errors and biases, especially when the wrong simple strategy it selected, or a vital piece of 
information is ignored. But in this way a particular need can emerge, be met, and then direct a person's 
behavior. According to the social psychologists Susan Fiske and Shelly Taylor, human beings are by 
habit “cognitive misers” (Fiske and Taylor, 1991).  Certainty – the banishment of doubt, the imposition 
of an‘either/or’- is the reward of rationality.  
 
In reality, as Richard Gregory (1998, p.205) emphasises: “any retinal images is infinitely ambiguous”. 
In other words, it “could correspond to, or represent an infinity of possibilities of shapes and sizes and 
distances of objects”. As a result, “perception is a matter of making the best bet on the evidence.” 
(Gregory, 1998, p.186)  And, as visual perception is active, “perceptual structures do not always force 
themselves upon the observer; there are some which are ambiguous. But these reveal even more   78 
effectively the presence within us of spontaneous evaluation: for they are elusive shapes which suggest 
constantly changing meanings to us.” (Merleau-Ponty,1962, p.440).   
 
The subject enters a field of potential meanings and is confronted by the possibility of confusion and 
loss of self-mastery, but it also has the possibility of reinterpreting or redefining the field in ways that 
do not simply take the most familiar or safest routes. Through the recognition of the presence of a 
‘horizon’ – the uncoupling of perception from unreflective acceptance of the dominant gestalt - the 
subject may transform situations and changes perspectives. But as we saw, ccognitively, the goal for 
consciousness when it is faced with the bewildering onslaught of percepts is to resolve ambiguity in the 
simplest way possible.  “It is remarkable”, Gregory (2000, p.1141) writes 
 
That line figures may flip spontaneously in depth, or change from one object to another with little or no conscious 
control. How else can one understand this, except by thinking of the alternative perceptions as different hypotheses 
of what may be out there? How can one (should one?) avoid the general conclusion that perception is not stimulus-
driven, as it can take off from the world of objects it seeks to capture?   
 
Children are more attuned to and at ease with the kinds of reversals that are always potentially part of 
perception: “Once upon a time,” writes David Michael Levin (1999, p.172),  “our vision could move 
freely, spontaneously, back and forth, between dream and reality, fact and fantasy.” The ludic energy 
that children unleash permits the suspension of inhibitions and constraints, and implies a temporary 
freedom from the dominance of the habitual and often oppressive social and environmental influences, 
implying that the normative activity requiring the  “forceful seizure of shape” can be replaced by “the 
leisurely pursuit of taking shape”, as Barbara Maria Stafford (2011, p.19) puts it. But the adult self can 
also potentially continue to encounters things and people in the pre-analytical, pre-logical and pre-
cognitive ways that in children are dominant.  
 
In the well-known examples in Fig.33 we see either a goblet or two faces in profile in figure-ground 
segregation, an old woman or a young one, either a duck or a rabbit, shapes or text. In the second and 
third examples, however, the gestalt shift will probably be harder, and even when both gestalts can be 
seen, many people will favour one over the other when they first look again at the picture. As the final 
example shows, such  ‘recursivity’ can also infect texts. The ability to explore  ambiguous figures, 
writes Levin (1999, p.172), allows our eyes 
 
to play with the freely flowing interplay that is possible between figure and ground, to soften the dualism that 
typically differentiates figure and ground. The duplicity of these images makes them intriguing; it also makes them 
a source of visual pleasure. In their presence, one experiences a certain jouissance, a certain delight, a certain quite 
singular freedom: it is as if one were magically transported back in time—back to the innocent enchantments of 
early childhood. For, once upon a time, our vision knew nothing of the inhibitions, the constraints, the disciplinary 
regimes to which, in due time, it would be subjected. Once upon a time, our vision could move freely, 
spontaneously, back and forth, between dream and reality, fact and fantasy. For the child, Gestalt reversals were 
natural events, manifestations of a mimetic magic inherent in the visionary world. Why shouldn't a duck turn into a 
rabbit or a rabbit turn into a duck?
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FIG. 33. Ambiguous Figures – Goblet, Old Women or Young Women, Duck-Rabbit, Text (MAILBOX)  
Sources: ‘Goblet’-  http://www.tau.ac.il/~tsurxx/FigureGround/Figure-ground+mp3New.html  
Duck-Rabbit - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Duck-Rabbit_illusion.jpg 
Old Women or Young Women - http://www.pbthomas.com/science_&_faith.htm 
Ambiguous text. Source: Hofstader, 2000, p.75. 
 
 
When we become aware of being able to shift between readings of figure and ground we have made a 
gestalt switch. “Aware that nothing in his environment has changed,” as Thomas Kuhn (1996, p.114) 
writes,  the subject in this situation “directs his attention increasingly not to the figure (duck or rabbit) 
but to the lines of the paper he is looking at. Ultimately he may even learn to see those lines without 
seeing either of the figures, and he may then say (what he could not legitimately have said earlier) that it 
is these lines that he really sees but that he sees them alternately as a duck and as a rabbit.” 
  
Ambiguity’ in this context means the possibility of perceiving any given situation or aspect in more 
than one way. ‘Indeterminacy’ is a related but distinguishable phenomenon, indicating the fact that the 
perceptual process conceals aspects of a situation at the same time as revealing other aspects. In other 
words, it is impossible for everything given to perception to be perceived in a determinate way. 
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While the duck-rabbit and other ambiguous figures demonstrate the shifting nature of figure and ground 
through de-regulations of the bounding line or contour, my paintings generate ambiguity more through 
reduced contrast and apparent loss of focus, as in the bottom image in FIG.11. Because of this loss of 
contrast, and the subsequent oscillations in figure-ground contrast, the viewer can apprehend one of my 
paintings more fully through the senses and in time – through their bodies - and become less engaged in 
correlating what is seen with what is known.  Or rather, these cognitive processes are problematized and 
delayed by the contingent qualities of the work’s surface, and the embodied temporality involved. Thus 
one of my paintings can read as containing figures within the canvas’s ground, or all ground to the 
frame’s figure, or all figure to the wall’s ground, depending on position of viewing. I look for ways to 
de-formalise the encounter with the painted surface, so that a more open-ended and undetermined kind 
of relationship can be enacted.  
 
My paintings distinguish between the physical edges of things as given by perception  - a boundary - 
and the contour that is used to mark them on a surface. In formal terms, one of the central aspects of my 
work is the foregrounding of what James Elkins calls the “ontological instability of the mark”. That is, 
the ways in which marks “exfoliate” or have “deliquescence” (1998, p.26). Contour or edge, where we 
can perceive a more or less abrupt change in the visual stimulus, defines outline, but the history of art 
shows many way in which it is possible to loosen the line’s purchase on two-dimensional surfaces so 
that the boundary becomes unbraided. The boundaries that divide figure from ground seem frangible,  
“turning both the original mark and the original surface into surfaces” (1998, p.26), and demonstrating 
that  “mark making turns surfaces into marks.” (1998, p.28)  
 
Applying terminology derived from Alberti, Elkins gives several examples of how a mark cannot be 
reduced to easy semiosis:  in contorno, or the serpentine braiding of marks typical of drawings and 
sketches when a mark is a kind of repetitive approximation; when it can be “a shimmering thing at the 
edge of analysis” (he gives Seurat as an example) or a “barely perceptible forms” that “operate at the 
limits of resolution”; when marks are “swirled into washes, or scumbled into large areas, or smudged 
into continuous gradations, [so that] they lose their disjointedness but not the idea of disjunction”, 
meaning they can be undecidably a part or whole, or a part of a whole; when a mark is “surrounded by a 
pale apparition, hovering undecideably between drawn contour and mere edge.”  This, Elkins (1998, 
p.42)  writes, is the orlo – what he calls the “ghost” that can never become “securely visible”: 
 
The orlo is a twilight creature, barely existing on paper or panel, remaining attached to the abstract haunts of 
perspectiva, the geometric theory of vision [developed by Alberti]. When I think of the exfoliation of the mark, the 
initial moment when my awareness begins to be attracted by the edge of the mark, playing with the idea that the 
edge of the mark may also be a mark, even though nothing is drawn, I would use Derrida’s word, trait. But I can 
imagine an orlo there, and then it might congeal into a sense of a full outline, surrounding a mark, and eventually 
becoming a mark in its own right. Without the orlo, there is the choice only between mark and surface, or mark and 
field; with it, there is no longer even a binary opposition from which to begin.  
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My paintings are centrally involved with the orlo. They substitute orlo for contour – a sense of 
indeterminate edge for the bounding line. As a result, they suggest that any differentiation of figure 
from ground is only temporary, contingent and in process.  The orlo is “the ghost not only of the visual 
rays and the geometry of vision, but of written signs, which all have determinate boundaries”, Elkins 
(1998, p.45) writes. 
 
Subjective Vision 
Historically, until the emergence of the museum system, most paintings were often habitually viewed at 
levels of low ambient light – for example, in churches by candlelight or in domestic interiors with small 
windows.  Strong contour and contrast permitted the stable viewing of images regardless of changing 
light conditions. Artists attended to the lower spatial frequencies, ensuring that even at low luminance a 
viewer could recognize basic compositional configurations and the narrative dimensions.  But much of 
the discursive semiotic content was lost at such low spatial frequencies – symbols do not ‘read’ within 
the low light. As a result, paintings often worked in a more elliptical or subliminal way upon 
consciousness. Within this situation, figure-ground segregations were likely to be more metamorphic, 
and awareness of ambient light conditions also led to awareness of the importance of context as an 
intrinsic part of the meaning of a work.  
 
But the window-like aperture of the Renaissance perspectival grid suppressed the fact of ambient light 
and substituted an ideal light provided by the logos.  Nevertheless, at least until the modernist white 
cube, artists consciously or unconsciously accounted for the considerable variations in potential 
luminance within the spaces in which their works were installed. They aimed to convey an awareness of 
the global perceptual field, rather than attending merely to the local and detailed data delivered in high 
frequencies. Today, however, it is customary to display paintings in brightly lit, white walled rooms 
with large areas of empty space between each work. To an excessive extent this prioritizes the 
requirements of foveal centric vision, and so appeals predominantly to the logos. The ambient 
conditions of beholding have been skewed towards the extraction of rational, clear and distinct 
knowledge grounded in first order properties.  
 
The experience of my artworks involves duration mixed up or confused with space, and is decidedly 
impure. Looking at one of my paintings involves the viewer in two contrasting roles – that of viewer 
and reader – foregrounding the relationship between perception and conception. Characterised as a kind 
of discourse my paintings make themselves available to be read like a text – at proximal viewing-
distance they appeal to the mind as a coherent and bounded entity within which ‘figure’ – text, image - 
announces itself as the ‘positive’ element and ground subsides from attention as the ‘negative’. The 
figure is assigned symbolic relevance or signifying power within a clearly articulated system of 
linguistic signs, and the rest of the painting’s surface withdraws from consciousness. Through the 
representation of pre-existing historical sources, the paintings are decanted into a complex cognitive 
sphere made up of memories, associations, allusions, analogies and paradoxes. A channel is opened up 
through which different kinds of history pour in. But the sign-making, figure-making process is   82 
deconstructed; words and images appear to be neither quite here nor there. In this condition of optical 
obfuscation a word is re-located into a zone that suggests the provisional and ambiguous. A word 
immersed in visual ‘noise’. In contradistinction to a situation in which it is possible to assign hard-and-
fast figure-ground distinctions, the ground appears to be eroding the figure, or alternatively, the figure is 
emerging from within the depths of the ground. The ground seems to be exerting a kind of force, putting 
pressure on the picture surface.  As a result, I bring to the surface – to attention -  the gap between mark 
and sign,  “the crucial moments of darkness, when the picture, in all its incomprehensible, nonlinguistic 
opacity, confronts us as something illegible, is to hope that pictures can deliquesce into sense”, as James 
Elkins (1998, p.18) writes. 
 
                 
 
FIG. 34. Four Paintings from the Series ‘Hitchcock’s Blondes’ (2009), gold acrylic on canvas, 30.5 x 20.5cm each. 
The typography is taken from the title sequence of a Hitchcock film in which the actresses starred. 
 
Vision is dynamic; we are not seeing all at once but in glimpses, and when confronted with broken and 
incomplete contours, vaguely defined fields of colour, and blurred compositions, something ambiguous, 
a psychological projection occurs, a situation in which the viewer must play a more active role. This 
suggests a phenomenology based on “the cognition and stimulation of the active or projective nature of 
perception and cognition”, as Dario Gamboni (2001, p. 9-10) puts it, and the recognition of the “active, 
subjective nature of seeing” (2001, p.18).  There is the possibility of a more fluid and  de-regulated 
relationship between subject and world:  “In the mark that a sponge leaves on a wall, just as in ever 
changing cloud formations,” writes Hubert Damisch (2002, p.185), referring to Leonardo’s famous   83 
advice, “people see whatever they wish to see: configurations of their designs, images from their theatre 
of life, signs of their culture.”  Aesthetically, this means “the establishment of an open relationship in 
which the viewer is called upon to collaborate in the development of a work in progress” (Gamboni, 
2001, p.241).  
 
Neurobiologist Margaret Livingstone (2002) suggests that much of the enigma of the Mona Lisa can be 
attributed to variations between peripheral and central vision exploited by Leonardo, which soften the 
grid. Livingstone (2002, p.73)  notes that research has shown that facial expressions are more easily 
identified from coarse components at high spatial frequency, suggesting that Leonardo deliberately 
utilized a peripheral effect in order to render his sitters more elusive. Leonardo’s goal was to make 
painting a more imaginative art, one capable of depicting the invisible and intangible [FIG. 13]. As 
Gamboni writes, in Leonardo’s work “imaginative perception” is accorded “a central place in the most 
advanced theory and practice of painting. We can see that without formally challenging the doctrine of 
imitation, his approach extends it well beyond the ‘visible’ and the foreseeable.” (Gamboni, 2001, p.29) 
By rendering his depictions shadowy and vague, Leonardo minimised the ability of viewers to ‘read’ his 
paintings as already established texts, and instead they are obliged to make a greater imaginative 
investment in the making of meaning.  Leonardo aimed to engage the viewer’s feelings, appealing to 
their emotions in new ways. Shadows, elusive and transient, erode large areas of his compositions, 
creating an effect as if space has been scooped out of a darkly luminous receptacle. As Gamboni puts it, 
Leonardo signals the turn away from art as a passive experience – the perception of a discursive sign - 
into an active tool for the artist and viewer. Subjective impressions henceforth supplant the quest for 
detached vision, conveying a visual experience that is characterised by the fugitive and transitory – by 
the “irradiation of things” as Odilon Redon (quoted in Harrison and Wood, 1992, p.1065) called it, and 
the encouragement of “dreaming accompanied by thought.”  
 
My paintings capitalize on subliminal temporality within vision. The perceptual absence of clear 
contours frustrates the overwhelming cognitive need for certainty and clarity, and the absence of clear 
distinctions overflows into thought, thereby inhibiting rational analysis,  delaying active responses 
through decisions and judgments. In the presence of something obscure - where a dim, vague, 
impalpable ambience occludes our view - the ability to think clearly and to draw conclusions is 
challenged. The overt emptiness of the coloured field leads to a situation in which options have been 
left more open than usual, and this can have two broad implications for the viewer: on one hand, 
judgment is suspended or fruitfully complicated, and a new and emancipatory and open dialogue 
between work and viewer  is created in which the latter becomes a far more engaged party - less a 
‘spectator’ than a ‘participant’. On the other hand, however, this same space of potential can also have 
negative implications, with consequences ranging from indifference, flat incomprehension and hostility, 
to more nuanced judgments concerning the painting’s inadequacy as an art form.  “You paint […] .an 
indeterminate red”, wrote Berthold Brecht (quoted by Fer, 2000, p.10) in the 1930’s, “and some cry at 
the sight of this indeterminate red because they think of a rose, and others because they think of a child 
lacerated by bombs and streaming with blood”.    84 
 
Vagueness, the loss of certainty, the disruption of the stable gestalt, and the suspension of the 
discriminating faculties, leads to the creation of elusive moods and intangible meanings, but these may 
also register as inconclusive and arbitrary. However hard the subject seeks to control cognitive 
functions, uninvited and unexpected memories and associations are continuously rising and falling in 
the mind, effecting  and infecting visual perceptions, drifting upwards to become ‘figures’ then back 
down towards the unconscious ‘ground’.
36  
 
My work foregrounds awareness of a more fluid and subtle interplaying between boundaries, bounded 
forms and boundlessness. Visually, I enact “the resistance and surrender of form to form–defeating 
fusions as the principal sign of the very emergence of forms”, as Leo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit (1993, 
p.100) put it. The viewer is invited to enter an immersive environment.  Forms partially dissolve into an 
expansive ambient ground, evolving relationships that engage their capacity to imaginatively relate 
perception to subject and context, while at the same time entering them into states of suspension, non-
knowing, negativity or emptiness. The kind of paintings I am interested in generate a temporary and 
heightened sense of subjective emptiness, but an emptiness that is only briefly holding at bay a plethora 
of signs. It forestalls the possibility of the painting’s chromatic rectangle being perceived as merely 
blank or of offering the instantaneous perception of one colour, by producing visual effects in which 
figure and ground shift in relationship to each other. But nevertheless, the signs that emerge exist in an 
ambiguous zone, and expresses condition, hypothesis, contingency, possibility and process, rather than 
seeming to state anything definitive. My paintings suggest movement, passage or transition. The space 
they convey can be described as a soft, indefinite, ambient, pulsing, and slowly changing field.  Their 
turbidity has the effect of softening, smoothing, uncoupling, loosening and dematerializing, forcing 
thereby the detachment of seeing from the determined activity of perceiving an image or a clear and 
distinct sign, and drawing the viewer first towards a chromatic haze, then moving them towards the play 
of illusion and the reading of signs, then closer, towards the material surface, until once again, as they 
move away from the painting, the indeterminate coloured space re-asserts itself.  My work thus 
ultimately guides the viewer to a more structured kind of space, one full of memory-triggering signs, on 
the one hand, and of subtle variations in colour and physical texture, on the other. I present a sense of 
dynamic shifting between wholeness and fragmentation - of the loss of boundaries, and then the re-
establishment of wholeness again. A process involving both dispossession and recuperation.  
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CHAPTER: III: 
Ways of Seeing, East and West 
 
 
This presence is not that evoked by intellectualism to define clear and distinct knowledge. Presence in which the 
sensuous is experienced is not the presence of the cogitatum to the cogito, which is still representation. 
Mikel Dufrenne, 1987, p.154, Note 8 
 
To whom  
   No subject/No image/No taste/No object/No beauty/No message/No talent/ No    
    technique (no why)/No idea/No intention/No art/ No feeling….;  
John Cage on Robert Rauschenberg’s white paintings, quoted in Roth, p.1973:50 
 
 
 
Visuality in the Expanded Field 
In  Fra Angelico: Dissemblance and Figuration  (1995, p.15), Georges Didi-Huberman points out that  
Western art history is founded on a fundamental prejudice: 
 
It rests first on the perceptual commonplace attached to the usual notion of figure: a figure is defined in the first 
place as an aspect, a discernible aspect. Discernible means that a figure must necessarily detach itself from a ground 
and relate to an object in the real world [……] This perceptual commonsplace is then paired, as if naturally, with a 
theoretical prejudice: the ‘figure’ is defined as the very thing that supports meaning in a painting, inasmuch as it is 
capable of personifying, as Panofksy puts it, as theme or a concept, and of telling a story. 
 
As Didi-Huberman  (p.15) continues, as a result, “the figure would be defined as what supports 
meaning, what is able to present us with a story, in contrast to the ground, a place that merely ‘contains’ 
this meaning and this story.”  He goes on to argue that for an artist such as Fra Angelico, there was no 
such hard-and-fast distinction, and in the artist’s works there is in fact  a far more subtle relationship 
between texts and images, which challenges the dominat strain of Albertian perspective in the service of 
generating a more spritual kind of art conducive to his role as a painter and monk.
 37 Thus Didi-
Huberman draws attention to the complex ways in which figure-ground segregation have been 
understood in the West, ways that supplement and challenge a narrow reading of ocularcentrism and the 
critique of Cartesianism,  and thereby also challenging the efficacy to render a full account of the 
experience of painting of art history and theory as it is customarily practiced. 
 
In this Chapter, I will supplement Did-Huberman’s discussion (and that of Martin Jay outlined in 
Chapter I) by beginning my cross-cultural analysis through reference to a fascinating essay by Norman 
Bryson (1988). Bryson brings radical  critiques concerning visual perception - epitomised for the 
occasion by Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques Lacan - into confrontation with the thought of the Japanese 
philosopher Keiji Nishitani (1900-1990), who engages directly in his work with Heidegger and Sartre’s 
existentialist phenomenology.
38  Bryson’s goal is to challenge the totalizing assumptions, and he   88 
chooses Sartre and Lacan as extreme representatives of modern Western ideas  about how the modern 
subject is constituted in relation to visuality in the wake of the collapse of the Cartesian world-view.  
 
Vision, regarded as something monocular, inflexible, unmoving, transcending, ego-logical and 
exclusionary is systematically deconstructed in Sartre, Lacan, and Nishitani. However, as Bryson 
stresses, while they might  start with similar insights they come to very different conclusions.  In 
addressing the visual they all agree in  rejecting  the value of rational analysis and of the sufficiency of 
clear and distinct knowledge.
 39  They assume that stepping back and attempting to see the world in an 
objective manner is impossible, indeed potentially harmful, because the subject is actually always an 
intrinsic part of what is happening. They concur that the subject’s attachment to the world is illusory, 
and its relationship to objects overly detached, observer-like and dead. ‘Reality’ is only a hall of mirrors 
- a simulacrum - while ‘truth’ is the prejudice of a certain perspective. After the subject recognizes that 
they can no longer believe in their status as an autonomous observer and so find security amidst the 
solid structures of a shared symbolic order – the gestalt within which they once lived - a radical de-
centring inevitably takes place. The subject must learn to live in a state of ‘uncanniness’, as Martin 
Heidegger (1962: 233; Blattner, 2006: 138-142) called it,  or in the mode of the “not-at-home”. Thus 
Bryson’s juxtaposition is intended to foreground the difference between the Western and East Asian 
orientations when faced with the realization that “the centring of the universe around the sovereign 
subject [is an] illusion.” (1988, p.106) 
 
Withtin the counter-paradigm adopted by Sartre and Lacan,  the visual is understood to be a ‘trap’.  In 
Being and Nothingness (1958),  as Lyle Massey (2007, p.120) writes, Sartre recasts the Cartesian 
subject “as a subject only insofar as he is ‘ebing-seen-by-the-other’.” As Massey continues: 
 
Distinct from the transcendental ego that begins with itself as the true point of contact with the world, Sartre inverts 
this relation, posing the gaze of the Other as the negative source of knowledge about the self [….] Sartre saw a 
fundamental disjunction between looking and being looked at, or between the subject and the object of the gaze. 
The other’s gaze has an annihilating force that restricts free will. 
 
In contrast,  Nishitani approaches the problematic of the subject’s relationship to the world though the 
lens of Buddhist ideas concerning ‘dependent origination’  or contingency -  that is, through recognition 
of interconnectedness. Everything affects everything else. Everything that exists,  exists because other 
things exists. As a result of working from within this paradigm, Nishitani can propose an entirely 
different interpretation of what is at stake once the illusion of the autonomous subject is exposed. For 
Nishitani postulates the rootedness of the subject in relation to time and space in a way that links it to 
both the conventional and  the numinous,  eternal  or infinite, and also to nature conceived of as 
radically impermanent, and so in continual process.  Indeed, the problem with the Western critiques, as 
Nishitani (Nishitani, 1990, p.187) notes in relation to Sartre, is that Sartre’s version of nothingness “is 
unable to make the being of the self (Existence) sufficiently ‘ek-static’”, and as a result,  Nishitani 
concludes,  “to this extent it differs radically from Buddhist ‘emptiness’.”  
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Bryson makes a comparison between Hans Holbein’s The Ambassadors (1533), with its celebrated 
anamorphic representation of a skull [FIG.35], as seen by Lacan (1978, p.92ff) and Japanese flung ink 
painting [FIG.36]	 ﾠas it would be read from within its own conceptual framework.  
 
While the normative perspective of Holbein’s painting corresponds to the geometric mapping of space 
achieved according to the model of fixed-point perspective, the anamorphosis exposes the arbitrary and 
conventional nature of such mapping. It is thus an example of “antispecular mirroring” (Jay, 1993, 
p.572), initially presenting the viewer with a shapeless form that needs to be converted into an image by 
the viewer through making a shift to another code of the visual. ‘Rather than abstracting and detaching 
the eye from the body and incoproating it into the mechanism of perspective, anamorphic illusions”, 
writes Lyle Massey (2007, p.2), “juxtapose disembodied and embodied notions of vision.” 
Anamorphosis brings to attention the fact that an image really only exists in the mind, and it is based on 
an aporia – a gap or absence.  What is recognizable in one representational schema is not in the other.  
 
But for Lacan, the fact that  representation of the skull cannot be construed through the perspectival 
space that dominates the rest of Holbein painting, means anamorphosis works as a stain, demonstrating 
that the gaze is a channelling and socializing of desire. In the reading of Holbein’s painting undertaken 
by Lacan, the anamorphosis becomes an exemplary instance of the nature of art in general, of the fact 	 ﾠ
 
 
 
 
FIG. 35. Hans Holbein the Younger, The Ambassadors, 1533, Oil on oak, 207 cm × 209.5 cm (81 in × 82.5 in), 
National Gallery, London. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Ambassadors_%28Holbein%29 
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FIG. 36: Sesshu, Flug-Ink style Landscape, 1495, 148,6 × 32,7 cm (full scroll), National Museum, Tokyo. 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/japan/events/showevent.asp?eventid=2036 
 
that “the beautiful illusion […] contains within itself a seed of its own dissolution.” (Iverson, 2007, 
p.11)
40 The strangeness of the floating object, as Lacan (Lacan, 1978, p.92) put it, "reflects our own 
nothingness, in the figure of the death's head". For Lacan, the anamorphosis of the skull  “represents the 
subject’s fear of dissolution”, Bryson (1988, p.106) writes; it “appears in and as the protest of the 
Imaginary against its own decentring, as the menace of death”.  
 
Bryson’s deployment of an alternative East Asian paradigm serves to foreground the fact that Lacan’s 
analysis is actually culturally contingent, a prognosis of a specific and modern cultural crisis rather than 
diagnosing a universal condition. Indeed, even for the European contemporaries of Holbein, the 
anamorphosis would have been recognized as symbolizing the presence of death in the midst of life,  
and understood not so much in terms of  the “smooth running of the pleasure principle…..disrupted by 
something internal to the system itself”, but as an integral part of a world-view that recognized the 
fictive nature of representation.  For, as Massey (2007, p.3) writes, following Hubert Damisch: “ths lack 
of fit or fundamental disjuction was evident at the very birth of normative perspective and was not 
simply an effect of anamorphosis.”
41  
 
In contrast to a psychoanalytically-inspired drama of impending psychic collapse and disintegration that 
is being played out in the gap between two incompatible codes of representation, Bryson gives the 
example of Japanese haboko painting, as it would be understood according to its own interpretative 
paradigm. In the fourteenth century haboko or ‘broken’ or ‘flung-ink’ painting emerged under the 
influence of Zen, embodying the fundamental fluidity and permeability at the heart of East Asian   91 
aesthetics in a dynamic formal technique,  and giving rise to works with a remarkable degree of 
abstraction, where images seem to unfold within an indistinct, permeable and ambiguous field.  Bryson 
argues that this convention demonstrates a very different relationship to the disruption of the stable 
visual gestalt, the collapse of the autonomous subject. For what ‘flung-ink’ painting represents is “the 
subject’s acceptance of decentring”, writes Bryson (1988, p. 106); it reflects a willing  “renunciation of 
a central subject position on a field of radical emptiness where the last remains of the cogito are 
rendered null and void, literally cast out on empty air.”  
 
In the world-view from which the ‘flung-ink’ painting arose, awareness of process rather than of 
essences or fixed and finite forms predominates. Every single thing is seen to be perpetually coming 
into existence, developing, decaying, or going out of existence. This awareness of radical 
impermanence or contingent arising means that the subject is understood to realize both itself and its 
relationship with others and the world within the unity of chʼi  - which is usually translated as ‘breath-
resonance’, ‘vibration of vitality’, ‘vital-energy’, or ‘spirit-resonance’. “Not only my own being, as I 
experience it intuitively, but the entire landscape that surrounds me as well, is continuously flooded by 
this subterranean circulating energy”, writes François Jullien (1999, p. 92).  Ch’i  signifies that 
everything is open to the invisible ‘breath’ or flow of life, and as a consequence, everything is radically 
impermanent. The existence of a thing or a person within this perspective is as much determined by 
what they are not as by what they are; they are simply a phase within a continual process of 
transformation driven by chʼi. 
 
Impermanence is understood in terms of the intertwining of apparent opposites or contraries – yin and 
yang or yinyang. Althought it is fundamentally misleading to set them in opposition to each other, 
broadly speaking, yin is negative, dark and feminine, while yang is positive, bright and masculine. The 
sky is yang and the earth as yin. Yang is active and yin is restful.  In East Asian thought ‘nature’ is 
therefore not conceived of as a distinct notion. Instead, it signifies many things that on metaphysical 
level refer to processes of regulation within the cosmos, and on the physical one refer to trees, 
mountains, rivers, clouds, etc. The Chinese characters meaning ‘mountains-waters’, which is usually 
translated by the word ‘landscape’, for example, describe the phenomenal aspect of nature, but this 
coupling of geological attributes implies a fundamentally different relationship to the depiction of 
nature to that of the West – mountain is yin, while water is yang. By circulating, ch’i  is understood to 
be an inherent animating energy that continuously concentrates itself, bringing consistency to reality. A 
sense of order is conceived as lying within this state of becoming - within process.  
 
As a result, thought itself is understood to be internal to such metamorphic transitoriness (Jullien, 1995, 
p.217), and the presence of ‘breath-resonance’ impinges on the subject through awareness of an 
undifferentiated source that can be alluded to through words such as  ‘emptiness’, ‘blankness’ or 
‘nonbeing’. In order to evoke the radical impermanence at the heart of ch’i,  meditation on the elusive 
indeterminate void was therefore central. Through a process of interiorisation and transformation, void 
is understood to be inextricably connected with and also prior to fullness. Void participates in both the   92 
noumenal and the phenomenal worlds. In the noumenal dimension, accounts of the origins of the 
universe describe it as arising out of  ‘nothing’, and evoke the origin of all things in the state of 
nonbeing. At the level of the phenomenal world,  ‘empty’ is understood to be the prior condition for 
everything concrete and  ‘full’. In nature, analogues to this condition are such phenomena as water, 
clouds, mists and smoke, which to a high degree manifest traits of impermanence. The Tao Te Ching of 
Lao Tzu (1985)
42, as Jullien (2000, p.293) writes, “expresses reality in relation to presence-absence, in 
terms of full, the indistinct, and the evanescent. Instead of making its objects more present, a 
comparison might efface it and make it ungraspable; in suspending the characterizing function of 
discourse, it checks the risk of ontological signification.” A sense of void thus permeates consciousness. 
And so the founding text of Taoism employs metaphors like ‘guest’ and ‘uncarved block’, ‘thawing ice’ 
and ‘vacant valley’ to capture the condition towards which the tao leads.  
  
Void “is the nodal point where potentiality and becoming interweave, in which deficiency and 
plenitude, self-sameness and otherness, meet”, as François Cheng (1994, p.51) emphasises. It sites the 
subject within the integrated energy of yinyang (Cheng, 1994, p.13). As a result, East Asian thought, 
notes Frank Vigneron (2011, p.118),  “did not create a hierarchy between full and void, and this 
monistic view even resulted in a non-hierarchical relation between subject and object. The interactions 
between full and void therefore created the self-generated movements of Nature.” Consequently, the 
metaphysical dimension referring to essence and origin is linked to the physical one of phenomena. “Far 
from forming two opposing and separate qualities or states,” writes Jullien (2009, p.84), “emptiness and 
fullness are structurally correlated; each exists only by virtue of the other.” Awareness of void presses 
on the subject, opening it up to its surroundings. “Emptiness proceeds by hollowing out fullness, just as 
fullness, in turn, is opened wide by the void”, writes Jullien (2009, p.84).  It  “permeates the interiority 
of forms, opens then, aerates them, liberates them, and makes them evasive.” (Jullien, 2009, p.78) 
“Thanks to emptiness”,  declares Jullien (2009, p.89-90), “fullness breathes. Because emptiness releases 
things from the field in order to do its work, things are no longer sterilely shut away within themselves 
but, thanks to their evasiveness, become expansive, spread, and carry it off to infinity.”  
 
The East Asian world-view, by adopting a position of nonduality grounded in awareness of void,  posits 
a liminal consciousness in which subject and object become co-dependent and complementary, folded 
into one another. Loss of boundaries does not endanger an anxious de-centred subject, but on the 
contrary, permits the emergence of a subject capable of entering freely into an expanded field, one in 
which there is the possibility of partial release from virtual confinement within prevailing 
epistemological and ontological structures.  “In the field of sunyata [void or blankness]”, Bryson (1988, 
p.106) writes, “the centralised subject falls apart; its boundary dissolves, together with the consoling 
boundary of the object”. As Nishitani (1990, p.190-191) puts it:  
 
In the locus of emptiness, beyond the human standpoint, a world of ‘dependent origination’ is opened up in which 
everything is related to everything else. Seen in this light, there is nothing in the world that arises from ’self-power’ 
and yet all ‘self-powered’ workings arise from the world. Existence at each instant […..] the humanization in which   93 
the self becomes human – all these can be said to arise ceaselessly as new accommodations from a locus of 
emptiness that absolutely negates the human standpoint.  
 
 
 
‘Enlightenment West’ and ‘Enlightenment East’ 
Historically, there have always been two very different versions of cultural ‘enlightenment’ – two 
distinct recursive patterns. One, as the philosopher Leonard Angel (1994, p. 3) writes, “refers to a style 
of thought […..] in which the central value is the humanist pursuit of social and individual well-being, 
justice, and scientific rationalism”. This, Angel dubs ‘Enlightenment West’. In contrast, there is the 
notion of ‘enlightenment’ that has been prevalent in the East, and which has as its central doctrine, as 
Angel (1994, p.3) writes, “the belief in the possibility of mystical experience”,   where awareness of the 
transformative potential of consciousness means that “the pursuit of mystical awakening is centrally 
valued”. Thus ‘Enlightenment East’ and ‘Enlightenment West’ signify two different ways of conceiving 
of the subject’s realtionship to the world, and have informed the different civilzations’ religion, ethics, 
and art.  
 
The sociologist Colin Campbell (2008) terms these two broad recursive patterns ‘metaphysical monism’ 
(East) and ‘materialistic dualism’ (West),  while for François Jullien they are philosophical positions of  
‘immanence’ and ‘transcendence’.   On an ontological level, in Thomas P. Kasulis’ (2002) terminology, 
these different world-views lead to one culture prioritizing ‘intimacy’ (East) and the other  ‘integrity’ 
(West), or on an epistemological level, what the social psychologist Richard E. Nisbett  (2003) calls 
‘holism’ (East) and  ‘analysis’ (West). As Nisbett et al. (Varnum, Grossmann, Kitayama, Nisbett, 2010, 
p.9) write: 
 
Analytic cognition [the Western recursive orientation] is characterized by taxonomic and rule-based categorization 
of objects, a narrow focus in visual attention, dispositional bias in causal attribution, and the use of formal logic in 
reasoning. In contrast, holistic cognition [the East Asian recursive orientation] is characterized by thematic and 
family-resemblance-based categorization of objects, a focus on contextual information and relationships in visual 
attention, an emphasis on situational causes in attribution, and dialecticism. What unites the elements of the analytic 
style is a tendency to focus on a single dimension or aspect, whether in categorizing objects or evaluating 
arguments, and a tendency to disentangle phenomena from contexts in which they are embedded, for example, 
focusing on the individual as a causal agent or attending to focal objects in visual scenes. What unites the elements 
of the holistic style is a broad attention to context and relationships in visual attention, categorizing objects, and 
explaining behaviour. 
43 
Within the Eastern orientation, the whole is perceived in every part, and thinking proceeds from the 
‘inside’ rather than the ‘outside’ (Kasulis, 2002, p.107), from within a state of flux, rather than from in 
relation to an essence or transcendent unity. In contrast to an epistemology and ontology based on 
formal logic, East Asian thought prioritized the experience of an embodied relationship to time and 
space, exposing the impermanence of things. This experience is delivered through tactile or ‘haptic’ 
sight that is more adept at considering the holistic ‘field’ than in analyzing specifics. Indeed, it is closely   94 
related to the kinds of negotiations of space engendered by peripheral vision and low spatial 
frequencies. As a result, in this world-view ‘vision’ is understood to be inextricably bound up with the  
‘visionary’.  
 
 
Westerners therefore distrust the senses, separating mind from body. The essence of the rational 
method, as Gilles Deleuze (1992, p. 155) writes, lies in its commitment to ‘analysis’ and faith in the 
“certain sufficiency of clear and distinct ideas”.  Descartes had  asserted “that the distinct serves as the 
gauge of truth, ‘that the things we conceive very clearly and distinctly are all true,’ in the oft quoted 
formula”, as Jullien (2009, p.37) notes.
44  The elevation of sight, and the relegation of the other senses 
to inferior status as potential sources of knowledge about the world, meant that the intellect is 
understood to inspect and process the visual field modelled on the retinal images provided by foveal or 
centric vision. Mathematical structures - point, line, plane and ratio -  are therefore of the first 
importance in modern Western philosophy and also in the classical conception of art. Value lies in 
epistemic repeatability and reliability, and due to their alleged delivery of ‘merely’ subjective and 
private experience, the sensible data of the world - colour, taste, sound, odour, and touch - have been 
relegated to lower status. These secondary, inferior properties are closely connected with the emotional 
and valuing tone of experience, and as a result, emotion and value-judgements have also been demoted 
to inferior position.  
 
Within the “optics of truth” produced by such an emphasis on primary properties of ratio and 
objectivity, as Mark C. Taylor (1984, p.175) writes, “the goal of the viewer is utter clarity and complete 
transparency.” This lucidity, as Taylor continues, “is supposed to erase equivocality by securing 
univocal meaning”; it guarantees a kind of “monologism of truth” which is “pre-scribed to ease the 
distress induced by the uncertainty that arises from the polymorphous play of appearances.” The highest 
cognitive value is thereby placed in the ability to state “specifically how things are staying the same and 
how, precisely, they are being altered”, as Stafford (1999, p.159) puts it. As a result, as Stafford 
continues: 
 
Modern philosophy from Descartes forward quantified certainty, that discursive activity of mathematics asserting 
that nothing has been introduced by the actual operation of the intellect that it cannot fully identify. The claim, in 
brief, is that nothing is being added or subtracted, equated or changed without the mind’s active warrant, that no 
mistake either has occurred or is possible. To ensure the maintenance of exact identity, mathematical vigilance of 
this sort admits only a small set of valid transformations. 
  
It is against the narrowness of  ‘Enlightenment West’ that thinkers like Sartre and Lacan rebelled,  
 
But in the secular modern period, the quest for alternative visions of ‘enlightenment’ also inspired 
various intellectual ‘journeys’ to the Orient in search of a living ‘mystical’ tradition. For nearly two 
centuries there has been intense cultural traffic in both directions, and evidence of the fertilization of the 
West by Eastern thought and aesthetics can be found in many fields.  The influence of traditional Taoist   95 
and Buddhist thought on modern Western philosophy goes back at least as far as Arthur Schopenhauer, 
who openly acknowledged his debt to Buddhism (Clarke, 1997). In the wake of rampant 
industrialization and secularization, Western artists often turned to Indian and East Asian ideas in the 
quest for the ‘re-enchantment’ of their overly materialistic culture. At the beginning of the twentieth 
century pioneer abstractionists such as Kandinsky and Mondrian painted works inspired by Theosophy - 
a proto-‘New Age’ creed fusing interpretations of traditional Indian religion concerning the nature of 
ultimate reality with Neo-Platonism and an awareness of new developments in science such as 
evolutionary theory, thereby offering a rationale that gave support to the desire to repudiate mimesis in 
painting in order to pursue a more spiritual art (Tuchman et. al, 1987). From the 1940’s to 1960’s the 
influence of Zen Buddhism was especially widespread both in Europe and the United States, impacting 
on artistic explorations of such important themes as emptiness, gesturalism and dynamism, and the 
quest for an art that could express a direct experience of the ‘here-and-now’ (Westgeest, 1996, p.217-
224). Indeed, the resources for the quarantining of art from extremes of arbitrary symbolism, traditional 
metaphysics, and mere objecthood, were often harvested from East Asian thought, which was 
understood to call for the suspension of analysis, to welcome indeterminacy, and to prioritise non-
conceptual knowing (Bass, 2005).  
 
The potential similarities between modern physics and ancient Oriental insights are also significant. 
Fritjof Capra in The Tao of Physics (1975, p.18) quotes Robert Oppenheimer: “The general notions 
about human understanding  [. . . ] which are illustrated by discoveries in atomic physics are not in the 
nature of things wholly unfamiliar, wholly unheard of, or new. Even in our own culture they have a 
history, and in Buddhist and Hindu thought a more considerable and central place.” As Capra (1975, p. 
25) suggests, such influences have spread deep into Western culture as a whole: “The organic, 
‘ecological’ world view of the Eastern philosophies is no doubt one of the main reasons for the 
immense popularity they have recently gained in the West, especially among young people. In our 
Western culture, which is still dominated by the mechanistic, fragmented view of the world, an 
increasing number of people have seen this as the underlying reason for the widespread dissatisfaction 
in our society, and many have turned to Eastern ways of liberation.” More than thirty years after Capra’s 
published his book, the technological wonder of the World Wide Web can be added to the list of 
phenomena that provoke analogies with ancient Oriental ideas (Davis, 1999). Indeed, as a result of such 
affiliations, Colin Campbell (2008) argues that we have witnessed what he calls the “Easternization of 
the West”.  
 
But long before the modern period, when contact with the East became more routine,  elements of the 
‘Eastern’ kind of ‘enlightenment’ can be identified in the West. Indeed, the kind of subjectivity upn 
wihich the humanist appraisal of consciousness is founded belong to the specific historical conditions of 
modernity. Traditions informed by Pre-Socratic philosophy, Neo-Platonism, Kabbalah and Christian 
mysticism, for example, run parallel to the dominant Englightenment ‘project’ epitomised by classical 
thought and the scientific rationalism of  Descartes and the philosophes. The critique of Cartesianism   96 
begun by phenomenology should thus be regarded as directed not so much at a universal problematic of 
mind-body dualism, but as a critique of a culturally and historically specific period.  
 
More recently, as the work of Deleuze suggests, attention has been paid to a counter-tradition of 
‘baroque reason’, which reacted against a world-view giving pre-eminence to the eye guided by reason 
alone, and that was preoccupied with the provision of knowledge of objective and innate ideas. Spinoza,   
as Deleuze notes, argued that all things, whether physical objects, animate creatures, or immaterial 
ideas, are transient modifications or modes or a single universal substance. “Against Descartes,” as 
Deleuze (1999, p.167) writes, “Spinoza posits the equality of all forms of being, and the univocity of 
reality which follows from this equality”.  Leibniz’s theory of the ‘monad’, Deleuze (2003A: Chapter 1) 
notes, evokes the fluctuating exchange between entities, microscopic and telescopic, relating universals 
to particulars in ways inconceivable in Cartesian dualism, and in Leibniz’s concept of the ‘fold’ there is 
an overtly non-Cartesian description of perception that would be endlessly reproduced in the Baroque 
period in general. Deleuze describes Leibnizian  “pleats of matter” and “folds in the soul” going out to 
infinity and disrupting the stable schema at the heart of Cartesian perspectivalism. “Contrary to 
Descartes”, writes Deleuze (2003A, p.90), “Leibniz begins in darkness. Clarity emerges from obscurity 
by way of a genetic process, and so too clarity plunges into darkness, and plunges deeper and deeper: it 
is natural chiaroscuro, a development out of obscurity, and it is more or less clear to the degree that 
sensibility reveals it as such.” As a result, Deleuze continues (2003A, p.90-91), “clarity itself depends 
on what is only fathomed obscurely. For the clarity has to emerge out of darkness, as if through a first 
filter that would be followed by many other filters, for what is distinct, what is confused, and so on.” 
 
Deleuze’s exploration of such alternative strands is part of a much widers cultural  turn in radical 
contemporary thought and in the art forms that echo its premises. Poststructuralism’s deconstruction of 
‘logophallocentism’ seeks to challenge the dominant Western epistemological regime. Philosophers 
mine alternative philosophical and aesthetic traditions within the West, or seek congruencies between 
indigenous traditions and those outside the West.  The established questions are themselves questioned, 
and the assumption that clarity is a prerequisite of knowledge undermined. Parallels can be drawn 
between the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction and Buddhism 
(Glass, 1995; Marra, 2010).  
 
The spatial tropes  ‘East’ and ‘West’ thus describe two broad recursive patterns or paradigms that 
should be understood to represent different styles of thought rather than deep cultural oppositions, 
whenever they may be found historically and wherever they may reach cultural expression. Today, we 
can observe many convergences. However, in the West, still mired in dualistic conception of thought 
which establishes a code of binary oppositions,  such critiques tend to invert the conventional hierarchy 
in order to prejudice the once ‘inferior’ term. Recognizing that Western thought  installs a hierarchy that 
privileges one term of a dichotomy (presence before absence, speech before writing, and so on), 
deconstructive strategies unmask these ways of thinking, operating on them especially through two 
steps—reversing dichotomies and attempting to corrupt the dichotomies themselves. So, for example,   97 
‘desire’ trumps ‘reason’, and the ‘clear and distinct’ vision of knowledge that is enshrined in 
Cartesianism is subverted by its antinomies – obscurity and indistinctness.   
 
But  because East Asian thought is grounded in ‘immanence’ rather than ‘transcendence’, what  it 
suggests is not the necessity of binary opposition but rather a holism - an ecological or ‘holographic 
paradigm’ that is fundamentally non-dualistic. Thus, in the East Asian model the subject’s identification 
with a sense of its own emptiness is not considered to result in alienation of the self from the ‘fullness’ 
of the world, but on the contrary,  is understood to put self in harmony with the world, so that it 
becomes its mirror. As Bryson (1988, p.106) writes, within the protocols of this alternative world-view, 
“[n]ihility and blankness undo the subject’s centring of the world upon itself; and, radically decentred, 
the subject comes to know itself in noncentred terms, as inhabiting and inhabited by a constitutive 
emptiness.” This locates the subject in a kind of liminal zone of the in-between. 
 
Within the dominant Western paradigm, indistinct in-betweeen-ness, or ambiguity, uncertainty and 
indeterminacy -  a vagueness that is the consequence of relinquishing the control of centric or foveal 
vision over consciousness and of entering into a condition of friction or movement within the “gauzy 
permeability of consciousness” - inspires either a sense of cognitive deficit and failure, loss and lack, 
fear and anxiety, or, in a more affirmative context,  a sense of ecstatic release, of being lost in the 
‘oceanic’. Confronted by the infinity of the ‘horizon’, beyond which the infinite looms, the subject 
either relinquishes self-mastery and experiences ‘self-shattering’, or withdraws into reflexive self-
knowing, where it acquires knowledge of limits, and as compensation or reward acquires a heightened 
sense of a more ‘authentic’ or less deceived or deluded existence.  
 
The Korean artist, Lee Ufan [FIG. 10], in a text referring specifically to Namsan mountain in Gyeongju 
province in south-west Korea, describes the perceptual haziness that is the dominant effect of the 
Korean weather ( 2002, p.151). “In Korea, the sky is in general a finely nuanced indistinct blue”, he 
writes. “It is the same with the vegetation, where no part really dominates, for their colours seem 
nuanced by the rocks.” The Korean peninsula is 8o% mountains, so this vagueness is a characteristic of 
much of the landscape, which consists of seemingly endless ranges of wooded, hazy-blue mountains 
that merge imperceptibly with the sky in the far distance [FIG. 37]. 
 
But Namsan mountain is special because it is dotted with the ruins of Buddhist sites, and Lee calls it  
“an intermediate site between the natural and the artificial”
 , where, so he suggests, a visitor can 
experience particularly intensely the “in-between” -  an emotional state embodied in the Korean words 
eun eun ham. This signifies a reduction of the perspicacity of centric vision, and the substitution instead 
of a more peripheral or haptic negotiation of space: “a kind of infinite resonance, suggesting a diffuse 
clarity, an absent presence, a vacillating stability.” (Lee, 2002, p.151) Traditionally, says Lee, Koreans 
love this in-between-ness, which is also perceptible in the half-closed eyes of their Buddhas represented 
in postures of mediation. “Indeterminacy for the Koreans is a comfortable state”, writes Lee (2002, 
p.151),  “because it is an opening onto the infinite”.  But this is not the ‘infinite’ understood as some   98 
 
 
FIG. 37. Simon Morley, Mountain landscape, South Korea. Photograph, 2012. 
 
metaphysical idea. On the contrary, this is the infinity of “an ever-changing world with constant 
communication between inner and outer space”. For, as Lee (2009, p.8) declares elsewhere: “infinity is 
what materializes when I depart from the self and interact with that which is other than myself.”  
 
East Asian paradigm implies that the indistinct lies at the very centre of lived experience, and actually 
brings a heightened sense of a subject existing in medias res.  Such a cognitive shift does not lead to the 
rejection of the reigning epistemic regime and the embracing of subjectivism,  nihilism, existential 
angst, or the anarchic rhythms of desire. Instead, it articulates an in-between space that preserves a 
sense of the differentiation of the self from the world while also acknowledging the inevitability of 
fusion between self and world. Indeed, in East Asian thought the acceptance of this kind of ‘middle 
way’ leads ultimately to a heightened sense of quietude and serenity. This mode of thinking implies the 
coexistence and co-evolving of the conventional and the nonconventional - of the reigning figure-
ground segregation and  of insights into its contingency. As illusions fall away, the subject regards itself 
as inextricably steeped in a reality that it shapes, and which in turn shapes the subject. For, so this 
world-view argues, without relying on relative truths the absolute truth of existence cannot be 
expressed, and so this ‘middle way’ is understood to offer the surest path to real enlightenment.  
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CHAPTER IV: 
The Metamorphics of Figure-Ground  
in East Asian Aesthetics 
 
 
Which are these Six Principles? 
        The first is: Spirit Resonance (or vibration of Vitality) and Life Movement. The second is: Bone Manner 
(Structural) Use of the Brush. The third is: Conform to the Objects (to obtain) Likeness. The forth is: Apply the 
Colours according to the characteristic. The fifth is: Plan and Design, Place and Position (i.e. Composition). The 
sixth is: To Transmit Models by Drawing. 
Hseih Ho, Ku Hua P’in Lu, (5
th Century AD). In Sirén, 2005, p.219 
 
How is it possible to figure the indifferentiation of the tao, which makes it hazy, dim, evanescent? In other words, 
how do we render that indistinctness from which the distinct constantly proceeds by standing apart, how are we to 
show that indetermination, which is the foundation of all determination possible? 
François Jullien, 2009, p.31 
 
 
In this Chapter I will look at how the mode of thinking outlined in the previous Chapter has influenced 
East Asian aesthetics. In particular, I will focus on how this aesthetics reflects an expanded conception 
of visuality, one that can incorporate into its centre the ‘metamorphics of figure-ground’, or the elusive 
indeterminacy of the liminal in-between. 
 
 
 
Classification 
The East Asian painting I will be focusing on is ‘literati’ painting
45. ‘Literati’ painting belongs within a 
matrix that encompasses a spectrum of pictorial practices ranging from ‘academic’ painting at one 
extreme to  household,  record, religious, and memorial paintings, at the other. At an indeterminate 
point, this productive spectrum crosses a line between the domain of existential, practical, or everyday 
life and the domain of detachment or withdrawal from this everyday life. Paintings wedded to the 
requisites of the practical life are characterised by quasi-utilitarian goals, and respond to the interests, 
needs, and functions of the world of believing, loving and fighting -  a world characterized by 
contingency, and consequently by the desire to obtain guarantees against potential and actual misfortune 
and  to find signs and symbols to assist in the consolidation of power and prestige. The domain of 
contemplation is primarily concerned with intellectual or spiritual thought and reflection, and is 
characterized by detachment, experiment, and analysis. It posits a kind of painting whose usefulness or 
whose relationship to the practical life is more obtuse.  
 
In the West after the Renaissance, an increasingly rigid distinction was created between ‘decorative’ or 
practical painting and works produced within the more intellectual or ‘High Art’ framework. In East 
Asia, however, a more fluid and ill-defined division between ‘academic’ painting and ‘folk’ or popular 
painting persisted until the twentieth century.  However, ‘literati’ painting, insofar as it was produced 
primarily to express cultivated personal feelings rather than to display skill, and to be primarily non-  102 
commercial and non-utilitarian, approximates most closely to what the West considers to be defining 
characteristics of  progressive Fine Art. 
 
 
 
Formats 
One consequence of this more nuanced division between the ‘practical’ and ‘contemplative’ worlds is 
that East Asian painting is characterised by a variety of formats that immediately distinguish it from 
Western conventions. These also challenge Western readings of clear figure-ground segregation.  Such 
formats include: the album, comprised of relatively small square, rectangular, or fan-shaped paintings or 
calligraphy mounted on individual pages and then assembled in a book-like structure to be viewed from 
right cover to left; the fan, oval in shape or folding and made of paper or silk; the handscroll, used for 
horizontal paintings and calligraphy made on paper or silk, viewed section by section by unrolling and 
re-rolling a portion at a time from right to left, the mounting being attached to a wooden dowel at the 
end on the far left, on which the handscroll is wound; the hanging scroll, used for vertical compositions, 
with the image on paper or silk mounted onto a paper backing and framed with decorative silk borders, 
the silk mounting being attached to a wooden rod which also helps the rolling up the painting for 
storage; the folding screen, usually produced in pairs and with up to eight panels, although six-paneled 
screens were the most popular.  
 
Western painting-frames suggest windows and doors, and images to be viewed in a detached manner, 
but the thin paper and silk mounts of East Asian works, floating parallel to the wall behind, or laid on 
the floor or table-top, reinforce awareness that the work, as Jonathan Hay (2007, p.437) writes, is “a 
boundary constituting its own surface environment.” The framing-edge of the work becomes much 
more permeable, opening the painted surface onto its surroundings. Such formats mediate against the 
reading of a painting as an illusionistic three-dimensional space to be contemplated in a detached 
fashion, and encourage the viewer to engage in more mobile and somatic modes of perceptual 
engagement, and to consider the works within a wider environment.  
 
Interestingly, when East Asian works are illustrated in books, however,  the convention is to crop  so 
that the works loose their mounts, thereby rendering them more like Western paintings [FIG.38].  
A similar convention prevails in relation to the partition-screen, with book illustrations often 
reproducing it as a flat, multi-panelled image.  Indeed, partition-screens are an especially clear example 
of a kind of work that is meant both to be looked at and used. As Wu Hung (1998, p.11): writes of 
Chinese screens: “The screen is versatile, but as an architectonic form it always serves this basic role 
[…..] The screen transforms space into places that are definable, manageable, and obtainable.”  A 
screen conveys predominantly awareness of it erecting an opaque wall-like surface within a space, 
while also inviting readings of its own surface in a more pictorial sense.  Thus, as  Jonathan Hay (2007, 
p.437) observes:  
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The convention of modern historical reproduction that crops the scroll to its pictorial image is therefore misleading, 
because it allows frame-conditioned Western habits of looking to take effect, turning an example of the Chinese 
category tuhua (conventionally translated as ‘painting’) into a picture. The representation, in other words, should 
not be seen as window-like on a Western model; one needs to make a conscious effort to become attuned to the 
polydirectional play of mark making and imaging across the surface that scroll mounting subtly reinforce. 
 
 
 
                                                        
 
 
 
FIG. 38. Left: Fang Ts’ung-i:  The High, High Pavilion, 14
th Century, Yuan dynasty 
hanging scroll/ink on paper, painting: 62.1 x 27.9cm 
Right: complete hanging scroll: 152.0 x 40.0cm, National Palace Museum, Taipai 
http://www.nigensha.co.jp/kokyu/en/p55.html 
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Painting as Inscription 
 
As Chinese writing was closely bound to image-forms, painting functioned as an integrated sign-
system, its range established across a broad spectrum of gestural marks. Literatipainting increasingly 
incorporated procedures from the art of writing, and these contributed to the transcendence of formal 
resemblance, so that by the twelfth century no clear distinction was any longer made between the crafts 
of writing and depicting [FIG.39].  
 
 
 
FIG.39. Huai-su, Autobiographical Essay, dated 777, Handscroll, ink on paper, 28.3 x 735cm, National Palace 
Museum, Taipai.  
http://pagodagallery.com/PagodaGallery/05_Interesting_information/03_Archive/Calligraphy/Calligraphy%20.htm 
 
While the West developed phonetic alphabetic writing, subordinating the oral to a visual regime that 
was based on “transforming the evanescent world of sound to the quiescent, quasi-permanent world of 
space” (Ong, 1982, p.91), the Chinese writing system uses logograms, or graphemes which represent a 
word or a morpheme (Fischer, 2001, Ch.5). Hubert Damisch (2002, p.209) notes that the separation of 
speech from writing in China had far reaching consequences as it led to a notion of form “that owes 
nothing to delineation in the Western sense.”  Thus in China “painting was definitively liberated from 
any dependence upon language, upon logos as phonè and [….] was established at the origin of the 
interaction from which language, alongside ‘logic’ or ‘science’, stemmed”, and unlike in Western art, 
this bond between inscriptional modes was constitutive rather than analogous (Damisch, 2002, p.222).  
 
In addition, literati paintings were in a sense ‘open’ or collaborative works, insofar as they were 
designed to be appended by others through the addition of stamps and commentaries in the form of 
poems.  For example, separate pieces of paper were often added to the mounting after a handscroll was 
produced in order to provide space for later viewers to make inscriptions. 
Thus, as Jonathan Hay (2004) writes: “For more than two thousand years, Chinese painters, unburdened 
by the concept of mimesis, took an inscriptional approach to representational images. There is no figure   105 
and ground in Chinese ink painting, only a combined figure-ground continuum in which the ground is 
generated from the figure and vice versa.” 
 
 
The Painting of ‘Breath-Resonance’ 
François Jullien argues that the divergence between Chinese thought and that of the West in relation to 
visuality is best understood through positing two different ways of conceiving of the subject’s 
connectedness to the outside world:  perception and breathing. “There are two ways in which my 
existence is continuously connected to something outside”, Jullien (2009, p.134) declares: “I breathe 
and I perceive”.  He continues: “I can privilege the gaze and the activity of perception, the Greek 
choice, which led them to grant priority to a conception of reality as an object of knowledge: the mind 
moves upward from visual sensation to the construction of essences, and vision is corrected, structured, 
and at the same time transcended by reason.” In relation to the philosophical underpinnings of such a 
bias, Jullien (1995, p.218) notes:  “One could say – metaphorically, at least – that Greek thought was 
marked by the idea, at once tragic and beautiful, of ‘measure’ attempting to impose itself on chaos’.  
The Greeks privileged an understanding of visual perception that was closely bound to reason, and this 
laid the groundwork for the West granting “priority to a conception of reality as an object of knowledge: 
the mind moves upward from visual sensation to the construction of essences, and vision is corrected, 
structured, and at the same time transcended by reason.” (2009, p.124)  This meant an over-emphasis on 
the importance of rational argument and analysis, in which a whole-as-parts paradigm or bipolarity was 
used. Reason alone was understood to provide knowledge of objective innate ideas, which meant the 
equation of the eye with the mind. What is sought is publicly verifiable objectivity, requiring 
argumentation grounded in epistemological protocols provided by the rules of non-contradiction and the 
excluded middle. Westerners value discrete, clear and distinct ‘building blocks’ for thought. “Because 
Western thought projects order from outside,” Jullien (1995, p.218) writes, it most values the causal 
explanation (according to which an antecedent and a consequence, A and B, are extrinsically related to 
one another).”  
 
In contrast, Chinese philosophy proceeded, Jullien (2009, p. 134) notes, “from the fact that I am alive, 
breathing in-breathing out,” and from this,“I deduce the principle of a regulating alternation from which 
the process of the world flows.”  The Chinese became sensitive early on to “the regular, spontaneous 
fecundity stemming simply from the alternation of the seasons”, writes Jullien (1995, p.218), and their 
philosophy was not based on the activity of gathering objective knowledge through the senses. The 
Chinese way is grounded on a conception of the world founded  “not on the activity of knowledge but 
on respiration.” (Jullien, 2009, p.134) 
 
Plato and Aristotle famously referred to representation as mimesis:  “the intentional making of an 
appearance [….] that resembles something of a certain kind but is not something of that kind itself.” 
(Stafford, 2007, p.173) The painter’s goal in this context is to find form for abstract essences, and this 
makes art an intellectual activity. “In Greece,” Jullien (2009, p.106) writes, “the notion of mimetic   106 
representation emerged from the metaphysical perspective of a progressive ontological loss: from the 
idea of the bed, to the manufactured bed, to the painted bed.” In contrast, East Asian painting was not 
grounded in the idea of representation as an affair of sight and light, darkness and colour, of visible 
elements striking the eye. By prioritizing breath over perception, the sense of sight was replaced by 
respiration as guiding principle, and as a result, the East Asian concept of representation can better be 
described as a making of multi-sensual contact with forms. Painting was not about the imitation of outer 
shapes, but rather about being absorbed by tones and atmosphere, and was less concerned with looking 
with the eyes than a kind of indirect observing, or looking through the eyes (Marchiano, 1998, p.4).  
Rather than understanding the world as an object of perception, the East Asian idea expresses a sense of 
immersion.   
 
China’s canonical text on painting, Hseih Ho’s Ku Hua P’in Lu, (c.500 AD) consists of six principles, 
and the first is “Spirit Resonance (or vibration of Vitality) and Life Movement.” (Sirén, 2005, p.219) 
For, by channelling ch’i the painter enhances awareness of a flux-like and evanescent reality within 
which the viewer can actively participate. “When the ‘breath’ of a painter, and thus of his work, 
stimulates the viewer’s response”, writes Wen C. Fong (1992, p.5), “his painting projects a life and 
energy beyond representation.” [FIG.40 – 45] As the T’ang Dynasty painter and writer Chang Yen-yüan 
wrote in his Origin and Development of Painting (c.845AD): “If the spirit-resonance [ch’i] is sought 
for, the outward likeness will be obtained at the same time.” (Sirén, 2005, p.227)  
 
What is suggested by East Asian aesthetics informed by the concept of ‘breath-resonance’ is a painting 
of the ‘middle way’, one based on integration and complementarity – on nonduality.  In traditional 
monochrome ink painting [FIG. 40], for example, as Kenneth Inada (1997, p.125) writes, “the black 
strokes are not alone for they are the result of a complementary process that includes/involves nonblack 
components or the nonbeing aspect”.  The artist’s aim was not to fix essences but to make a record of 
the play of energy. The work of art, notes Jullien (2009, p.219), therefore “gets its indexical value from 
a spirit dimension that it tends to ‘transmit’’, and the goal is to “render the invisible intentionality and 
not form”.  By ‘intentionality’ Jullien is here translating the Chinese character yi -  “the impulse of 
energy mobilizing from within”, that is deployed “in the conscious evolution of man as point of view, 
intention, vision, state of mind, disposition, meaning, desire, and volition all at once.” (2009, p.221).  
As Jullien (2009, p.221-222) continues: 
 
Too designate yi in its most general definition as the object of painting, [……] is obviously to make its objects the 
nonobjectifiable, too foundational to be inscribed in any face-to-face encounter, too fluid to be isolated, opposed, closed off. But 
the nonobjectifiable thereby relentlessly returns to the original agitation that ceaselessly deploys as realities – gestures, forms, or 
words, so many figurations – from the invisible impulse.  
 
On the level of technique, ‘breath-resonance’ corresponded to the graphic contour lines that define 
major masses and provide the general structure of a work. A sense of process, pulse or fluctuation, of 
liquidity and permeability within the image, occurs on the level of the trace or mark and animates the 
surface. The goal was to express a dynamic totality rather than to clearly demarcate sets of contrasts.   107 
East Asian painting thus employs a ‘deictic’ mode – that is, it is contextual, and the image cannot be 
“taken in all at once, tota simul, since it has itself unfolded within the durée of process,” as Norman 
Bryson (1983, p.94-95) describes it. This implies an indexical relationship between work, and 
acknowledgment of the “carnal, corporeal body, with its gestures and physical presence”. On a 
performative level,  ‘breath-resonance’ was signalled by the dynamism displayed by brush, ink and 
colours. East Asian artists employed devices that aimed to challenge the false impression of 
permanence, opening painting onto the field of energy. They used techniques explicitly designed to 
relinquish conscious control of the process of making, aiming for an ‘artless art’, or the ‘technique of no 
technique’, as it was known in Taoism. 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 40. Mu’ Chi, Persimmons’, early 13
th century, Southern Song, ink on paper, Daitoku-ji, Kyoto, Japan 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six_Persimmons 
 
In order to further the entry of the viewer into a work, paintings were often characterized by pronounced 
qualities of imperfection and insufficiency, and by the juxtaposing of disparate, contrasting and 
imperfect elements.  By the Song period (usually divided into Northern (960-1127) and Southern Song 
(1127– 1279)), painters were employing what was called the ‘short cut’ - “or the art of expressing much 
by little”, which amounted to a form of expressionism based on the utmost concentration and economy 
of means. In the ‘one-corner painting’ style, unpainted areas of paper or silk were exploited in order to 
more directly depict the spatial continuum.  The technique known as ‘flying blank’ developed, where 
the sparse hairs of a worn brush left blank spaces as it traversed the surface It was also for this reason 
too that the style known as ‘flung-ink’ painting, discussed by Bryson, developed. Theses styles aimed to 
loosen the hold of fixed form and determined meaning by relinquishing control of the painting gesture. 
As a result, what to Western eyes may register as lack of finish or refinement, sketchiness, or a sense of   108 
incompletion, was actually highly valued because  ‘breath-energy’ was associated with spontaneity. 
Catching the flow of ch’i required that a painting conveyed a stage “when plenitude has not yet broken 
up and dispersed”, writes Jullien (2009, p.68). Sketchiness was meant to put potentiality at the centre of 
representation. “When you paint”, advised Tang Zhiqi (c.1620), “there is no need to paint all the way; if 
with each brushstroke you paint all the way, it becomes common.” (Jullien, 2009, p.72)  Thus it can be 
said that East Asian art is based on the belief that “‘breath-resonance’ designates “both that from which 
beings and things arise and that which animates them.” (Jullien, 2009, p.85) 
 
 
Void In Painting  
The Korean curator, Lee Joon, writing in the catalogue to an exhibition called Void in Korean Art 
(2007-2008), elucidates how void is construed within the language of art:  “East Asian painting 
traditionally placed more emphasis on the inherent spirit in objects than on representing them”, Lee 
Joon (2008) writes, and “void was often used to express not only profound spaces of nature, such as 
clouds, atmosphere, and the ocean, but also worlds that are abridged, suggested, and invisible.” As he 
continues: 
 
From the perspective of Western art, which explicates everything based on forms, the void of Asian painting may 
appear, to certain extents, to suggest a lack of forms or a space of incompletion. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to 
find a term corresponding to the concept in the Western artistic lexicon. ‘Empty space’, a negative element, implies 
absence of physical representation or is synonymous with ‘blank space’. In the theory of East Asian painting, 
however, void exists as a complete, legitimate part of a work, and, in a more active sense, is an ‘unpainted 
painting’. In that sense, void does not mean the renunciation of the use of space but rather the encouragement of 
space and is absence-cum-presence.  
 
It is precisely through awareness of void that the other units within the depictive system of painting 
function. Indeed, void can be understood to constitute the central aspect of an expanded system of 
representation in which emptiness is actually considered a privileged sign (Cheng, 1994) [FIG. 41- 43]. 
The void points towards perception at a level of undifferentiation, and one of its principle visual 
analogues is the indistinct or empty visual impression. As a result emptiness is quite the contrary of a 
‘no man’s land’, blank spot, or negative space, as it is in western thinking. As Vigneron (2011, p.117) 
summarises:  
 
To define very simply the role of the void in a Chinese landscape painting, we could say that there is no possibility 
of activity, and no possibility of exchanges and interaction between forms, without the empty space between them 
[…..] By arranging a necessary amount of empty space in their paintings, Chinese artists succeeded in showing the 
constant interactions that make Nature itself function. And it is precisely in that relation with Nature that Chinese 
landscape artists managed to make the act of painting and the act of viewing an artwork spiritual endeavors.  
 
On the level of representation, phenomenal analogues for void were water, clouds, mists, smoke and 
moonlight, which to a high degree manifest traits of indistinctness and impermanence. Commitment to 
void meant artists also juxtaposed in their works such things as bounded structures signifying   109 
permanence - mountains and rocks  (yin) - animating them by ‘wrinkles’, which were drawn within the 
contour lines to provide detail, relief, texture, and luminosity (yang). In the literati painting of China 
during the Song period and Yüan Dynasty (1206-1368), there  developed painting styles in which at 
times the landscape seems to  be “eaten away by the vibrant void”, as Max Loehr (1980, p.211) writes 
[FIG. 41 – 42]. A vague, stochastic and indistinct impression is conveyed, and during the Southern 
Song especially, artists preferred to depict “events like sunset, dusk and nightfall; a breeze, gusts of 
wind, or squalls; a sudden shower, a gentle rain, or clearing skies; the luminous haze of a summer 
morning, or the brewing fog in early evening.”(Loehr, 1980, p.197).  
 
Thus the emptiness of clouds and mists in East Asian art is not only the indistinct beyond into which 
forms vanish at the horizon, as it would be within the conventions of Western landscape painting. As 
Wen Fong (1992, p.86) notes in relation to Travellers Among Streams and Mountains by the Northern 
Song artist Fan Kuan (active ca.990-1030) [FIG. 44]: “the blank areas between the three distances serve 
as perceptual respites, inviting the viewer to roam freely through a space that is infinite because it is 
unmeasured and unmeasurable.”   
 
                          
 
FIG.41. Mi Fu Misty Landscape. Southern Song-Yuan dynasty (1127-1279), Ink on silk, 150 x 78.8 cm  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mi_Fu 
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FIG. 42. Mi Fu, Spring Mountains and Pines, ink on rice paper, National Palace Museum, Taipei. 
http://www.chinaonlinemuseum.com/painting-mi-fu.php 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG.43. Ma Yuan (alive1160-1225), Water Album: The Waving Surface of the Autumn Flood, ink on silk, 26.8 x 
41.6cm, Beijing Palace Museum. 
http://m.iphotoscrap.com/m.scrap.view.php?q=%E6%B0%B4%E5%9B%BE&ap=0&df=7 
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FIG. 44.  Fan Kuan (active ca.990-1030), Travelers among Mountains and Streams, ink and slight colour on silk, 
183 x 46cm, National Palace Museum, Taipei. 
http://leqiyu.wordpress.com/2012/11/27/traveling-among-mountains-and-streams-2/ 
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Figure-Ground-Together 
 
As Jullien (2000, p.295) observes: 
 
By evoking a mode of specific indeterminacy, each image brings us to the very limits of the sensible, both upstream 
and downstream from it: whether it has not yet unfolded […..] or is in the process of dissolving [….], it is contained 
in the undifferentiated space that tends to reabsorb it. Through their variations (for it always a matter of variation), 
these images keep us as far as possible from the seen or distinct, in a realm where the concrete is discreet and 
everything merges in harmony. They are used to paint the unpaintable.  
 
Consequently, as Kenneth Inada (1997, p.127) puts it, “the seemingly empty nature of space is the 
‘hidden’ potentiality waiting for the appearance or creation of any and all beings.”. And, as Jullien 
writes (2009, p.212): “Whether it was the technique of drawing with ‘a single stroke of the brush’ [….] 
linking together figurations without interrupting the rhythmic momentum, or that of the ‘flying-blank’ 
[….] which reveals within the body of the stroke an internal emptiness,”  the aim was that the  technique 
“aerates the figure and makes it resonate”.  “In pointing to the undifferentiated source of the Tao”, 
Jullien concludes, “the role of the image is therefore not to call on the sensible to converge above it, but 
to stimulate the void that animates the sensible world to pass through it: to express through the 
individual the disindividuation in which it is rooted and to make the plenitude it contains manifest 
through the indistinct.” (2000, p.293) 
 
“Transitory between two poles”, as Jullien (2004, p.93) writes of the special quality of Chinese 
landscape painting, on the one side “a too-tangible, sterile, and limited manifestation”,  while on the 
other, “an overly volatile evanescence, where everything disappears and is forgotten”. This is a liquid 
and permeable space of the ‘in-between’, “through all these manifestations of vivacity and vitality, 
however diverse they might be, that spiritual resonance is found, even though we cannot fix it more 
precisely.” (Jullien, 2009: 96)  Such in-between-ness suggets a movement within the visible that is 
closely bound to respiration  - to “breathing in-breathing out” – and, Jullien argues,  this special quality 
can best be captured by the Chinese word dan, translated by him as the French word fadeur, or  
‘blandness’ in the English version of his text (2004B).  
 
Jullien chooses this somewhat unpromising word - with its connotations of insipidity, lack of flavour, 
dullness and indifference - for deliberate reasons. He wishes to question the Western preoccupation with 
the extreme polarities central to “a conception of reality as an object of knowledge”, substituting instead 
a state that does not seek to make distinctions. Flavour, “provokes attachment [….] overwhelms us, 
clouds our minds, reduces us to a state of dependence”. Blandness or insipidity, on the other hand, 
“provokes detachment [….] liberates us from the pressure of the external world, from the excitement of 
sensations, from all false and short-lived intensities. It frees us from fleeting infatuations and silences 
the wearying din and clamour.” (2004B, p.43) It consists, writes Jullien (2004B, p.93) 
 
not of the absence of signs but of a sign that is in the process of emptying itself of its signifying function, on the   113 
verge of becoming absent: as marks of an invisible harmony, scattered traces. Transitory between two poles: on the 
one side, a too-tangible, sterile, and limited manifestation; on the other, an overly volatile evanescence, where 
everything disappears and is forgotten. Caught between the dangers of signifying too much and of ceasing to 
function as a sign at all, the bland sign is just barely one.    
 
Visually, ‘blandness’ gives birth in Chinese art to “pale paintings, composed of the rare brush stroke 
opening onto vast, empty spaces (of sky and of water), where nothing forces itself on the gaze and 
everything is equal and seems on the verge of disappearing.” (2004B, p.133-134) Furthermore, 
‘blandness’  “corresponds to man’s capacity for inner detachment.” (2004B, p.43) ‘Blandness’, 
“characterizes the real in a way that is complete, positive, and natural.” (2004B, p.45) “Like emptiness, 
tranquillity, indifference, insentience, or non-action’,” ‘blandness’ is what “characterizes the basis of 
reality” (2004B, p.45), and as such it is quite the contrary of a sign of deficiency or of a negation 
produced in the service of some kind of unrepresentable transcendental. Instead, ‘blandness’ shows that 
“[r]eality projects no meaning beyond itself, and nothing else lends it variety or attraction. Jullien 
quotes Zhuangzi
46 (2004B, p.44):  “Let your heart move freely in blandness-detachment [dan] and unite 
your breath with non-differentiation [mo]. If you cleave to the spontaneous movement of things without 
permitting yourself to entertain individual preferences, the whole world will be at peace.” ‘Blandness’, 
Jullien (2004B, p.144) argues, is in effect the “experience of transcendence reconciled with nature – and 
divested of faith.”  
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CHAPTER V: 
Studio Practice 
 
 
It is a fact of experience endlessly repeated, inexhaustible, piercing: painting which has no offstage, which shows 
everything, all at once and on a single surface – painting is endowed with a strange and formidable capacity for 
dissimulation. It will never stop being there, before us, like a distance or a power, never altogether like an act. Why 
is this so?  As much, doubtless, because of its material status – the paint material – as because of its temporal, 
ontological position; also invisibly, because of the ever defective modality of our gaze. The number of things that 
we do not make out in painting is confounding. 
Georges Didi-Huberman, 2005, p.229 
 
 
Incompleteness should not be the cause for regret; one should rather regret completeness. 
Li Tai Ming Hua Chi (concluded 845AD), Section II, Chapter III.  In Sirén, 2005, p.321 
 
 
The practise of thought is consistent with the practice of vision precisely in its elusive capacity to move, adjust, and 
change register. 
Barbara Maria Stafford, 1999, p.154 
 
 
In the light of my research my studio work evolved across a broad front. I made new decisions in 
relation to the editing of sources in my on-going series of ‘Book-Paintings’ and also in relation to how 
the works were installed. In a new series of Book-Paintings, the ‘Monograph’ series [FIG. 46, 47, 48], a 
selection was made by Tatsuya Taguchi, the director of Taguchi Fine Art, Tokyo, of twelve Old and 
Modern Master’s monographs published between 1930 and 1970 from an initial ‘long list’ supplied by 
me. This represents the official art historical canon – and a specific art historical gestalt. The chosen 
artists were those that seemed appropriate to Tatsuya, when seen from within what he understands  as 
the specific cultural parameters of Japan.
47 Also, as usual, I selected books designed and published 
between certain dates, thereby implicating the artists within a specific time-frame via typography and 
design. But in this series I removed textual references to author and publisher, leaving only the names of 
the artists and the image. This distances the paintings from too parasitic a relationship to their sources, 
and also from the ‘appropriation discourse’ of postmodernism (within which they would be read 
predominantly as appropriations of books), hopefully making them more independent in terms of 
potential meanings, and less reliant on such an intertextual paradigm.  I felt this allowed for the affects 
of visual indistinctness to play a greater role.  
 
Furthermore, by working with book covers that contain images, I focused to a greater extent on the 
manipulation of images, on what happens when a picture is reduced to low spatial frequencies, and 
when the relationship of textured ‘figure’ to flat ‘ground’ is confused. I felt this reduction served to 
emphasise the kind of complementarity between text and image that is central to East Asian thought. I 
also experimented with surface facture, drawing more fully on haptic vision by building up surfaces into 
higher variations of terrain. I began to recognise more fully that this represents an altogether different 
kind of negotiation of space to that generated by optical foveal vision. But I was surprised how much 
recognitional data is still available even when a reproduction of a painting in poor quality digital image 
is further degraded through being turned into the basic interaction of light and dark, of two-tone shape.   116 
 
FIG. 45. Simon Morley, ‘Piero della Francesca’ (1960), 2012, acrylic on canvas, 40x30cm 
 
  
 
FIG. 46. Simon Morley, ‘Vincent van Gogh’ (1956), 2012, acrylic on canvas, 40x30cm   117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 47. Installation Views of ‘Monograph’, Taguchi Fine Art, Tokyo, November 24 – December 22, 2012. 
‘Vincent van Gogh’ (1956) is second on the right. 
 
In other new works with imagery drawn from photographs, I experimented with ways of producing 
greater effects of visual metamorphosis, keeping the painted surface of the image smooth and flat, and 
seeing  how  far  I  could  go  towards  loosing  the  image  entirely  in  the  ground  through  a  process  of 
scumbling layers of paint over the top so the image seems eaten away or partially obliterated,  and does   118 
not  emerge  through  the  play  of  shadows,  as  in  the  relief-heavy  paintings.  In  two  works,  Twelve 
Thousand Diamond Peaks I and II  [FIG.48] - made for the REAL DMZ project, a group exhibition 
held at various locations along a small stretch of the Demilitarized Zone between North and South 
Korea during the summer of 2012 – I laid down thin layers of acrylic paint over flatly painted two-tone 
monochromatic renderings of old photographs. 
 
 
 
                         
 
 
 
FIG 48.  Simon Morley, ‘Twelve Thousand Diamond Peaks’ I and II, 2012, acrylic on canvas, 21 x 53cm each   119 
 
I painted a line of text from well-known children’s song on top in high-relief (in one painting it is in 
English and in the other in Korean). The text and images refer to the location where the works were 
exhibited – an abandoned railway station next to the DMZ which once took passengers north to the 
beautiful Geumgang (or Diamond) Mountains. I wanted to evoke a collective memory, or help bring 
back something that has been traumatically buried.  The visual effect of the works produced three 
readings of the picture-plane – one registering as undifferentiated surface, one as inscribed surface, and 
one as indeterminate mimetic illusionistic depth. It isn’t possible to see the surface, read the text, and 
see the image within the same gestalt. But cumulatively, they enhance the sense of seeing as something 
‘under construction’. In this sense, rather as in Holbein’s painting, I was playing with kinds of 
normative space - with three rather than two - driving wedges between them. Also, from within the East 
Asian paradigm, these works perhaps generate a stronger sense of void – of something that “permeates 
the interiority of forms, opens then, aerates them, liberates them, and makes them evasive.” (Jullien, 
200, p.78)   
 
The large triptych, Zarathustra 1924/1943/1950, found itself installed as a free-standing work in up-
right triangular format within one of the rooms of Poznan’s Museum of Fine Art [FIG 49]. I wanted to 
see what happened once the planes of its monochrome surfaces were dislodged from the wall, and to 
explore the possibilities offered by the play of different light across the three angled surfaces. This also 
meant that viewers were obliged to circumnavigate the work in a 360 degree arc in order to take it all in. 
It  foregrounded    ‘embodied  temporality’,  and  as  a r e s u l t ,  I  also  shifted  the  painting  further  in  the 
direction of ‘haptic’ visuality. 
 
 
              
 
 
FIG. 49. Zarathustra 1924/1943/1950  installed at the National Museum, Poznan, Poland, during Poznan 
Mediations Biennial, 2012. 
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I also thought about the East Asian convention of the folding screen, but ended up establishing other 
kinds of analogy – inadvertently - to some kind of memorial, even to a tomb sculpture.  In fact, one 
could say that the work seemed to be seeking out as company the older paintings in the room, and then 
‘defending’ itself against them. This, incidentally, was a typical Biennial, in that most of the works 
exhibited were videos and installations, and  (I now realise) I chose a room full of paintings (mine was 
the only work from the Biennial in that particular room) to establish some kind of sense of continuity or 
continuum, or a sense of place. 
 
In another series of works I have been tackling the legacy of Cartesian perspectivalism in a more 
through-going, even parodic way. In the ‘Natural History’ series of paintings - watercolours made in 
trompe l’oeil effect -  I pick up flora from my surroundings and lay them out on a piece of paper to spell 
words, then try to paint the text in watercolour, ‘life size’ and as accurately as possible - in the sense of 
as illusionistically,  mimetically,  as possible. The words in these works refer to specific contexts – the 
Halls in a Korean Buddhist temple and titles of books about Korea for exhibitions in Korea; captions for 
photographs from a book about the twentieth century for an exhibition in London [FIG 50]. 
 
 
 
 
FIG.50. Simon Morley, Natural History Series, The October Revolution: Lenin, 2011, 56x77.5cm, watercolour on 
paper. Next page: detail 
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These works also reflect my heightened awareness since coming to Korea of the connection between 
mimesis and Western cultural ‘colonialism’. I decided to work from the premise of my dominant 
‘scopic regime’ (that sight is monocular, static, unblinking, saccadic and disembodied, and the maker’s 
emotional involvement in the activity of depiction is withdrawn).  I was also interested in bringing to 
awareness that connection between the phonetic alphabetic writing system and the reading of space 
assumed by such a ‘scopic regime’. Jacques Lacan saw trompe l’oeil as signifying another defeat of the 
mastering eye, as it exposes the duplicity implicit in all painting; for where usually the gaze is seduced 
into laying down it’s power before the eye, in trompe l’oeil   an ocular form of manipulation is made 
clear (Jay, 1993, p.336). These works acknowledge in an obvious way the connection between mimetic 
illusion and illusionism; they foreground the fact that perception, conception and deception are all 
variants of the same root – capio, capere, to take (Summers, 2005, p. 233). I wanted to produce 
something that showed off a certain kind of obvious technical skill, while at the same time exaggerating 
the idea of painting as representation, in the narrow sense as it is enshrined within the analytic, 
geometric grid.  But conversely, I also bring to attention the actual surface plane, which appears to be 
the support for real objects.  I generate a very shallow illusionistic space – in both senses of the 
adjective.    122 
 
Perhaps the most striking new series are the ‘Folding-Paintings’ [FIG.51]. These are watercolours on 
paper mounted on card and backed with silk, East Asian-style, so that they can be folded up and carried 
around.  Here too, I wanted to ‘get off the wall’, this time by using an East Asian convention of portable 
folding pictures or albums. These works stand or lie on flat surfaces, or are held and viewed in the hand.  
Stood upright they might be thought of as miniature folding-screen. At the same time, by using this 
format I also reconnect my work with the book via another kind of analogy – to the folio as literally a 
hinged piece of paper folded once to make two leaves or four pages of a book or manuscript. I reduced 
the source photographs to two-tone black and white, then stretched them horizontally and squeezed then 
vertically on the computer. Then I projected the resulting image, drew it out, and painted it horizontally 
in thin watercolours.  Later, the paper was folded, mounted, and backed with silk.  
 
I began the series by choosing photographs from the Internet of Marxist thinkers and Communist 
leaders [FIG. 51].  I selected these, I think, because they symbolize failed liberty, smashed Utopianism. 
After images of the radicals I moved on to the Madonna from the paintings of Giovanni Bellini, 
gravitating more overtly in the direction the symbolic representation of the ‘anadyomene movement’ 
[FIG. 53, 54]. The hazy atmospheric effects that are frequent features of Korea’s mountainous 
landscape also inspired me. Perhaps these works initially look something like landscapes, before 
coalescing into heads. An initial encounter with a ‘Folding-Painting’ sets in train the viewer’s pattern-
making instincts, as they try to work out what is ‘figure’ and what is ‘ground’. On an initial viewing the 
viewer is likely to see only random marks on a surface, but slowly an image emerges – rather as in 
FIG.11. 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 51. Simon Morley,’ Folding-Paintings’, All That is Solid….’ (Marx and Engels), 2011, 76x17cm each,  
watercolour on paper mounted on card and silk, installed at ‘Guest from the Future, Galierie8, London, 2011 
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FIG. 52. Simon Morley,‘Folding-Paintings’. After Bellini No.1-3, 2012,  watercolour on paper mounted on card 
and silk, detail of back. Displayed in the residence of Chang Eung-Bok and Simon Morley, Seoul. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 53. Simon Morley,‘Folding-Paintings’. Reverse of After Bellini No.1-3, 2012,  watercolour on paper mounted 
on card and silk, detail of back. Displayed in the residence of Chang Eung-Bok and Simon Morley, Seoul. 
 
 
This task of interpretation is complicated not only by the fact that the images are reduced to a simple 
contrast of watercolour wash on white paper and folded down the centre, but also as they are painted in 
a kind of anamorphic projection, which as we saw, is “a kind of reductio ad absurdum of the aporia 
into which perspective leads when it is reduced to solely linear components,” as Hubert Damisch puts it 
(2002, p.136). The viewer must hold up the ‘Folding-Painting’ and regard it at an oblique angle, almost   124 
at a right angle to the picture-plane, so that the image can be ‘read’ in more or less ‘correct’ proportion. 
The image becomes more conventionally ‘legible’ when viewed vertically and flatly from an oblique 
angle. But unlike within the Lacan paradigm of the anamorphic ‘stain’, I interpret these works as 
offering viewers the opportunity to engage in a playful ‘hermeneutic’ process – pattern-making and un-
making, more in the service of the ‘pleasure principle’.  
 
In the ‘Folding-Paintings’ I was also drawn to an idea central to East Asian art - of ‘breath-resonance’ 
being channelled through the free and gestural mark, and so sought to incorporate into my practice a 
more performative dimension. I wanted to ‘aerate’ or liquefy the image, to undermine the authority of 
the photograph. After studying East Asian art that was created under the influence of Zen – such as 
‘flung-ink’ painting - I became especially aware that my works are usually highly controlled, too much 
in the ‘aoristic mode’. So I have started exploring the possibilities of more freely and expressively 
painted surfaces, but also that seem effortless and carefree compared to the works in trompe l’oeil and 
in heavy impasto. My intention here, I now see in retrospect, is to try to be rid of the constraints I 
imposed on myself concerning ‘deictic’ markers. I want to leave more evident traces of my own 
indexical relationship to the surface and the temporality of the event, and I want to convey a feeling of 
graceful nonchalance. This is something I need to explore much further…… 
 
 
 
FIG.54. Simon Morley: Left: ‘Caption Scrolls’, 2011,  ink on linen mounted on paper. 4 scrolls, each 50x300cm. 
Installed at art Link Gallery, Seoul, 2011. Below: Detail. 
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For an exhibition in Seoul,
48 I produced four hanging-scrolls. These carried the captions for illustrations 
in books written by Westerners about Korea around the turn of the last century [FIG.54]. The text was 
printed on coarse Chinese linen and mounted according to the traditional manner. For another 
exhibition, this time in London, I used the same format, but paired down the ‘framing’ so that the linen 
hung without decorative backing. This time, the text was also of a very different kind   - a list of verbs 
lifted from a text written by the anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon describing the effects of being 
‘governed’ [FIG.55 and 58]
 49 
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FIG.55. Simon Morley, To Be Governed…(Proudhon)’, 2011, ink on linen, 50x350cm. See also FIG.58   
 
Alternative conventions of display were  married to visual distortion in Edgemen [FIG.56], made for the 
project REAL DMZ. From Google Image I sampled four images  (in low dpi resolution) of border 
guards  - choosing two North Korean and two South - putting them through a regime of distortions on 
my computer:  stretching into quasi-anamorphosis (vertically, rather than horizontally), reducing to two-
tone contrast, and then printing them on narrow vinyl banners and hanging them on the façade of the 
monorail terminal of the Peace Pavilion at the DMZ. Here, I could work big and outside. I wanted to 
allude to East Asian hanging scrolls, to the aesthetics of monumental political banners, and also to 
advertising (which is the context within which the printing technique and materials are mostly used).  I 
also made the decision, in this case, to remove the signs of my own handwork through printing the 
images directly from the digital. Initially, I had intended to also reduce the images to indistinct off-
white monochrome, so that the quality of visual in-between-ness was strongly conveyed, but in the end 
I decided that they needed to be more visible from a distance. The title, Edgemen, refers to the social 
anthropologist Victor Turner’s description of liminal figures (Turner, 1970: 28).
50  In Latin, limen 
means threshold, surround, or lintel of a doorway, while limes designates a boundary or limit. Liminal 
moments define times of tension and extremes, but are also moments of great potential. Traits that are 
central to the liminal are ambiguity, indeterminacy, fragmentation, loss of the auratic, and the collapse 
of normal hierarchical cultural distinctions. In interpreting this state, linguistic or discursive modes of 
signification cede to the noncognitive realm of the visual, kinetic, gravitational, proximal, and aural. 
This liminal zone or field is a vague and turbid littoral extending between absence and presence, past 
and present – a site for the metamorphics of figure-ground.  Dualisms give way to the coalescence of 
opposites – to an ‘in-between’.   127 
 
5 
 
 
Fig. 56. Simon Morley, Edgemen, 2012, printed ink on vinyl, installed at the Monorail terminal of the Peace 
Pavilion, Cheorwon, DMZ, South Korea. Below: Detail. 
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Finally, I have been enlarging my on-going series of video works, and these have especially absorbed 
the atmosphere of my research, and then generated some of their own. In these works I aim to engage 
more fully with the liquidity and permeability of the image in an obvious way through actually 
introducing in-built temporal changes. I also sought various strategies for generating a more powerful 
sense of dedifferentiation and the loss of clear boundaries. I have been thinking about both the formal 
means available through digital editing for the production of indistinct and evanescent imagery, and the 
ambient conditions possible for display - in particular screening video in spaces with low or no ambient 
light, or screening them in groups at the same time, rather than singly.   
 
I maintained some ‘rules of engagement’ from my existing practice: I worked with  ‘ready-made’ texts 
and (here, mostly) images culled from books, movies or the Internet. In the latter two cases, there is 
already considerable loss of high spatial frequencies  - they are pixilated in low-resolution. I have given 
one work the same title as my Thesis - The Anadyomene Movement (2011) [Grabs from this video are 
illustrated at the beginning of each Chapter]. Here, I sampled the final few seconds of Federico Fellini’s 
La Dolce Vita (1960), borrowing - I now realize - a powerful image of the kind of non-terroristic ‘gaze’ 
that I have been discussing.  It is perhaps no coincidence that the young girl is standing beside the sea. 
In another, La Pittura del Trecento (2003/2012) {FIG.57] I submerged illustrations from a book on   129 
Italian art under a hazy, indistinct veil, rendering the images decidedly evanescent.  In Poem Without a 
Hero (2011), an animation, I deconstructed - or rather, re-constructed - photographs of Communist 
leaders [FIG 58], making an obvious play with the process of pattern recognition within the visual field.  
Finally, an on-going series, Thousand Suns (2011-2012) [FIG.59-60], I sampled archive photographs 
with (what now I realize are) very pronounced figure-ground contrast, and then submitted them to 
systematic chromatic and digital erosion, so that their original semiotic value is severely compromised.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG. 57. Simon Morley, Video Grabs from ‘La Pittura del Trecento’, 2012, video, 11 minutes 51 seconds 
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FIG.58. Simon Morley, Video Grabs from ‘Poem Without a Hero’, 2011, digital animation, 3 minutes 24 seconds, 
as illustrated in the  exhibition catalogue ‘Guest from the Future’. 
Below: Installed during ‘Guest from the Future’ exhibition at Galerie8, London, 2011. With ‘To Be 
Governed…(Proudhon)’ in front.  
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FIG.60. Simon Morley, Video Grabs from ‘Thousand Suns’ No.3’, 2011/2012, video, 16 minutes 14 seconds.   132 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIG.61. Simon Morley, Video Grabs from ‘Thousand Suns’ No.1, 2011/12, video, 9 minutes 19 seconds.   133 
 
I see my research in the ‘new’ medium of digital video as an extrapolation of the inherent potentialities 
of an old medium, painting  - this is also Lev Manovich’s argument in The Language of New Media  
(2001). It is possible to find many strategies and techniques that can be augmented by the new medium, 
and I sought to bring into the field of video the kinds of qualities of indistinctness and in-between 
vision, of liminality and void that I discussed in relation to the old medium of painting. For example, as 
framed images, video works within the same structured or bounded format as painting, but they makes 
it possible to generate real temporal transformations within the image.  The obvious benefit of video is 
the introduction of a time-based element. I was curious to see what happens when I use a very slow rate 
of temporal change, and a very slow cross-dissolve or fade in which the images seem to become 
intensely permeable and liquid, a process that is actually taking place over a duration of time, and that is 
now generated not by the movement of the viewer in front of the work but by the internal mutability of 
the image itself. I also wanted to see what happens on an affective level when light can be used more 
directly as part of a work. I wanted to up-scale, and create a more enveloping ambient space. In these 
works I have also introduced digitally generated sound, extending my explorations into the aural – into 
aural space.  
 
I will only make here some initial comments concerning the digital and figure-ground; indeed, a future 
area of research would be the exploration of the matamorphics of figure-ground within the digital 
media.  Working with video has foregrounded in particular the potential for exploiting digital ‘damage’ 
and distortion – both ‘ready-made’ and/or induced.  In addition to having infinite expansibility, the 
digital medium is inherently fluid and permeable, making central to an encounter qualities of 
evanescence, mutability and impermanence. A key feature of the digital is recombinability – the 
exponential potential for the manipulation of data or computational information, which is possible on a 
scale that cannot be matched by the old material media. Because data is made of bytes, everything is in 
a sense ‘ground’, and only ever temporarily becomes ‘figure’.  Within the digital domain -  which is an 
inherently liquid medium - the metamorphics of figure-ground are therefore far more pronounced.  
 
Finally, what thinking about East Asian art and working increasingly with video have made me realize 
is that the environmental ambience within which paintings are displayed is of much greater importance 
than I previously thought. The effects and control of lighting is something I have started to explore 
more fully.  In relation to the ‘Folding-Paintings’, the existence of a central hinge or fold means that one 
surface can catch light differently from the other, which produces a subtle shift in how the surfaces 
relate to each other. The result is that the image, already stretched and squeezed, becomes further 
distorted by the play of light.  I have also made some preliminary tests with works made in opalescent 
paint, to be viewed in low ambient and/or directed ligh [FIG 52] .
51   
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FIG. 62. Simon Morley, ‘Moon is Homeland Bright’ 2011, opalescent acrylic paint on round canvas, 60cm diameter.  
Photographed in ambient electric light. The Chinese text is from a poem by Tu Fu.  
 
Indeed, the word ‘environmental’ is too limiting. Better is ‘ecological’ - by which I mean to suggest the 
interdependence of organisms or things in an environment (the word derives from the Greek oikos, 
house).  One of the great ‘repressed’ of painting is the importance of the impact of factors such as 
ambient light on viewing protocols and affective resonances. The metamorphics of figure ground in 
painting do not begin and end within the rectangle of the canvas, or within a sealed perceptual arena 
containing work and viewer, but rather extend perceptually in all directions around the canvas and the 
viewer.  Empty rooms with white walls, regular spacing of works at even heights, and clear and 
‘neutral’ electric lighting, all work to constrain a painting within a narrow breadth of consciousness – 
one amenable to centric or foveal vision – and that, furthermore, is most likely to encourage detached 
analysis and the extraction of ‘clear and distinct’ ideas.  
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FIG.63. Installation shots of PhD Exhibition, Winchester Gallery, Winchester School of Art, February 
2013.  
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Detail of the work in the final installation shot. Acrylic on Chinese linen scroll.  
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CHAPTER VI: 
Conclusion 
 
Ocular eccentricity rather than blindness [….] is the antidote to privileging any one visual order or scopic regime. 
Rather than calling for the exorbitation or enucleation of ‘the eye’, it is better to encourage the multiplication of a 
thousand eyes, which, like Nietzsche’s thousand suns, suggest the openness of human possibilities. 
Martin Jay, 1993, p.591 
 
 
If things are constantly falling into bits and pieces, and being put back together in a slightly different way, then the 
same must be true of human beings, because the ego is ‘first and foremost a bodily ego’. 
Kaja Sliverman, 2009, p.166 
 
If the oceanic feeling deepens without claiming any part of speech it will threaten to erase your skin. A 
contradictory position. Pressure just below the phrase level. 
Rosemarie Waldrop in Drucker, 2012, p.6 
 
 
For all this, humans are, by nature, doomed to rationality. To condemn empty, fruitless speculation is one thing; to 
condemn all intellectual inquiry is something else. Zen masters condemn theorizing not because of what it is, but 
because too often it comes to take the place of the experience that is the ultimate aim and that theory is supposed to 
serve. 
 
Robert J.J. Wargo, 2005, p.88 
 
Return to nature 
That is to say, re-examine the source. 
Nature is the realm of infinity where one can continuously bring  
       one’s self back to nothingness. 
One can limit or define one’s self in the midst of this realm of the  
        undefined or infinite. 
Staring at the depths of self-negation is the true recognition 
        of history; this is the starting point where one can be  
        transformed.   
Lee Ufan, 1996, p.2 
 
Let go of ‘I am’  
Let go of ‘I am not’. 
 Nagarjuna, in Batchelor, 2000, p.97
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As Lyotard (2010, p.380) writes in relation to anamorphosis, my studio work can be considered as 
largely constituting  “a critique through the representation, not the represented.” I have argued that 
perception and conception do not always coincide in the production of clear and distinct ideas, and have 
been interested in positing the sufficiency of unclear and indistinct images and ideas, because that is 
how we 'see’ holistically. As Barbara Maria Stafford (Stafford, 1999, p.54) puts it: “The practise of 
thought is consistent with the practise of vision precisely in its elusive capacity to move, adjust, and 
change register.” What I have been looking for is a point of view that leaves room for the  “‘dark’ 
efficacy” of the image, for a methodology and a studio practice that  “makes it possible to hold several 
ambiguous possibilities in suspension together without premature close on one outcome” (McGilchrist, 
2009, p.82). I have aimed to take into account the fact that “physiological activity also produces a non-
formalized, nonalgorithmic insight.” (Stafford, 1999, p.159). In the light of such recognition, I have 
argued that primary intellectual properties should be displaced as sources of knowledge by secondary   142 
sensible properties - those more closely connected with the somatic, emotional and valuing tone of 
experience. What is suggested is a situation in which the subject can be temporarily relieved of the 
“burden of discriminations”, and as a result my work makes space for “the intellectual ambiance most 
favourable to a loss, or suspension, of that assumption on which all particular acts of discrimination 
rests, the assumption of an individualizing (self-discriminating) ego” (Bersani and Dutoit, 1993, p.142). 
 
Central to my research has been the need to  address both “the resistance and surrender of form to 
form–defeating fusions”, as Bersani and Dutoit (1993, p.100) put it, and the role of cognition in making 
sense of such “form-defeating fusions”. Unfixed and in continuous process, conveying a sense of the 
fluid and unfolding, the condition my paintings present gives preference to the subjunctive mood, 
insofar as it produces transitional effects rather than steady states.  They posit a state of  transit between 
figure and ground, and suggest the possibility of a passage away from an “oppressive, pathological 
figure-ground Gestalt, fragmented and disfigured by the enframing conditions”, as David Michael 
Levin (Levin, 1999:124) writes,  towards what is  “a radically different Gestalt released from such 
conditions.”  
 
Thus I have also sought to accommodate into my account those aspects of consciousness and art that are 
generated by foveal, centric vision and the powers of rational analysis. I have been interested not only in 
dispossession, but also in recuperation. To this end I have argued that the East Asian paradigm, as 
adumbrated in part by François Jullien, provides a useful methodology.  I began my researches under 
the canopy of my responses to indistinctness and mutability in Western art, and what seemed to be 
comparable qualities in the art of China, Japan and Korea. But I soon discovered that while some visual 
attributes were apparently very similar, meanings within the different recursive aesthetic orientations 
have been interpreted very differently. For example, a reading of  Kandinsky or Mondrian as ‘holistic’ 
in the East Asian sense, or of Mark Rothko’s painting as a kind of  ‘Zen art’, are misplaced,  since they 
continued to rely on a Western world-view imbued with a Platonist conceptions of the artwork as 
representing an idea, whereas East Asian art, as Frank Vigneron (2010, p.88) stresses,  aims to be 
fundamentally idea-less.
53  Similarly, correlations between Heidegger and Derrida’s philosophy of 
‘deconstruction’ and Buddhism are also misleading because although, as a consequences of the collapse 
of the dominant paradigm of ‘Enlightenment West’, Western radical thought has come to share similar 
views concerning the status of the subject as traditional ‘Eastern’ wisdom traditions, they remain 
fundamentally at odds.   
 
As a product of human consciousness postructuralist thought declares rather like Buddhism that reality 
is illusory:  everything has only relative existence. Indeed, attention to ontological lack or deficiency, on 
how the subject will inevitably fail to comprehend reality through thinking, is central to much 
poststructuralism, as it is to East Asian thought. They both concur that there is no publicly verifiable 
objectivity, and that argumentation grounded in logical rules is of very limited value; they both concur 
that what the subject makes of reality inevitably depends on the specific socially-determined 
constructions of their mind – on the paradigm or gestalt they adopt - rather than on anything the subject   143 
can identify as an innate attribute of reality itself; and they both concur that when the subject realizes all 
this, the consequences are profound.  But while the Western paradigm considers this as involving 
dispossession, the East embraces it as a dialectics of dispossession and recuperation.  
 
The ‘East Asian’ or ‘Oriental’ qualities I have highlighted have also been those that have come to 
attention in much postmodernist thought. They include the following: the valuing of a ‘mystical’ sense 
of monistic unity or intimacy over rational dualistic integrity; the recognition of knowledge as esoteric 
or ‘dark’ rather than bright and clear; the prioritizing of the somatic over the psychological as a 
knowledge generator; the valuing of affect over rational thought, pathos over logos; the positing of a 
kind of vision that is no longer construed in a narrowly optical sense, but instead is somatically 
extended to include ‘eccentric’,  ‘peripheral’, ‘aural’, ‘haptic’, ‘holistic’, ‘respiratory’, ‘bland’, or, what 
might be collectively called a kind of kinaesthetically charged ‘pneumatic’ vision (from Greek pneuma, 
wind). However, within the East Asian paradigm this is registers within the context of ‘holographic’ 
vision that delivers ecological and internal connectivity between self and world, rather than simply 
analysing an environmental and external context, and it therefore considers the opening of self to world 
in terms of a movement between dispossession and recuperation – or an expansion into a larger field of 
connectivity, rather than of merely dispossession – or mourning and loss. 
 
I have hoped to supplement my own world-view by seeking another, which means exploring buried or 
overlooked possibilities lying within our own orientation through perceiving them as they appear more 
clearly and dominantly elsewhere. We allow them to ‘aerate’ the forms of the orientation within which 
we labour. What the East Asian paradigm proposes is that the subject identifies from the start with the 
‘periphery’, approaching the ‘centre’ from within its evanescent penumbra:  moving from indistinct to 
the distinct, from ‘ground’ to ‘figure’, from nonbeing to being. As soon as we try to analyze something 
indistinct it is converted it into something distinct - as soon as we shift our eyes to the periphery it 
becomes the centre, or as soon as we study ‘ground’ it becomes a kind of ‘figure’. So what is at stake is 
not so much the abandoning the distinct for the indistinct, or the centre for the periphery, or the ‘figure’ 
for the ‘ground’ – or of embracing nothingness, the ultimate and essential ground of Being, or the 
unconscious (be it unitive or collective). This would be to believe that it is possible to make room for a 
consciousness that works from peripheral vision within an expanded sense of the centric, to analyze the 
irrational, or to render discursive into the noncognitive. Instead, the Eastern paradigm assumes that the 
position of the perceiver (and the maker) in relation to what is perceived  (and made) is not external, but 
rather is internal. East Asian thought implies not the abandonment of cognitive modes in favour of the 
evocation of some apparently deeper, non-cognitive or ineffable experience. Instead, it proposes the 
supplementing of a certain kind of cognitive orientation - the ‘analytic’ or ‘integral’ - by another - the 
‘holistic’ or ‘intimate’. The yinyang symbol – the t’ai chi -captures in visual form this 
interconnectedness. 
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The essential premise of my argument can also be summarised using Venn diagrams. First, is a 
visualization of the interstitial space between figure and ground I am calling the indistinct spaces of the 
“metamorphics of figure-ground” – or the ‘in-between’, Second is the recursive orientation of the 
‘West’ in relation to the understanding of this intermediate space,  and third is the ‘East’s’ more 
immersive, holistic or ‘mystical’ points of view:  
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Living in South Korea has helped me to transmit what might otherwise have been abstract theoretical 
ideas into something more concrete. As a result of my exploration of East Asian thought and aesthetics I 
have come to think more in terms of complementarity, which implies bi-directionality and exchange of 
energies and is closely bound to respiration  - to “breathing in-breathing out”.  But I have also become 
more aware that today, within our thoroughly hybrid global culture, the ‘elsewhere’ of the East Asian 
‘scopic regime’ I’ve discussed has become inextricably bound up with the ‘here’ of our own culture, but 
that at the same time they remain distinctly different orientations. 
 
 
* 
 
It is the greater understanding of the brain now made possible through breakthroughs in the 
neurosciences that perhaps offer the most solid basis for future research into the divergences and 
convergences of the kinds of world-view and their relation to art that I have been discussing.
54  While 
areas of disagreement abound regarding the interpretation of experimental data, and the essential 
mystery of consciousness remains, there is now general consensus in key areas.  Thus, it is recognised, 
for example, that the brain manifests an incredible ability to remap or rewire itself, and this plasticity is 
so creative and protean that it foregrounds and makes essential for study the dynamic qualities of 
liquidity and permeability within the perceptual field. In this context, visual perception can best be 
understood as a complex web of brief certitudes, of “knowing who and what things are”, combined with 
“the ambiguity of nonresemblance: the relentless slide of things and situations into entropy and chaos.” 
(Stafford, 2011: 17) Memories and expectations serve as the contextual parameters within which 
perceptual experiences are defined and understood.  The context the subject brings to a particular 
situation stems from experiences they had before, or experiences they will have later,  and  is not 
directly tied to the spatiality of a present situation organized by the  segregation of the figure-ground 
structure (Weiss, 1992, p.18). Furthermore, these memories and expectations are subject to the same 
ambiguity and indeterminacy that are inherent in the perceptual world, thereby allowing the subject to 
transcend the spatiality of the physical figure-ground relationship. In other words, we see  both what we 
apprehend through our senses and also what we already know, and  the latter is implicated in a complex 
matrix of conscious and unconscious mental activity. 
 
New insights into this plasticity and the potential of the brain’s neurons, synapses and neural networks 
for remapping and re-wiring draw attention to the essentially social nature of the human brain but also 
to its mutually modifying relationship with the body - the brain’s complexity, flexibility, mutability and 
potential for change in both positive and negative directions.  Neurologist Antonio Damasio (Damasio, 
2003:199-200) summarises how the workings of visual perception can be understood:  
 
The images we have in our minds, then, are the result of interactions between each of us and objects that engaged 
our organisms, as mapped in neural patterns constructed according to the organism’s design. It should be noted that 
this does not deny the reality of the objects. The objects are real. Nor does it deny the reality of the interactions   146 
between objects and organisms. And of course, the images are real too. And yet, the images we experience are brain 
constructions prompted by objects, rather than mirror reflections of the object. There is no picture of the objects 
being transferred optically from the retina to the visual cortex [….] There is a set of correspondences, which has 
been achieved in the long history of evolution, between the physical characters of objects independent of us and the 
menu of possible responses of the organism.  
 
There is a multi-layered interplay at work between neural biological matter and man-made context. The 
activity of pattern recognition in perception is thus a two-way street: patterns are generated by the mind 
and patterns are recognised, working between the poles of neural plasticity and epigenetic configuration 
and activity (a state which has multiple possibilities) through which selected possibilities are made 
stable within a given context. The subject is open to an environment that is also transforming it as part 
of a whole, and the plasticity of the brain means that this kind of creative activity remains in potential 
throughout life. In other words, plasticity is an underlying neural property, while epigenesis constitutes 
the process through which this property is reconfigured ecologically by the environment. As Stafford 
writes: “Epigenesis captures this notion that individual development is not a simple unfolding of some 
innate potential but a highly variable activity resulting from immensely complicated interactions 
between genetic information, the developing features of an organism or group, and the mutual 
environment.” (Stafford, 2001, p.140)  
 
As research now shows, the left-brain hemisphere delivers a sense of boundaries and structures, and 
provides cohesive organizational protocols. It does this by applying the narrowly focused beam of left-
hemisphere attention, which is grounded in foveal vision, to what is seen, and it is therefore intimately 
involved with directing the pattern formation necessary for supplying clear and distinct knowledge. The 
left-brain hemisphere’s primarily goal is the construction of a feeling of certainty.  Indeed the logical, 
rationalistic mind-set that the left hemisphere fosters cannot comprehend the loss of clear boundaries or 
contours as anything but incompletion, deprivation or lack (O’Hare and Hibbard, 2001; 191). But the 
left-brain hemisphere also “makes new things actively, by wilfully putting them together bit by bit” 
(McGilchrist, 2009, p.198). Indeed, so-called ‘normal’ visual space, as Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan 
and Zingone, 1995:368) writes,  “is an extrapolation into the environment of the left brain in high 
definition – abstract, structured as a figure minus a ground.”  The left-brain thus has an “affinity for 
what it itself has made […] well-worn familiarity, certainty and finitude”, as the psychiatrist Iain 
McGilchrist (2009, p.198) writes. This also suggests, however, that “the more certain we become of 
something the less we see.” (2009, p.83) The right-brain hemisphere, in contrast, is familiar and at ease 
with the liquidity circulating at the heart of perception.  Working primarily with peripheral vision it 
makes it possible to “hold several ambiguous possibilities in suspension together without premature 
close on one outcome”, and so has an  “affinity for all that is ‘other’, new, unknown, uncertain and 
unbounded.” (McGilchrist, 2009, p.82) As a result, the right-brain hemisphere is involved in empathetic 
bonds and emotional understanding, and helps bring the subject into touch with whatever is new by an 
attitude of receptive openness to what is. (McGilchrist, 2009, p.198). Not surprisingly, one of the most 
consistent early finds in the study of hemisphere specialisation, as McGilchrist (2009, p.82) reports, was 
that “whenever an image is either only fleetingly presented, or presented in a degraded form, so that   147 
only partial information is available, a right-hemisphere superiority emerges.” For the right hemispheric 
orientation does not produce a predominantly visual or optical space; by deriving data from the 
peripheral and working with low spatial frequencies, it allows the subject to conceive of itself not as 
existing separately from the world, but rather as being holistically embedded within it.  In other words, 
the relationship between self and world for the right brain hemisphere is internal – there is no 
bifurcation between objectivity and subjectivity. ‘Acoustic space’, as McLuhan terms it - the space of 
the right brain hemisphere -  “has the basic character of a dynamic sphere whose focus or centre is 
simultaneously everywhere and whose margin or periphery is nowhere.” (McLuhan and Zingone, 1995, 
p.368)  
 
Paradox and ambiguity are inimical to one brain hemisphere but not to the other.
 55  Immersion in 
limitlessness, or consciousness of multisensory connectedness with the world, remains an intrinsic and 
constant potential experience, one encompassing the whole matrix of mind-body. A capacity to 
prioritize one aspect or the other remains an inherent aspect of the brain’s plasticity. But the expansive 
and interpenetrative nature of holistic awareness that is conveyed by the right-brain hemisphere needs to 
find its place beside the more narrowly focused and analytic awareness of the left-brain. In the West, 
and increasingly now also in the East, the former is suppressed within an epistemological and 
ontological regime that values focused attention and abstracts things from context, dividing them into 
parts before reconstructing new synthetic and abstract wholes. This is a ratio of dominance encouraged 
by recursive cultural patterns grounded in the prioritizing of the rewards garnered by centric foveal 
visual perception over those that are the gift of the peripheral and the other senses.  
 
However, it is also important to recognize that without the distance and structure provided by the left-
brain hemisphere, “there could be no art, only experience.” (McGilchrist, 2009, p.199)  In other words, 
art ultimately arises out of patterns of connectedness between brain hemispheres. It depends on the 
recognition of the permeability and fluidity of the interchange between self and world, between 
awareness of boundaries (left-brain hemisphere) and boundary-free fusions (right-brain hemisphere). By 
integrating the experience of the ‘breakdown of boundaries’ into ritual, art creates a social context 
within which a ‘middle way’ between differentiation and dedifferentiation can be formalized and 
developed. In art, vagueness, the stochastic, the equivocal, the uncertain, and the experience of fluidity 
and permeability within the visual field can thereby remind us of our deep attraction to the wholeness of 
nature, and of the desire to make intimate connections. But it also alerts us to its dangers, and draws 
attention to the contrary necessity of establishing boundaries and maintaining distance. For, as Barbara 
Maria Stafford (Stafford, 2007, p.173) writes: “Caving into an all-embracing blur prevents us from 
understanding how ‘the well fenced out real estate of the mind’ can, in fact, be one with the events 
observed and how observing, in turn, does not necessarily entail being one with the events.”  
 
Recent research in cognitive neurosciences also seems to suggest that the insights of traditional East 
Asian thought and aesthetics may be of special value in understanding human consciousness. East Asian 
cultures give a much greater credence to the kinds of awareness supplied by the right-brain hemisphere,   148 
seeking to integrate it into harmony with the left. As McGlichrist (2009, p.458) reports, Oriental 
cultures “use strategies of both [brain] hemispheres more evenly, while Western strategies are steeply 
skewed towards the left hemisphere.” Richard Nisbett and Takahiko Masuda (Nisbett and Masuda, 2003 
p.11166) note that Japanese participants in their experiments were shown to be more attentive to the 
perceptual field - that is, to the figure-ground continuum - than American participants, confirming that 
recursive orientations determine not only what can be seen but also what can be thought.  
 
J. A. Scott Kelso and David Engstrom (2008),  discuss how research into the complementarity lying at 
the centre of many important cognitive processes is changing how we understand  them, and also how 
they impact on  decision-making and other coginitive activities. This new data challenges the 
assumption that knowledge gathering is best understood as grounded in the rules of traditional logic 
(such as non-contradiction and the law of the excluded middle) upon which binary thinking is founded.
  
As Kelso and Engstrom show, both aspects of any situation are in fact required for an exhaustive 
understanding of any phenomenon, and this therefore requires a mode of analysis that seeks the 
reconciliation of apparent contradictions, dualisms and binary oppositions. Kelso and Engstrom propose 
the use of the grapheme tilde or squiggle (~) as the symbol for a way of thinking that prioritises the 
equivalent relation or complementary, as opposed to the binary, contrary or oppositional:   
Figure~Ground, rather than Figure-Ground. The squiggle is not meant to imply a bridge; instead it is a 
way to write and think about complementary aspects that emphasizes their relational and dynamic 
character. Thus it is not merely ‘oneness’ as opposed to ‘multiplicity’; instead, what is implied is non-
duality rather than sameness, uniformity or synthesis. That is, a web of processes within which 
opposites penetrate, or a state of dynamic ‘becoming’.
56 A prime example of such complementarity, 
they suggest, is the yinyang symbol. 
 
The belief of Taoism and Buddhism that perception without cognition is the gateway to release from 
illusion (Maya in Buddhism) and the inertia of mental habits have also been substantiated on the level 
of recordable mental processes in experimental conditions. Francisco Varela and his team (Rodriguez 
et. al., 1999) found that the first visual impact of a phenomenon (as well as of sounds) is non-
conceptual. In the first 180 milliseconds there is instant recognition ― an “Aha!” reaction – that means 
that the brain first perceives without interpretation, and only after this comes recognition and 
interpretation of what is perceived. In other words, we first perceive objects in themselves as presented 
in our brains, then we perceive them through the mediation of mental representations, or gestalts, 
extending this organization via memory, expectation, posture, movement and intention. Anne C. 
Benvenuti and Elizabeth J.L. Davenport  (2011, p.213) describe tests involving mediation practitioners, 
such as Buddhist monks, which show that meditation brings about significant changes in neural 
patterns. Specific cultural practices indigenous to the East thus coordinate and formalize the inherent 
potential for making ‘gestalt shifts’ a routine part of daily life through ritual. When deafferentiation 
occurs in certain areas of the brain the mind experiences itself as infinite, and as a part of a holistic 
unity. Subtractive effects - the elimination or interruption of sensory nerve impulses - by blocking 
afferent nerve impulse or the neural inhibition of information allows the brain to experience itself as   149 
‘mind’ independent of input. Such deafferentation leads to “decreased sense of awareness of the 
boundaries between the subject and other individuals”. As Benvenuti and Davenport (2011, p.226) note: 
“When certain association areas of the brain, normally assigned to create a sense of subjective location 
in time and space, are deafferentiated (as may occur during practice of meditation), the mind 
experiences itself as infinite and as a unitive part of a greater whole.” But this experience can lead the 
subject in two directions: towards enhanced anxiety in the face of the loss of familiar perceptual 
coordinates, or to modulating and calming emotions which responds to the loss of stimuli within the 
visual field as signifying the cessation of uncomfortable physiological arousal.  In relation to meditation 
practitioners, research concluded that “this breakdown of boundaries allows for a heightened sense of 
community among individuals.” (2011, p.226) In short, it has a healing or therapeutic impact.  
 
* 
 
The Korean artist Kimsooja, asked by Nicholas Bourriaud (Commandeur, 2012: 8 and 11) whether she 
thought Oriental thinking has a real impact on the contemporary art world or whether it risks being 
merely a “postmodern exoticism, a décor for western aesthetic investigations”, replied that in her 
opinion Oriental art is always there “as a dialectic, in all basic phenomena of art and life together.” 
While I have fallen back on a cultural, historical and geographical heuristic that was initially suggested 
by François Jullien’s writings, I also assume that in comparing Western and Eastern cultures I describe 
inherent possibilities of human consciousness - everywhere and at all times -  but that have assumed 
different configurations within cultures and periods.  As Kimsooja continued:  
 
Eastern thought often functions in a passive and reserved way of expression, usually invisible, nonverbal, indirect, 
disguised, and immaterial. Western thought functions more with identity, controversy, gravity, construction in 
general rather than deconstruction, and material rather than immaterial, compared to Eastern thought. The process 
finally becomes the awareness and necessity of the presence of both in contemporary art. It is the Yin and Yang, a 
co-existence that endlessly transforms and enriches. 
 
Carl Jung (1967, p.xxii), in his Forward to Richard Wilhelm’s celebrated translation of the I Ching - the 
ancient Chinese ‘Book of Changes’, wrote the following: 
In order to understand what such a book is all about, it is imperative to cast off certain prejudices of the Western 
mind. It is a curious fact that such a gifted and intelligent people as the Chinese has never developed what we call 
science. Our science, however, is based upon the principle of causality, and causality is considered to be an 
axiomatic truth. But a great change in our standpoint is setting in. What Kant's Critique of Pure Reason failed to do, 
is being accomplished by modern physics. The axioms of causality are being shaken to their foundations: we know 
now that what we term natural laws are merely statistical truths and thus must necessarily allow for exceptions. We 
have not sufficiently taken into account as yet that we need the laboratory with its incisive restrictions in order to 
demonstrate the invariable validity of natural law. If we leave things to nature, we see a very different picture: 
every process is partially or totally interfered with by chance, so much so that under natural circumstances a course 
of events absolutely conforming to specific laws is almost an exception.  
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It is in order to “cast off certain prejudices of the Western mind” that I have turned to East Asian 
thought and aesthetics, thereby to cast a different light on the metamorphics of figure-ground. 
 
What the ‘East Asian’ paradigm signifies, in this context, is not so much a return to or encounter with 
something or someone (though it can be symbolized as such). Nor is it primarily a memory of an earlier 
stage in the subject’s growth or the human species’ history (although a sense of de-diiferentiation and 
unboundedness are far more pronounced in infancy and are carried down time within symbols). Rather, 
it suggests a permanent and primordial dimension of existence, and what I have chosen to articulate in 
geographical and cultural terms may be understood on the neuronal level, and as John Onians (2007, 
p.16) has written in relation to the important new field of ‘neauroarthistory’, what I have been  
exploring can therefore be described as a further contribution to ‘Europe’s laborious recovery of an 
unconscious knowledge that had hitherto been widely shared elsewhere.”  
 
The liquidity and permeability of the visual in-between – of the ‘anadyomene movement’ - which arises 
in the context of a heightened sense of the ‘ground’ and posits the unity of a dynamic field in which 
absences and presences are intertwined, is something that remains in potentia within every human brain.  
Consciousness is indeed structured by ‘scopic regimes’, but the inherent plasticity of the brain means 
that although we are incapable of ever breaking free of the lure of the ‘gaze’,  we nevertheless have the 
capacity to relativise our gestalt or paradigm, thereby coming under the power of another, and hopefully 
less oppressive ‘regime’. Furthermore, the very act of making a shift in perception involves a change in 
consciousness of a profound kind, because we become aware that we make what we see and know. As a 
result we recognize that we have only a choice of perspectives; that while there is a reality ‘out there’ it 
is only accessible and articulated via the detour of a ‘scopic regime’ or epistemological paradigm. As 
the historian Philip J. Ethington (2011, p.146) writes: “All knowledge is perspectival. But that which 
endures transcends its perspective of origin and networks with many other perspectives”. And so, as he 
continues: “What we call cultural forms are very much like the shifting and tuning visual field maps in 
the mind: they are constantly in flux, they undergo constant infusive dynamism, and in the last analysis 
they link discrete monadic individual bodies, just as the vast complexity of consciousness unites billions 
of independently signalling neurons.” 
 
For this reason, looking ‘elsewhere’ as I have done involves both more and less than simply exchanging 
truth for falsehood, reality for illusion.   We are surely caught within the “ever defective modality of our 
gaze” (Didi-Huberman, 2005, p.229), but mind and world echo each other via an endless weave of 
analogies (Stafford, 2007).  
 
* 
 
So what of Aphrodite, rising in the sea-foam? The psychologist Erich Neumann(1954, Ch. 1 and 2; 
1955), in his study of the successive stages of the development of consciousness, saw consciousness’s 
earliest beginnings symbolized by the circle, sphere or egg and the self-contained uroboros (the primal   151 
dragon that bites its own tail). These, so Neumann argued, are images of a level of individual 
consciousness that has not yet become differentiated from the environment or from the original 
unconscious whole.
57  This state is also expressed in various creation myths, and especially in the myth 
of the Great Mother, and Neumann considered Aphrodite to be one of its most persuasive Western 
symbolic forms. Aphrodite, then, is the seductive inertia of nature, and according to Neumann’s Jungian 
reading, also a symbol of the collective unconscious.  
 
What I have been describing is a kind of oscillation over a threshold, a friction or stimulation that in a 
certain sense is also an arousal, charged with desire. I address a kind of consciousness that is embedded 
in a field characterised by complementarity relationships, by unions and disunions, by a regulating 
alternation or a kind of conjugality between partners.  For the liminal in-between brings consciousness 
closer in touch with the original unconscious whole, but then moves it away again towards 
differentiation. What has interested me here is to identify a paradigm for discussing a ‘middle way’ 
between extremes, one that offers the prospect not so much of the postmodern mind  that seems doomed 
to perpetual unease as an understanding of Being that proposes it is possible to live at ease (Shepherd, 
2007).   
 
In the end, the ‘in-out’ and ‘rising-falling’ rhythm of our breathing seems a better analogy for the 
kinaesthetic reality of what is taking place than anything drawn from the domain of visual perception.  
This means that painting can be understood as a kind of ‘respiration’ within a framed-format; it is 
involved in a continual cycle of dispossession (out-breath) and recuperation (in-breath) -  
dedifferentiation and unboundedness and then differentiation and boundary-formation, or ‘ground’ and 
then ‘figure’, then ‘ground’ again, and then ‘figure’ again.  The metamophosis of figure-ground - the 
‘anadyomene movement’  - is thus a metaphor for an activity that, as Barbara Maria Stafford (Stafford, 
1992: 72) puts it, is “inherently and spontaneously operative in the dynamics, the ekstatic interactions, 
intertwinings and intercrossings of the perceptual act, in so far as it be deeply, chiasmically, 
ontologically thought and re-membered.” Perhaps this is why painting, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1968:151) writes, can put us in contact with an initiatory dimension -  in touch with  
“the invisible of this world, that which inhabits this world, sustains it and renders it visible, its own and 
interior possibility, the Being of this being.”  
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NOTES 
 
                                                 
1 A recent exhibition at Tate Liverpool brought together three artists who are significant exemplars of 
the metamorphics of figure-ground, spanning the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries.  The curator, 
Jeremy Lewison, links them mostly via the concept of the Sublime. Turner Monet Twombly:  
Later Paintings, Tate Liverpool, 22 June – 28 October 2012 
 
2 In a review from 2009, David Lewis describes Quaytman’s “metaphorical systems, in which vision 
and disappearance, or blindness and insight, are inevitably intertwined.” (David Lewis, “R.H. 
Quaytman,” Frieze, February 2009, http://www.frieze.com/shows/review/rh_quaytman/ ) 
 
3 As the Exhibition Guide to the British Art Show 7: In the Days of the Comet (Hayward Gallery, 2011) 
puts it, Schoorel is “intent on slowing down looking and intensifying the process of perception” by 
addressing  “the ephemeral nature of memory and the difficulty of fixing a person’s image in the mind.” 
 
4 Examples of the kind of affects of vagueness and indistinctness I have in mind can also be found in 
other framed-formats: photography and video,  and in this context, the work of Darren Almond, 
Andreas Gursky, Atta Kim, Hiroshi Sugimoto, Kim Sooja  and Bill Viola come to mind. Also, more 
immersively, sculpture, installations and videos,  such as those produced by Anish Kapoor, Bill Viola, 
James Turrell,  Olafur Eliasson, Pierre Huyghe, Mischa Kuball, Charly Nijensohn and Fernando Pratts,  
to name but a few. Indeed, today, multisensory multi-media installations bring the metamorphics of 
figure-ground to new technologically-induced heights.  
 
5 Affects determine the relationship between bodies, environment and others, and as a result they arise 
in a kind of in-between. Affects are concerned with the passage of forces and intensities, and are what a 
body can do and what it can undergo, and so are independent of structure. As Seigworth and Gregg 
(2010, p.2) continue: 
 
At once intimate and impersonal, affect accumulates across both relatedness and interruptions in relatedness, 
becoming a palimpsest of force-encounters traversing the ebbs and swells of intensities that pass between "bodies" 
(bodies defined not by an outer skin-envelope or other surface boundary but by their potential to reciprocate or co-
participate in the passages of affect). Bindings and unbindings, becomings and un-becomings, jarring 
disorientations and rhythmic attunements. Affect marks a body's belonging  to a world of encounters or; a world's 
belonging to a body of encounters but also, in non-belonging,  through all those far sadder (de)compositions of 
mutual in-compossibilities. Always there are ambiguous or "mixed" encounters that impinge and extrude for worse 
and for better, but (most usually) in-between.  
 
6 Evidently, as the reproductions accompanying this text attest, the kinds of ambient effects I am 
addressing are also almost non-translatable into the photographic medium and so are lost in 
reproduction. Indeed, in several ways my Book-Paintings seem to inadvertently thwart any efforts to re-
mediate them through photography in a manner that deliberately foregrounds the limitations of this 
mechanical medium: they are a kind of anti-photography.  Surface facture, subtle variations in tonality, 
changes in luminance brought about by moving around the paintings - these are some of the ways they 
exceed the photograph’s capacity to record the visual, challenging its competence as a vehicle for the 
reproduction. I might even want to argue that an implicit drive behind  this work is to actively resist the 
dominance of the photo-image over accounts of art (which takes place through the catalogue, the 
magazine, on-line  reproductions, and Power-point presentations), a hegemony that has surreptitiously 
perpetuated the Cartesian model of perception into the contemporary era of poststructuralist 
deconstructionism, and no doubt contributes to the ‘clericism’ that seeks to turn every art encounter into 
an occasion for discourse. 
 
7 Edgar Rubin (1886-1951) noted in his now canonical study: “When two fields have a common border, 
and one is seen as figure and the other as ground, the immediate perceptual experience is characterized 
by a shaping effect which emerges from the common border of the fields and which operates only on 
one field, or operates more strongly on one than the other. The field which is most affected by this 
shaping process is the figure; the other field is ground.” (1958, p.194-195) As Rubin also noted: “when 
it [an area] is experienced as figure it is in general more impressive than when it is experienced as   153 
                                                 
ground. It dominates consciousness; consequently in descriptions, the figure is usually mentioned 
before the ground.” (Rubin, 1958, p.199) In other words, one part of the field rather than another 
becomes the locus of attention. The Gestalt psychologists (Max Wertheimer (1880-1943), Wolfgang 
Köhler (1887- 1967), Kurt Koffka (1886- 1941) built on Rubin’s work, investigating what they saw as 
the organizing principles of perception.  
 
Gestalt psychology’s insights have been confirmed, challenged or modified.  Recent research in 
neurology and cognitive neuroscience, for example, shows that memories of object structures are in fact 
also part of the mental processes involved in figure-ground assignment, and that they affect its outcome. 
For example, the profile contour of a familiar face or letter are treated as figures for longer duration than 
unfamiliar regions (Peterson and Grant, 2003). Furthermore, while Gestalt theory considered that 
assignment of figure or ground to be a winner-take-all competition, in the sense that something was at 
any given moment either figure or ground, recent researchers have suggested that cognitively-speaking, 
competition occurs, that assignment is far less determined, and shapes can be suggested but not 
perceived on the ‘ground’ side of a contour, but  that this confusion is subsequently suppressed. 
(Peterson and Enns, 2005) 
 
8 For Kant the unknown, or noumenon, was in principle inaccessible to experience, and therefore must 
be considered ‘a limiting concept’ beyond which one cannot, or should not travel.  In Critique of 
Judgment (1790) he focused on the limits of reason, but shifted attention away from the external sources 
of the sublime experience discussed by Edmund Burke (1990) in order to address the consequences and 
its origins within the human mind. For Kant, the sublime was a way of talking about what happens 
when the subject is faced with something it doesn’t have the capacity to understand or control. It may be 
terrifying, or it may just be so complex that an inability to form a clear conception of it in the mind 
leads to a profound sense of the difference between the experience and the thought. As a result, Kant 
argued, the self is made aware of indeterminacy, ambiguity, and the limits of reason, thereby coming to 
understand more clearly the true nature and limited extent of its powers (1973, p.106)  
9 While working on my Thesis I was especially occupied with painting a triptych, Zarathustra, 
1924/1943/1950 for the exhibition ‘The Unknown’, Poznan Mediations Biennial 2012, Poland, 
September – October 2012.  However, this triptych is too large to transport from Korea to Winchester 
for  my PhD exhibition, and so  was represented only by reproductions. The other series of Book-
Paintings I made during the same period was for the exhibition ‘Monograph’  at Taguchi Fine Art 
(November-December 2012). I will also refer to a diptych made for the exhibition REAL DMZ in July-
September 2012, held along the Demilitarized Zone between North and South Korea. Of  these, there 
will be examples in the exhibition. However, the main thrust of my exhibition will be works that 
developed out of my research and that have led me to explore other media, such as watercolours, 
videos, and hybrids, like the Folding-Pictures and scrolls. 
 
10 The once dominant medium for the carrying of written text is today challenged by new 
communication media, with the result that the isomorphism of folio book and rectangular canvas is 
perhaps more evident than it once was. Written texts have been emancipated from two-dimensional 
geometric supports. At the same time, the visual arts have shifted towards ‘un-framed’ media, such as 
installation and performance. The result is that the canvas on the wall, and the book on the shelf, 
suddenly structurally and cognitively have more in common than was once recognized. 
 
11 A Ganzfeld is “the conceptual antonym of a contour” (Solso, 1996, p.52).  
 
12 Arthur Danto invites us to a hypothetical exhibition made up entirely of red monochrome paintings 
(Danto, 1997, p.167): 
 
….we can imagine two red squares, one executed in the spirit of Kierkegaardian joke  [Kierkegaard had imagined a 
monotonal red painting as depicting the Red Sea after the Israelites crossed out of Egypt] and one in the spirit of 
Suprematism  [ Malevich’s vision of a higher reality] which look enough alike that the temptation would be to place 
them in the same position on the style matrix, but which actually have very different stylistic attributes, not to speak 
if different interpretation and meanings. But one can also think of monochrome monotonal paintings done in 
neither of these spirits, and whose stylistic similarities or dissimilarities are purely accidental.  
 
13 Clement Greenberg, though a champion of abstract art, was not impressed by monochrome painting:    154 
                                                 
 
 I remember that my first reaction to the almost monochromatic pictures by Rollin Crampton in 1951 (at the Peridot 
Gallery) was derision mixed with exasperation. It took renewed acquaintance with these pictures [……].to teach me 
better. The next monochromatic paintings I saw were completely so – the all-white and all-black paintings in 
Rauschenberg’s 1953 show (at the Stable). I was surprised by how easy they were to ‘get’, how familiar-looking 
and even slick. It was no different afterwards when I first saw Reinhardt’s, Sally Hazlett’s, and Yves Klein’s 
monochromatic or near-monochromatic pictures. These too looked familiar and slick. What was so challenging in 
Crampton’s art had become almost overnight another taming convention (Pollock’s and Tobey’s ‘alloverness’ 
probably helped bring this about too.) The look of accident was not the only ‘wild’ thing that Abstract 
Expressionism first acclaimed and then domesticated in painting: it did the same to emptiness, to the look of the 
‘void.’ A monochromatic flatness that could be seen as limited in extension and different from a wall henceforth 
automatically seemed to be a picture, to be art. 
Clement Greenberg, ‘Recentness of Sculpture’ (1967) reprinted in Gregory Battock, 1995, ‘Minimal Art: A Critical 
Anthology (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press), 181  
 
14 The dominant form of the allegorical postmodernist work is the palimpsest, and contemporary artists 
drawn to this mode were likely to indulge in a general confusion of traditional categories, using 
fragmentary and appropriated imagery, and preferring strategies of impermanence, repetition,  
accumulation, the sequential and the discursive (Owens,1994, p.52-54).  Painting, however, was not a 
prominent medium within this tendency. 
 
15 Maurice Merleau-Ponty took issue with the Cartesian thesis that sight as a unidirectional activity 
understood in terms of power,  and with a cogito  who can intellectually master the visual field by 
assigning objects precise meanings - a subject who passively gazes at things at a distance. Instead, 
Merleau-Ponty regarded perception as reversible and dynamic.  As Galen Johnson (1993, p.3) notes, 
what Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology suggests is a fundamental reversal of the binary opposition that 
has dominated modern Western thought:  primary intellectual properties are displaced by secondary 
sensible properties as the source of knowledge. Merleau-Ponty paid special attention to the spatial and 
temporal environment within which in a pre-logical, pre-cognitive way the subject encounters things 
and people, and he stressed the primacy of touch, which localizes an object in its environment, arguing 
that rather than the information provided by the disembodied eye, tactile properties provide the most 
powerful articulations of an object’s reality. Rosalind Krauss (1993, p. 217) notes, Merleau-Ponty 
argued that there is nothing to “shape the aperture that perception opens onto the field of experience; 
nothing structures that opening in advance.” Prior to any concepts or reflection that serve to establish 
the figure-ground segregation, the body is involved in a multi-sensorial dialogue with the world – or 
what Merleau-Ponty (1968; 1993) in his later work calls the “flesh” of the world. The subject is 
understood to be a congregation of senses awaiting stimulation from the external world -  an 
‘aesthesiological body’. The concept of “flesh” implies the sharing of a continuous bond, in which the 
body of the subject and the world interconnect. There is an indivisibility of seer and seen, they are no 
longer ontological opposites. “The thickness of flesh between the seer and the thing is constitutive for 
the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity; it is not an obstacle between them, it is their 
means of communication” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p.135). ‘Flesh’ implies that “he who sees is of it 
(flesh) and is in it” (1968, p.100). This reversibility Merleau-Ponty calls ‘chiasm’, from the Greek 
rhetorical form implying overlap, criss-cross, and inclining and reclining (Johnson, p.48).  
 
16 I owe this locution to Norman Bryson (2003). 
 
17 David Freedberg outlines the broad consequences for art history of such intellectualist approaches 
(2007, p.199): 
E.H. Gombrich’s Art and Illusion of 1960 was devoted to ‘the psychology of pictorial representation’. Yet 
practically nothing in it was devoted to emotional and empathetic responses to art. By this time, the emotions had 
entirely dropped out of the field of esthetics. This position was canonized by R.H. Collingwood’s The Principles of 
Art (1938). Following Kant, Collingwood believed that art should be separated from the emotional and from the 
realm of physical and spontaneous responses. Art came to be thought of as a matter of pure cognition. Nelson 
Goodman emphasized that ‘in esthetic experience the emotions function cognitively’. Clement Greenberg was 
devoted to the cognitive assessment of the perception of the picture plane. In its insistence on purely historical, 
cultural and social factors in responses to art, the ‘new art history’ of the 1970s remained intensely resistant to 
approaches that suggested the possibility of precognitive levels of response. This elimination of the emotional, the 
empathetic and the realm of non-cognitive corporeal response remained typical for most of the 20th century.   155 
                                                 
 
18 For Lyotard, “[t]he figure enjoys a radical complicity with desire” (2010, p..268), or is  “worked 
over” by desire (2010, p.277). It is the body’s challenge to discourse -  Dionysian excessiveness 
undermining Apollonian order. He describes three kinds of such ‘figurality’:  the ‘figure-image’ - “that 
which comes in view on the oneiric or quasi-oneiric stage” (2010, p.274); ‘figure-form’, which 
“upholds the visible without being seen [….] Its relation to unconscious space is given by the 
transgression of good form (Gestalt).” (2010, p.275); the “figure-matrix”: “Not only does it remain 
unseen, but it is no more visible than it is legible”, he declares. “It belongs in neither plastic nor textual 
space.” As a result, Lyotard adds, the ‘figure-matrix’ “is difference itself, and as such does not suffer 
that minimum of oppositionality that its spoken expression requires, of image – or form – conditioning 
that its plastic expression entails,” (2010, p.275)  
 
19 Freud, believed that this boundary-breaking experience revealed a subject in thrall to the death 
instinct. In Civilization and Its Discontents (1961A, p.68) Freud wrote:  
  
If we assume that there are many people in whose mental life this primary ego-feeling has persisted to a greater or 
lesser degree, it would exist in them side by side with the narrower and more sharply demarcated ego-feeling of 
maturity, like a counterpart to it. In that case, the ideational contents appropriate to it would be precisely those of 
unlimitedness and of a bond with the universe – the same ideas with which my friend [Romain Rolland] elucidated 
the ‘oceanic’ feeling.  
 
Romain Rolland had used the phrase ‘oceanic feeling’ to describe awareness of limitless and boundary-
free being that Jung explored, seeing it as what united all religious, spiritual or mystical experiences, 
and Freud adopted it in a critical context (Silverman, 2009,p. 9). However, the goal of the ego, so Freud 
argued, is to successfully sublimate the death instinct into the life instinct, thereby bringing about a 
stable and coherent sense of selfhood. The striving for the maintenance of unity and narcissistic 
uniqueness of individual homeostasis is characterised by ‘Eros’, by the desire for order and the 
constitution of ever more complex wholes, while ‘Thanatos’ is full of disruptive anxiety-driven 
discharges of energy and the rejection of tension and the complexity of life in favour of the peace of the 
unbounded and undifferentiated inorganic. But in lived reality the two only ever appear in combination, 
and so, as Hal Foster (1993, p. 9) writes, for Freud “[t]here exists…..an instinctual compulsion to 
repeat, to return to a prior state, ‘a principle powerful enough to overrule the pleasure principle’; and it 
is this compulsion that renders certain phenomena ‘daemonic’.” The  ‘Nirvana principle’, as Freud 
called it, is a compulsion that is dangerously tied to the death drive, seeking a state of zero tension 
through de-differentiation, and is equated with the transformation of Thanatos into Eros (Freud, 1961A, 
p.65). Within the ‘Nirvana principle’ the death drive “has undergone a modification in living organisms 
through which it has become the pleasure principle.” (Freud, 1961A, p.160)  
 
More recent Freudian interpretations offer a more afirmative reading of the experience of the ‘oceanic’: 
It is an opening and expansion of the subject to embrace the sensation of connectedness with all other 
beings (Silverman, 2009, p.29).
 The ‘oceanic feeling’, writes Julia Kristeva ( 2010, p.3), means the 
subject immersed in a kind of  “container or envelop” which “harks back to the newborn who has not 
yet established boundaries between his Ego and the mother’s body”. It evokes the experience of 
“jubilant osmosis of the subject in the communal flesh of a “not-yet self”, who is engulfed in a “not-yet 
world”. It implies a desire for “the intimate union of the Ego and the surrounding world, experienced as 
an absolute certitude of satisfaction and security, but also as loss of self in favour of that which 
surrounds and contains us.” (Kristeva, 2010, p.3) 
 
20 I am certainly no Sinologist; I cannot claim to be able to support my discussion of East Asian art with 
any real expertise. I recognize that I am straying rather far from my familiar habitat. But I believe it is 
worth the risk. 
 
21 Henry Zhao, writing in the New Left Review summarizes Billeter’s critique (2007):  
 
His counter-blast identifies Jullien as the latest in a series of European writers who have founded their work on the 
myth of China’s absolute otherness. Billeter cites Victor Segalen, Marcel Granet, Richard Wilhelm and Pierre 
Ryckmans, for whom China also constitutes ‘the fundamental other’. But the origins of the myth can be traced back 
to Voltaire and the ‘sinophile Enlightenment’ of the eighteenth century. Voltaire and the philosophes, of course,   156 
                                                 
used China as a foil, to represent the opposite of the regime they were fighting against at home. Jullien, Billeter 
claims, has taken this myth and updated it to the present, while at the same time hiding its political significance.  
 
22 For example see:  Ch’oe Wan-su, 2005, Korean True-View Landscape: Paintings by Chôn Sôn (1676-
1759), edited and translated by Youngsook Pak and Roderick Whitfield (London, Saffron Books).  
 
The first attempt by a Westerner to produce an art historical overview of Korean art was made by André 
Eckhardt, who in Geschichte der Koreanischen Kunst (1929) claimed that ‘classicism’ is the dominant 
intrinsic characteristic of Korean traditional art - by which he meant symmetrical structure, balance, 
simplicity, serenity and impartiality. The Japanese scholar Yanagi Muneyoshi, meanwhile, focused on 
an ‘aesthetics of sorrow’ in his influential study from 1920;  in comparison with Chinese and Japanese 
aesthetics, Korean  art displayed an ‘aesthetics of autonomy’, he declared. Korean scholars, most 
notably Ko Yu-seop writing in the 1940’s and Choe Sun-u in the 1960’s, emphasised disinterestedness, 
imperfection, naiveté and naturalness. This overview draws on: Kwon Young-Pil ‘The Aesthetic in 
Traditional Korean Art and Its Influence on Modern Life’, Korean Journal, Autumn 2001, pp.9-34. 
Kwon also discusses the influence of shamanism and the importance of humour, and writes that the 
Korean aesthetic is characterised by the ‘classical concept of “unification in diversity”.’ (2001, p.9) 
 
23 As examples of how East Asian recursive orientations might be construed in a more critical light in 
no way philosophically, ethically, environmentally and aesthetically more humane than the Western 
counterparts, Thomas P. Kasulis notes that within the recursive paradigm he dubs ‘intimate’, there is a 
tendency towards placing excessive power in the hands of the ‘select’, and that an ‘holographic’ model 
when applied to the state may invest it with enormous authoritarian control  (2004, p.145-150). The case 
of North Korea suggests itself.  Mindless obedience to authority and conformity to the ‘official’ line, 
even by the so-called ‘intelligentsia’, and even in the face of abundant the evidence to the contrary, as 
for example was rampant in Japan during its colonial era, and also recently in the wake of the tsumani 
nuclear disaster, are clearly negative consequences of ‘intimate’ and ‘holistic’ thinking.   More 
generally, yinyang holism can bifurcate into a dualism of a far more inflexible kind than even that of 
Cartesianism, as indeed seems often to be the case in contemporary China or South Korea.  Meanwhile, 
in relation to artistic conventions, it is possible for East Asian artists to consider the values espoused by 
the ideas and aesthetics of traditional culture just as limiting as the ‘scopic regimes’ within which 
Westerners labour. Thus, to the young South Korean painter Lee Seahyun, the ‘three viewpoint method’ 
that is characteristic of East Asian landscape painting, far from offering a more flexible and dynamic 
alternative to fixed-point perspective, in his opinion  is actually  “a repressive and egocentric approach 
to nature; a visual and perceptual violence”, because it involves  “arbitrarily cutting and pasting the 
front, rear, and the upper part side as a man wishes”.  (Cited in the Press Release to his exhibition, 
‘Plastic Garden’, Hakgojae Gallery, Seoul, 29/09/12 – 14/10/12)  Indeed, my time in South Korea has 
shown me how, in  myriad ways, the ‘East/West’ dichotomy I am proposing is in practise far more 
complex and nuanced, indeed in some ways, redundant. On the other hand, I am talking about 
‘recursive patterns’ and not hard-and-fast cultural norms. History shows such patterns to be mutable. 
For an attempt to view this complexity in relation to a specific period of South Korean art, see my 
Paper, ‘Dansaekhwa: Korean Monochrome Painting’, Third Text, April 2013. 
 
24 Art historian David Freedberg and neurologist Vittorio Gallese, in a article that explores the 
implications for the study of art of the discovery of mirror neurons, draw attention to the biological 
foundations for  “our capacity to pre-rationally make sense of the actions, emotions and sensations of 
others”, and the centrality of empathy to the aesthetic experience. Art’s power to move us, they argue 
(2007, p.198) 
 
depends on embodied simulation, a functional mechanism through which the actions, emotions or sensations we see 
activate our own internal representations of the body states that are associated with these social stimuli, as if we 
were engaged in a similar action or experiencing a similar emotion or sensation. Activation of the same brain region 
during first- and third-person experience of actions, emotions and sensations suggests that, as well as explicit 
cognitive evaluation of social stimuli, there is probably a phylogenetically older mechanism that enables direct 
experiential understanding of objects and the inner world of others.  
 
As a result, they propose (2007, p.197) that:  
 
a crucial element of esthetic response consists of the activation of embodied mechanisms encompassing the 
simulation of actions, emotions and corporeal sensation, and that these mechanisms are universal. This basic level   157 
                                                 
of reaction to images is essential to understanding the effectiveness both of everyday images and of works of art. 
Historical, cultural and other contextual factors do not preclude the importance of considering the neural processes 
that arise in the empathetic understanding of visual artworks.  
 
Their research aims to highlight the empathetic potential of art, and they conclude: “Automatic 
empathetic responses constitute a basic level of response to images and to works of art. Underlying such 
responses is the process of embodied simulation that enables the direct experiential understanding of the 
intentional and emotional contents of images. This basic level of reaction to images becomes essential 
to any understanding of their effectiveness as art.” (2007, p.202) 
 
25 Analogy, as Barbara Maria Stafford declares (1999, p. 9), generates “the vision of ordered 
relationships articulated as similarity-in-difference”, and it is  “a metamorphic and metaphoric practice 
for weaving discordant particulars into a partial concordance.” The fundamentally relational and 
transpersonal character of analogy points to a permeable gestalt of the in-between, one where no firm 
figure/ground, subject/object, substance/property duality exists.  As a result, the analogic method 
subverts the segregation imposed by centric vision and instead mobilizes sight that “sours the 
imagination to discover similarities in dissimilarities.” (Stafford, 1999, p.9) Analogy assumes that there 
is no dualistic ‘I’ standing outside reality looking in, nor a clear distinction between memory and 
consciousness.  For Gilles Deleuze, painting is “the analogical art par excellence” (2003, p.117) 
“Analogical language”, he notes (Deleuze, 2003, p.113), “would be a language of relations, which 
consists of expressive movements, para-linguistic signs, breaths and screams, and so on.” It is a method 
for mediating, “i.e., maintaining a proportional or balanced relation” (1999, p.108).  
 
26 According to Adele M. Holcomb, Turner was originally quoted as saying  ‘fault’ in a letter written to 
a collector on Turner’s behalf by the artist C.R.Leslie,  and the substitution of ‘forte’ for ‘fault’ seems to 
have been the responsibility of Turner’s mid-Victorian biographer, Walter Thornbury. Unfortunately, 
the mistake was perpetuated.  See: “Indistinctness is my fault” : A letter about Turner from C.R. Leslie 
to James Lenox”, Burlington Magazine, 114, 1972, p.557-558 , cited in Gerald Finley, Angel in the Sun: 
Turner’s Vision of History’ (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999),  note 49, 228)  
 
27 In an essay entitled ‘Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini’ (1981) Julia Kristeva touches on 
qualities that are central to the aesthetics of my work, writing that the Venetian artist’s series of 
paintings of the Madonna and Child generate effects of “[l]uminous, chromatic differences beyond and 
despite corporeal representation”. Kristeva sees Bellini’s use of colour and light as generating a 
pulsating and indistinct volume that eclipses the figure.  The result is the “integration of the image 
accomplished in its truth-likeness within the luminous serenity of the unrepresentable.” (1981, p. 243)
  
Drawing on the work of Melanie Klein and Hanna Segal, Kristeva argues that Bellini  “penetrates 
through the being and language of the father to position himself in the place where the mother could 
have been reached.” (1981, p. 249) The space Bellini fashions, according to Kristeva, is thus in fact  
‘maternal space’ - “ineffable jouissance, beyond discourse, beyond narrative, beyond psychology, 
beyond lived experience and biography – in short, beyond representation.” (1981, p.247)  We witness 
“the lost-unrepresentable-forbidden jouissance of a hidden mother, seducing the child through a lack of 
being” (1981, p.248). As a result, Bellini is able to “breath away from the theme” (1981, p.248) - the 
official symbolic content of his work – to make something fundamentally ineffable the real subject of 
art. 
 
28 The universality of colour associations is much debated, but research shows that some general cross-
cultural congruencies exist: thus, in most cultures white has association with eternity, virtue, innocence, 
purity, heaven, light, reverence, birth, simplicity, cleanliness, peace, humility, precision, innocence, 
youth, winter, snow, good, sterility, cold, clinical, and,  in Western cultures  with marriage, while in 
contrast, in East Asian cultures, white is also associated with death. Black is associated with death, 
mourning, remorse, unhappiness, murder, anger, evil, fear, sin and devils, impurity, hell, darkness, and 
underground, but also with depth, power, sexuality, sophistication, formality, elegance, wealth, mystery, 
anonymity. Red has associations with excitement, energy, passion, love, desire, speed, strength, power, 
heat, aggression, danger, fire, blood, war, violence, and all things intense and passionate, while in the 
East it can symbolize health. Green stands for nature, environment, good luck, inexperience, renewal, 
youth, vigour, spring, generosity, fertility, but also in the West, with jealousy, envy and  misfortune, 
while in the East, with eternity, family, harmony, health, peace, prosperity.   158 
                                                 
29 The theological world-view of Judeo-Christian monotheism teaches that ineffable and invisible God 
communicates to mortals only through the spoken word, and in order that this divine Word might carry 
lasting meaning, it had to take on a concrete physical form. Sacred speech was transcribed and 
concretized into two-dimensional graphic signs within the covers of the codex in order that the words of 
God could be interpreted for the masses by the few who had high enough social status to be literate. The 
very word ʻBibleʼ comes from the Greek for book, biblos, through the Latin biblia, and this sacred book 
came to symbolize the legitimacy of the Churchʼs authority. For Christianity, the Bible and its 
commentaries represented a logical and divinely transcendent universe in which everything has its 
rightful place. Not surprisingly, the image of the Holy Book pervades Christian art. But the corollary to 
the sanctification of a transcendent and invisible deity was the condemnation of the reality that was 
revealed to the senses.   
 
During the centuries of progressive secularisation, this potent cultural symbol of the Book went through 
metamorphosis. The control and dissemination of the information carried by the written word remained 
central to any successful articulation of power, but now these words were collected in what might be 
called the ‘Humanist Book’, housed in the universal library. In the process, the Bookʼs symbolism 
changed. It became transformed from the hallowed space within which was inscribed Godʼs spoken 
word into a cherished depository for mankindʼs wisdom or genius. The sceptical spirit of the 
Enlightenment further complicated this symbolism, diminishing yet further the transcendent status of 
the word. But it did not depose it. While in earlier periods the book had been understood to consist of 
celestially ordained facts, it would now be judged merely the repository of humanly-contested opinion. 
The legitimacy of the words’ message was thus thrown into question, as was the power of those who 
claimed to administer the will of the authority who spoke through the words. The information housed 
within the book would be seen arbitrary, and so open to endless critique, and so what once was thought 
to have the legitimacy of uncontested ‘truth’ was now merely a human projection or construction. In 
this context, the symbol of the Book comes to stand for both emancipation from authority and its 
legitimating. Each act of writing was a challenge to the canon - potentially an act of erring and of 
swerving away from the authority of tradition - and each act of reading could also empower the reader 
rather than simply setting them on a course of obedience. Indeed, in the modern world, books can 
sometimes be thought to pose such a threat to the ruling order that not only are they severely censored, 
but the objects themselves are actually destroyed. So one can say that the book symbolism evoked by 
the Book-Paintings has a dual significance: it stands for both authority and the challenge to authority.  
 
30 The painting was made for the Poznan Mediations Biennial 2012, whose theme was ‘The Unknown’, 
and I was invited to participate in the Biennial by the German curator, critic, and Jesuit priest, 
Friedhelm Mennekes.  My choice was therefore mediated strongly by a cluster of references – making 
connections to the theme of the exhibition, the nationality of the curator, the tragedy of Poland during 
the period spanned by the books, and the fact that Nietzsche famously declared that ‘God is dead’ 
within the pages of Also Sprach Zarathustra.
30 Nietzsche’s works and the nihilistic message they 
convey are mired in history – they are indeed ‘perspectival’, to use Nietzsche’s own terminology (which 
isn’t to imply that the problem of nihilism that Nietzsche poses is not still a problem for us today).  
 
31 Perhaps the most explicit exploration of the visual-verbal interface in my work is the exhibition 
‘Messagerie’, held at the Musée des Beaux-Arts de Dijon in 2010-11. The starting point was my 
encounter with the Museum’s collection of paintings including depictions of swirling banderols with 
text inscribed on them. These are mostly by Flemish or Flemish-influenced artists, dating from the 
fourteenth to the early sixteenth century. I thought that the way the graceful serpentine dance in space of 
the banderols appears to be frozen in an eternal present to be very beautiful.  But the more I looked at 
the banderols the more incongruous they became. The convention within which a visual representation 
includes such things is essentially medieval, a time when a painting was conceived of as a two-
dimensional surface upon which words and images were deployed to communicate mostly a religious 
message. Any texts incorporated into the field of the painting functioned as important ancillary devices 
that were meant to aid communication, and in the case of these banderols, they are also meant to 
represent speech. Their function is to bind the painting more tightly to the antecedent text that the 
painting is meant to illustrate, as if the silence of a visual image made it an inadequate vessel for 
communicating sophisticated spiritual truths. Thus the banderols give voice to the dumb muteness of the 
picture. But as a result of my problem in deciphering the texts on the banderols – they are in Latin and 
in archaic styles - I ended up looking at the letters’ shapes, and speculating about many possible 
meanings. The inscriptions became a kind of incoherent ‘effect of writing’, which, while implying   159 
                                                 
discursivity, is not any longer actually discursive. It is, rather, a kind of ‘asemic’ writing. It no longer 
has semantic content.  For images of this exhibition, and of my work in general, see my website: 
www.simonmorley.com 
 
32 Until I was five years old we lived overlooking the sea at Eastbourne on the south coast, and my first 
memories are nicely bifurcated: on one side I see the empty and sometimes frightening void of the 
ocean, on the other, the solid, manicured and reassuring edifices of  the seafront. Anti-structure and 
structure, one could say, or the sublime and the beautiful. There I am, being pushed along the Prom in 
my pram by my mother or father (he was ahead of his times!) or my au pair – along the in-between. In 
fact, the first paintings I made were of this place – the shoreline. I remember one especially well; the 
canvas shows the seafront at night. It’s winter and very still. There’s no moon and no clouds. The main 
colour is a cold viridian, and the sky is almost the same hue as the sea. I seem to have imagined a 
viewpoint as if hovering above the beach (very Chinese), looking sideways from the promenade and out 
towards the horizon, so we can see the pebbled beach at high-tide, a groin extending into the water from 
the left side, and, at the shore-line where waves are slowly breaking, there is a solitary silhouetted figure 
standing stock-still and looking out across the gloomy nothingness, The oil paint has been put on 
smoothly and thinly, and there’s only a small amount of impasto - in the beach area. I would say I was 
much more interested in depicting the scene than in painting it. But if my aim was to express how I felt 
at the time, then I think I did pretty good job in finding an obvious visual analogue for “I’m depressed 
and lonely”. But from where did the rhetoric of this image come? Certainly, it’s clichéd, trading on a 
very familiar set of visual tropes which at the time probably came to me less via art history than from 
popular or literary culture –from movies or photographs or novels and poems. Caspar David Friedrich is 
one obvious pictorial source.  But did I know his work then?  Anyway, I think that’s what my work has 
become: a kind of out-of-focus painting-the-littoral. 
 
33 I was born mildly astigmatic – with a type of refractive error of the eye. That is, with a problem of 
how the eye focuses light. “In an eye with astigmatism,” writes Gary Harting (2011), “light fails to 
come to a single focus on the retina to produce clear vision. Instead, multiple focus points occur, either 
in front of or behind the retina (or both).” This is one of the (until now, unconscious) sources of my 
work.  I am inclined to lateral or peripheral ‘confusion’ rather than focal organization.  Furthermore, 
because I have worn glasses since I was three years old, I think I am also inclined to greater awareness 
of the difference between centric and ‘eccentric’ vision, as the frame of my glasses registers as the 
structural limit to the ‘correct’ vision delivered at the foveal centre, and is technologically – socially – 
facilitated, rather than appearing ‘natural’. This would also imply that I am more aware of framing 
boundaries. 
 
34 In some works I explore the tendency to read worked-up surfaces as ‘figure’ by applying impasto to 
the areas that customarily would be considered ‘ground.’ 
 
35 The artist M.C. Escher, who popularized many of Gestalt psychology’s findings, noted of his own 
works (1992, p.164):  
 
In each case there are three stages to be distinguished. The first stage is the reverse of the final stage, — that is, a 
white object on a black background as against a black object on a white background. The second stage is 
intermediary between the two, and is the true, complete division of the plane, in which the opposing elements are 
equal.  
 
Douglas Hofstader terms Escher’s play with the reversibility of figure-ground ‘recursive’, meaning that 
“both foreground and background are cursively drawable”, where ‘cursively drawable’ means that, as is 
the norm in Western art, the “ground is merely an accidental by-product of the drawing act.” (2000, 
p.75) In other words, Escher seeks to incorporate to a greater extent the ground into consciousness. 
 
36 For Freud, the stability of the ego is continuously being endangered by shocks coming from 
potentially overwhelming stimuli, and so the subject is preoccupied with warding-off the impact of such 
occurrences, which nevertheless settle into the liminal limbo between consciousness and 
unconsciousness. Freud called this a sense of the ‘uncanny’ – the haunting of consciousness by half-
remembered things, and psychically generated intensities that are fundamentally at odds with the reign 
of gestalt, structure, order and discourse. 
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37 Thus Didi-Huberman refers to the role of colour as a dimension that spoils any hard-and-fast figure-
ground differentiation of signs.  He also emphasises how alternative interpretations of perception 
impacted on art, citing Albertus Magnus, for example, in relation to Fra Angelico. Magnus “developed 
an entire theory of the genesis of forms (inchoatio formarum), where the place [or ground] is very far 
from playing the simple role of a more or less neutral and indeterminate ‘container’ for the figures.” 
(1996, p.18) 
  
38 The Kyoto School developed a philosophical position that sought a fusion between Zen Buddhism 
and Heideggerian phenomenology.  See for example: Keiji Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, (1983) 
and The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism (1990); also Kitaro Nishida, An Inquiry Into the Good, 1990, 
trans. Masao Abe and Christopher Ives, (New Haven & London: Yale University Press)  
 
39 At one point early in Being and Nothingness (1943), Sartre directly applies the psychology of figure-
ground segregation in order to reveal the essential emptiness at the heart of being. He imagines waiting 
in a café for someone who is late, and the café becomes the background for a lack, because even a non-
presence can be perceived.  Sartre argues that the lack of the person he awaits stands out from the 
background of the café’s fullness, and the café becomes a dull, undifferentiated zone around this non-
appearance: “his absence fixes the café as an undifferentiated totality to my own marginal attention; it 
slips into the background; it pursues its nihilation.” (1953, p.10) As a result, Sartre wrote (1953, p.10): 
“what is offered to intuition is a flickering of nothingness; it is the nothingness of the ground, the 
nihilation of which summons and demands the appearance of the figure, and it is the figure – the 
nothingness which slips as a nothing to the surface of the ground.”   
 
40 The strangeness of the floating object, as Lacan (Lacan, 1978, p.92) put it, "reflects our own 
nothingness, in the figure of the death's head". For Lacan, amamorphosis thus comes to stand for 
figuring “the blind spot in conscious perception”, as Margeret Iverson (2007, p.7) writes. It makes one 
space legible while turning the other space into a hallucination, thereby causing a ‘crisis’ for the 
viewing subject. The eye would be “master of all it surveys, were it not for the gaze, a spot or void left 
behind by this splitting [between codes of representation].” (Iverson, 2007: 7) For Lacan, the 
anamorphosis of the skull  “represents the subject’s fear of dissolution”, Bryson (1988, p.106) writes; it 
“appears in and as the protest of the Imaginary against its own decentring, as the menace of death”. 
Anamorphosis is  for Lacan the  ‘Real’ irrupting into the geometrical and conscious model of vision that 
is epitomized by the rest of Holbein’s painting. Indeed, as Iverson (2007, p.11) puts it, the general 
conclusion to be drawn from Lacan’s reading of anamorphosis is that “art’s beauty or appeal to the 
imaginary is empty and may be one step away from horror.” Thus, Iverson (2007, p.13) writes: “The 
anamorphic paradigm of psychoanalytic art theory constitutes the basis of an aesthetic theory beyond 
pleasure, one that ultimately involves encounters with the pain of irretrievable loss and the inevitability 
of death. [….] The smooth running of the pleasure principle is disrupted by something internal to the 
system itself, and we are forced to take account of that reality.”  
 
Like Sartre, Jacques Lacan (who drew on Satre’s work) considered that visual experience unfolds as an 
on-going crisis for the boundaried and bounded ego, which is constantly in danger of slipping into the 
“nothingness of the ground”. Lacan argued that the illusion of a stable ego arises in what he called the 
infant’s ‘mirror stage’. Kaja Silverman writes (2009, p.1):  
 
Somewhere between the ages of six and eighteen months [......] the typical infant is held up to a mirror by a parent 
or caretaker and encouraged to identify with its reflection. This identification creates something that did not 
previously exist: a self. But since the child is sunk in ‘nurseling dependence’ and is little more than a disorganised 
mass of motor responses, this identification is impossible to sustain. As soon as the mirror asserts its exteriority, the 
infant self begins to  disintegrate. Only by overcoming the otherness of its newly emergent rival can the child 
reassemble the pieces. 
 
 Henceforth the subject will be in thrall to a specular state Lacan calls the ‘Imaginary’. In order to 
defend itself the subject inserts a screen between retina and world, “a screen consisting of all the 
multiple discourses on vision built into the social arena” (Bryson, 1988, p.92) – what Lacan calls the 
‘Symbolic’.  The ‘Symbolic’ is essentially linguistic – it is constructed out of language, and entry into it 
means the subject becomes trapped in a kind of immobile figure-ground segregation, and is convinced 
that union with the mirror image is possible, whereas in fact it is imprisoned in the ‘Symbolic’ – the 
linguistic and social structures  - the gestalt - which pre-exist the subject’s entry into the world. As   161 
                                                 
Margeret Iverson writes:  “The mirror [….] does not reflect back an already constituted self. Rather it 
creates a reasonable facsimile or simulacrum of a self.” (2007, p. 7] It is the function of the gaze to 
conceal the emptiness of the ‘Real’.  The viewing subject is caught in the trap of the gaze, confronting 
the screen that is suspended between subject and world, which  “mortifies sight” (Bryson, 1988, p.92).  
Lacan illustrated how this works in relation to visual perception through recounting his memory of a 
sardine can floating in the sea that looked in some way uncannily like an eye staring back at him. (1978, 
p. 96) As James Elkins summarises (2010A, p.21-22): “The purpose of the story, in the most immediate 
sense, is to introduce the chiasmatic or crossed nature of vision: the way that the gaze proceeds from the 
subject and also to the subject from ‘outside’.” As a result, as Silverman describes it (2009, p.1): 
“because the subject’s identity will continue to be propped upon external images,” it is in a perpetual 
state of defence, in a “battle-to-the-death with its own mirror image”, and this, in fact, “is only the first 
instalment in a life-long war between itself and everything else.” This rivalry between subject and 
object “makes similarity even harder to tolerate than alterity”, Silverman adds, “[s]ince the more an 
external object resembles the subject, the more it undercuts the latter’s claim to be unique and 
autonomous.”   
 
41 As Massey (2007, p.3) continues: “If perspective has indeed consistently undermined the foundations 
of its own representational claims, then it throws into disarray the widely held belief that the 
Renaissance produced a unitary conception of representation (one often categorized as optical, 
empirical, and Cartesian in character) that was dialectically opposed to both modernist and 
postmodernist theories of representation.”  
 
42 Lao Tzu or Laozi probably lived in the sixth century B.C. and is the founder of Taoist thought. 
 
43 In my experience, one of the most telling ways of gasping the difference between Western and 
Eastern understanding of consciousness is to ask somebody to point to where their mind is. A Westerner 
will invariably point to their head, while an East Asian will point to their heart. I recently learned why 
this should be: linguistically, the root of the words usually translated in China, Korea and Japan as 
‘mind’, is to be found in the Chinese character for ‘heart’.  
 
44 Descartes wrote:  
 
And as I observed that in the words I think, hence I am, there is nothing at all which gives me assurance of their 
truth beyond this, that I see very clearly that in order to think it is necessary to exist, I concluded that I might take, 
as a general rule, the principle, that all the things which we very clearly and distinctly conceive are true, only 
observing, however, that there is some difficulty in rightly determining the objects which we distinctly conceive. 
(2001, Part 4)  
 
45 ‘Literati’ refers to the work of scholars in China, Korea and Japan whose poetry, calligraphy, and 
paintings were intended primarily to reveal their cultivation and to express their personal feelings rather 
than to demonstrate professional skill. The concept of literati painters was first formulated in China in 
the Northern Song dynasty.  
 
46 Zhuangzi (or Zhuang Zhou or Chuang Zu) lived in the third century B.C.  He is associated with Lao 
Tzu as co-founder of Taoist thought. 
 
47 The list would no doubt be different if a British or Chinese person had selected the works. But 
actually, not so very different, I suspect. For the canon concerning artistic excellence for the Old and 
Modern Masters has settled into a familiar pattern, with the same artists acknowledged globally, at least 
within the developed world. The construction of a historical record is thus a prominent instance of 
figure-ground segregation within the cognitive field; what is recorded and considered worthy of 
entering the narrative becomes ‘figure’, while everything else that happened becomes an indifferent 
‘ground’. 
 
48 ‘Korea Land of the Dawn and Other Paintings’, Art Link Gallery, Seoul, 16-30 September 2011. The 
exhibition was based around a collection of books about ‘old Korea’ owned by the then British 
Ambassador, Martin Uden.  
   162 
                                                 
49 For the exhibition ‘Guest from the Future’, a two-person show with Maria Chevska, Galerie8, 
London, 27 October -12 December 2011. The full text reads: “To be governed is to be at every 
operation, at every transaction noted, registered, counted, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, 
assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, prevented, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, 
under pretext of public utility, and in the name of the public interest, to be placed under contribution, 
drilled, fleeced, exploited, monopolized, extorted from, squeezed, hoaxed, robbed; then, at the slightest 
resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, vilified, harassed, hunted down, abused, 
clubbed, disarmed, bound, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, 
betrayed; and to crown all, mocked, ridiculed, derided, outraged, dishonored.” I sampled only the verbs 
in order of appearance.  
 
50 The term ‘liminal’ was introduced into the social sciences by anthropologist Arnold van Gennep, 
(1960), and made known to a wider readership by Victor Turner (1967; 1969). Van Gennep envisaged a 
passage or change going through three phases –separation/transition/incorporation. The liminal phase is 
the one of transition, and is characterised by indeterminacy, ambiguity, confusion, paradox and crisis. In 
Turner’s elaboration, the middle phase became the anti-structural zone between structure and structure 
again. 
 
51 Initially, I hadn’t taken much notice of the reflective qualities of my surfaces of my paintings – 
sometimes they were matte, sometimes ‘satin’, sometimes gloss. But I have been moving towards the 
recognition that either near-matte or very high opalescence best serve to generate the effects that interest 
me. Matte surfaces forestall the tendency of ambient light to interfere with the absorbent and stable 
qualities of colour, and have the effect of dematerialising it.  Opalescent, highly reflective colour, on the 
other hand, lead to the opposite consequence: the surface becomes entirely material, dependent on 
luminosity from the surroundings, and the perception of the work suggests something fugitive and 
metamorphic that changes radically depending on the time of day and the nature of the light.   
Opalescence undermines the spatial optical qualities of colour, enhancing its planar, two-dimensional 
and haptic values.  
 
52 N a g a r j u n a  was  founder  of  the  ‘Middle  Path’  or  ‘Way’  school o f  M a h a y a n a  B u d d h i s m .  H i s  
importance is signaled by the fact that by some he is called ‘the second Buddha’.  
53 In a lecture at the Pratt Institute in 1958 Rothko said: ‘People ask me if I am a Zen Buddhist. I am 
not. I am not interested in any civilization except this one. The whole problem in art is how to establish 
human values in this specific civilization.’ Mark Rothko, 2006, Writings on Art, edited by Miguel 
Lopes-Ramiro (New Haven and New York: Yale University Press), p.126 
 
54 Research in the burgeoning field of neuroaesthetics takes broadly two directions, both of which are 
parallelism (Chatterjee, 2011). The first, characterised by, for example, V. S. Ramachandran and Semir 
Zeki, tends to proceed firmly from within a framework that regards the goal of neuroscience to be the 
production of a more truly ‘scientific’ objective theory of art (Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1999; 
Ramachandran, 2011; Zeki, 1999). A limitation within this aspect of the new field is its unwillingness to 
approach art as anything other than an affair of visual perception and questions of beauty. In contrast, a 
second neuroscientific approach is more interested in wedding brain research to contemporary art and 
theory (Gallagher and Zahavi, 2008). As the artist Warren Neidich (2011) declares, this kind of 
‘neuroasethetics’ “imports, displaces, appropriates, deterritorializes and reterritorializes the ideas of 
neuroscience into artistic practice and thereby commits it to a very different history, context and set of 
genealogic conditions.” Or, as VJ Mark Amerika (2007, p. 5)  puts it in a call for a ‘postcognitivist’ 
concept of the aesthetic: “Think of  [. . .] locating the breakout potential of your neuroaesthetic self.” 
Semir Zeki, who coined the term ‘neuroaesthetics’ to describe the new field within which he has 
become the pioneer, regards artists as unwitting neurologists, because in their different ways both are 
driven to try to understand the visual. In this sense, neuroscience makes explicit what has always been 
implicit within art (Zeki,1999). For a critique of neuroaesthetics see: John Hyman (2010).  A useful 
overview is provided by Donald Hoffmann in Visual Intelligence: How we Create What We See (New 
York: Norton, 2000).  In relation to the metahistory of the new field of ‘neuroarthistory’ see John 
Onians (2007).   
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55 Semir Zeki proposes that ambiguity is a distinguishing trait of all great artworks, and in relation to 
the several interpretations of Vermeer’s Man and Woman at the Virginal, writes that neurology  - or 
neuroaesthetics- can provide a different and more fruitful definition than that standard within 
conventional aesthetics, one which helps to keep open the richness of the experience of art: “not the 
vagueness or uncertainty found in the dictionaries, but on the contrary, certainty – the certainty of many 
different, and essential, conditions, each of which is equal to the others, all expressed in a single 
profound painting” (1998, p.10). 
 
56 More technically, the squiggle signals grammatically Kelso and Engstrom’s theory of ‘metastablity’ 
or coordination dynamics, which provides a useful discursive framework for understanding what is at 
stake in the perceptual and cognitive ‘twilight zone’ I have been exploring. ‘Metastability’, they write, 
describes “the simultaneous realization of two competing tendencies: the tendency of the components to 
couple together and the tendency for the components to express their intrinsic independent behavior” 
(2008, p.4) “Metastability, by reducing the strong hierarchical coupling between the parts of a complex 
system while allowing them to retain their individuality, leads to a looser, more secure, more flexible 
form of functioning that promotes the creation of information. Too much autonomy of the component 
parts means no chance of their coordinating and communicating together. On the other hand, too much 
interdependence and the system gets stuck; global flexibility is lost. “ (2008, p.9) Metastability thus 
“endows the synergy with robustness and flexibility, enabling the same parts to participate in multiple 
functions. If the synergy is a unit of life, then it is metastability that brings it alive.” (2008, p.6) This 
correlates well with the difference between foveal and peripheral vision, or with the right brain 
hemisphere’s ‘take’ on reality 
 
57 Neumann also refers to Taoism as communicating an especially clear evocation of such an 
undifferentiated foundation (1954, p.8-9).  He quotes from Arthur Waley’s translation of the Tao Te 
Ching Chapter XXV:  
The container of opposites is the Chinese t’ai chi, a round containing black and white, day and night, heaven and 
earth, male and female. Lao-Tzu says of it: 
‘There was something formless yet complete 
That existed before heaven and earth; 
Without sound, without substance, 
Depending on nothing, unchanging, 
All pervading, unfailing. 
One may think of it as the mother of all things under heaven. 
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